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FROM 


NOVEMBER-DECEMBER  1991 
PB  70-91-6 

Assistant  Secretary 
of  the  Army 

(Research,  Development 
and  Acquisition) 

STEPHEN  K.  CONVER 

Commanding  General 
U.S.  Army  Materiel  Command 

GEN  WILLIAM  G.  T.  TUTTLE,  JR. 

EDITORIAL  ADVISORY 
BOARD  MEMBERS 

STEPHEN  K.  CONVER 

Chairman,  Editorial  Advisory  Board 

LTG  AUGUST  M.  CIANCIOLO 

Director  of 

Acquisition  Career  Management 

LTG  BILLY  M.  THOMAS 

Deputy  Commanding  General  for  RD&A 
U.S.  Army  Materiel  Command 

MG  LARRY  D.  BUDGE 

Assistant  DCSPER 

MG  RICHARD  T.  TRAVIS 

Commanding  General 
U.S.  Army  Medical  R&D  Command 

GEORGE  T.  SINGLEY,  III 

Deputy  Assistant  Secretary 
for  Research  & Technology 
Office  of  the  ASA  (RDA) 

DR.  ROBERT  B.  OSWALD 

Director  of  R&D 
U.S.  Army  Corps  of  Engineers 

HARVEY  L.  BLEICHER 

Managing  Editor 
Executive  Secretary 
Editorial  Advisory  Board 


EDITORIAL  STAFF 

HARVEY  L.  BLEICHER 

Managing  Editor 

MELODY  B.  RATKUS 

Associate  Editor 

DEBRA  L.  FISCHER 

Assistant  Editor 

Army  RD&A  Bulletin  (ISSN  0892-8657)  is  published  bimonthly  by 
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designed  to  keep  individuals  within  the  Army  knowledgeable  of  cur- 
rent and  emerging  developments  within  their  areas  of  expertise  for 
the  purpose  of  enhancing  their  professional  development. 


By  Order  of  the  Secrelary  of  the  Army: 


GORDON  R SULLIVAN 
General,  United  States  Army 

Official:  Chief  of  Staff 

MILTON  H HAMILTON 
Administrative  Assistant  to  the 
Secretary  of  the  Army 


ARMY 

Research 
Development 
Acquisition 

BULLETIN 

Professional  Bulletin  of  the  RD&A  Community 


FEATURES 


Military  Lessons  Learned  from  the  Gulf  War 

CDT  Jason  T.  Hoffman 1 

Physical  Security  Equipment  Management 

Emanuel  J.  Nidhiry  and  ETC  Larry  J.  Petcu 4 

Technology  Transfer— It’s  the  Law 

James  A.  Ball 8 

ETDL  Inventor  Receives  $10,000  from  Patent  Fees 

Carol  A Widmaier 1 1 

Environmental  Clean-up  of  Explosives  Contaminated  Soils 

LTC  Larry  A.  Sparks  and  MAJ  Craig  A.  Myler 13 

The  Army  Center  of  Excellence  for  Advanced  Propulsion 
Systems  Research 

Gary  Borman,  Phil  Myers  and  David  Mann 16 

Implementing  the  In-Plant  Quality  Evaluation  Process 

CPI  William  J.  Belknap 19 

Chemical  Weapons  Treaty  Verification 

Richard  1 N.  Hutchinson,  Robert  E.  Lentz  and  Stephen  L.  English 22 

U.S.  Army  Tank-Automotive  Command  and  Tank-Automotive 
Research,  Development  and  Engineering  Center  26 

The  Army  Industrial  Modernization  Incentives  Program 

Eddie  Japzon 30 

Innovative  Operational  Testing 

MAJ  Laurence  A.  Womack  33 

Therapy  in  HIV  Patients  Using  Recombinant  GP160  Vaccine 

LTC  Robert  R.  Redfield,  MC 36 

Application  of  Level  of  Repair  Analysis 

Nicholas  R Giordiano 38 

TACOM  Develops  Ml  Mine  Clearing  Robot 

John  J.  Schmitz  and  George  Taylor 42 


DEPARTMENTS 


RD&A  News  Briefs  43 

Letters  46 

Speaking  Out  47 

Career  Development  Update  48 

Book  Reviews  50 

From  the  Army  Acquisition  Executive  53 


COVER 


The  collective  expertise  of  a 55-member  team  from  the  Center  for  Strategic 
and  International  Studies  has  provided  an  in-depth  analysis  of  the  military 
lessons  learned  from  the  Gulf  War.  Cover  designed  by  Joe  Day,  DOIM 
Graphics  Section  at  HQ  AMC. 


Dioi.sz/a  \/Q> 

By  CDT  Jason  T.  Hoffman 


Since  the  end  of  the  Gulf  War  in 
March,  the  U.S.  Military  has  tasked  itself 
with  assessing  its  performance  in  the 
war.  After  action  reports  such  as  these 
are  standard  procedure  for  the  modern 
military.  While  those  on  Uncle  Sam’s 
payroll  busied  themselves  with  study- 
ing the  war,  the  Center  for  Strategic  and 
International  Studies  (CSIS),  a 
Washington  based  think  tank,  also 
began  looking  for  lessons  to  be  learn- 
ed from  the  conflict  in  the  Persian  Gulf. 
CSIS  published  what  is  perhaps  the  first 
in-depth  analysis  of  the  war  conducted 
by  a non-governmental  organization. 

The  report,  entitled  The  Gulf  War: 
Military  Lessons  Learned , is  the  in- 
terim result  of  a six  month  long  study 
that  drew  upon  the  collective  expertise 
of  a 55  member  team,  and  will  even- 
tually be  published  as  a book.  The 
study  group,  headed  byjim  Blackwell, 
Mike  Mazarr  and  Don  Snider,  was  com- 
posed of  CSIS  analysts  and  subject  area 
experts  from  industry,  government  and 
the  military.  The  report  outlines  seven 
major  lessons  that  will  impact  future 
decisions  regarding  force  structure  and 
defense  procurement. 

Lesson  one  sets  the  tone  for  the  rest 
of  the  report.  In  summary,  it  states  that 
there  are  severe  limitations  on  our  abili- 
ty to  draw  conclusions  based  on  the 
Gulf  War,  because  it  was  in  fact  a uni- 
que war: 

All  wars  are  unique,  but 
this  war — its  enemy,  its  ter- 
rain, and  a host  of  other 
features  was  even  more  dis- 
tinctive than  most.  Whether 
any  major,  long-term  les- 
sons can  be  drawn  at  all 
from  the  Gulf  War  is  in  fact 
questionable. 

This  note  of  caution  is  not  meant  to 
diminish  the  value  of  information  that 
has  been  and  will  continue  to  be  col- 
lected with  respect  to  the  performance 
of  allied  troops  and  equipment  in  bat- 
tle. It  simply  means  that  the  distinctive 
nature  of  the  Gulf  War  places  con- 
straints on  our  ability  to  draw  lessons. 

The  idea  of  the  U.S.  being  dependent 
on  it  allies  for  military  security  is  distur- 
bing to  many.  However,  because  there 
is  great  instability  in  the  international 
security  system  as  it  moves  away  from 
a condition  of  bipolarity,  the  project 


MILITARY 

LESSONS 

LEARNED 

FROM 

THE 

GULF  WAR 

An  Analysis 
from  the  Center 
for  Strategic  and 
International 
Studies 


November-December  1991 


Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin  1 


Despite 
some 
changes 
for  the 
better, 
the 
brunt 
of  U.S. 
Defense 
Strategy 
is 
still 

inappropriately 

focused 

on 

countering 

the 

Soviet 

threat. 


found  that  the  war  demonstrates,  “The 
U.S.  is  both  politically  and  logistically 
dependent  upon  its  friends  and  allies.’  ’ 
This  dependency  is  the  substance  of  the 
second  major  lesson  discovered  by  the 
study  group.  This  dependence  means 
that,  “The  option  of  going  it  alone’ 
simply  does  not  exist,  and  all  foreign 
and  defense  policy  decisions  must  be 
made  with  this  realization.’’ 

The  study  group  found  that  the  use 
of  high  tech  weapons  in  war  was  the 
result  of  a “revolution  in  warfare.' ' This 
revolution,  it  is  argued,  brought  about 
a corresponding  change  in  tactics  and 
strategy.  The  stud}'  group  had  this  to  say 
in  the  report: 

New  tactics  might  resem- 
ble guerilla  warfare  writ 
large:  smaller,  agile,  steal- 
thy units  stage  hit-ancl-run 
raids  with  tanks,  armored 
cars,  artillery,  and  helicop- 
ters integrated  with  tactical 
air  support. 

The  fourth  lesson  of  the  report  is  one 
that  is  often  obscured  by  the  debate 
over  weapons  systems  and  defense  ac- 
quisition. It  is,  quite  simply,  that  the 
quality  of  military  personnel  is  what 
matters  most  in  any  military  force.  The 
wonders  of  technology  were  celebrated 
on  television  nightly  during  Desert 
Storm,  but  the  fact  remains  that  these 
weapons  are  useless  unless  deployed  in 
the  hands  of  capable  and  well-trained 
people.  The  overall  pre-combat  profi- 
ciency of  American  military  personnel 
in  Desert  Storm  was  higher  than  that 
of  any  previous  war.  The  trouble  is  that 
such  training  is  costly.  Realistic  train- 
ing requires  continuing  allocations  of 
resources  such  as  time,  money,  and 
equipment. 

For  the  four  Cold  War  decades,  the 
U.S.  shaped  its  armed  forces  and 
designed  its  weapons  systems  with  an 
eye  towards  the  Soviet  Union.  Since 
1989,  the  relationship  between  the 
superpowers  has  warmed  significantly. 
The  fifth  lesson  is  that,  despite  some 
changes  for  the  better,  the  brunt  of  U.S. 
defense  strategy  is  still  inappropriate- 
ly focused  on  countering  the  Soviet 
threat.  Other  threats,  such  as  Iraq,  will 
present  a different  kind  of  challenge  for 
the  future. 

The  sixth  lesson  has  to  do  with  the 
theory  of  deterrence.  The  Persian  Gulf 
crisis  provided  a model  for  studying 
perceptions  in  communications  be- 
tween belligerent  nations.  A message 


intended  to  convey  deterrence  may  not 
always  be  perceived  as  intended  if  even 
received  at  all.  Subtleties  in  language, 
culture  and  regional  politics  prevent 
signals  from  not  always  being  received 
as  intended  from  across  national 
boundaries. 

The  seventh  and  final  lesson  enu- 
merated in  the  report  has  clear  implica- 
tions for  the  future  of  defense  related 
planning.  As  established  in  the  first 
point  of  the  report,  the  war  in  the  Per- 
sian Gulf  was,  in  many  ways,  very 
unique.  It  was  an  unforeseen  conflict 
on  a rather  large  scale.  Other  recent 
military  operations,  such  as  Urgent 
Fury  in  Grenada  and  Just  Cause  in 
Panama,  were  of  short  duration  and  re- 
quired the  deployment  of  distinctly  dif- 
ferent forces  than  Desert  Storm 
required.  Understanding  the  variety  of 
missions  and  potential  contingencies 
that  might  arise,  a “balanced  defense 
investment  strategy”  becomes  im- 
perative in  defense  decision  making. 

The  combined  weight  of  the  lessons 
enumerated  in  the  CSIS  report  calls  for 
an  immediate  plan  for  adapting  our  na- 
tion’s defense.  In  the  coming  months, 
decision  makers  in  Washington  will 
make  a multitude  of  decisions  which 
will  lay  the  foundation  for  the  U.S. 
military  capabilities  well  into  the 
twenty-first  century.  Recognizing  this 
situation,  the  study  group  has  syn- 
thesized a list  of  10  principles  to  guide 
defense  investments  in  the  near  future: 

• Place  greatest  emphasis  on  the 
quality  of  military  personnel. 
Although  modernization  in  weapons 
technologies  has  always  and  will  con- 
tinue to  change  the  nature  of  warfare 
and  strategy,  it  is  competent,  well- 
trained  servicemen  and  leaders  that 
ultimately  win  the  wars.  Defense  in- 
vestment strategies  should  be  shaped 
around  this  principle. 

• Logistics  wins  wars.  This  is  a 
lesson  that  has  been  repeatedly  forgot- 
ten and  relearned  by  countless  armies 
throughout  history.  Rommel  had  in- 
credible strike  capabilities  with  his 
blitzkrieg  tactics  in  the  desert,  but  his 
army  outran  its  supply  trains.  Without 
beans  and  bullets,  they  became  vulner- 
able to  allied  forces.  In  Operation 
Desert  Storm,  the  U.S.  staged  the  largest 
airlift  of  troops  and  equipment  in  his- 
tory. But  it  still  was  too  little  too  slow. 
If  the  situation  had  been  slightly  dif- 
ferent and  Iraq  had  attacked  the  82nd 
Airborne  soon  after  deployment,  the 


Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin 


November-December  1991 


light  rapid  deployment  forces  would 
have  served  as  little  more  than  a speed 
bump  for  the  then-massed  Iraqi  army. 

• Given  U.S.  political,  logistical, 
industrial,  and  economic  depend- 
encies, forming  international 
coalitions  will  be  necessary  for  vic- 
tory in  any  major  contingency 
operation.  This  discovery  may  disap- 
point those  who  had  neo-isolationist 
hopes  for  U.S.  foreign  policy  in  the  post 
Cold  War  era.  This  century  has  seen  in- 
creasing connectivity  among  states 
politically,  culturally  and  economical- 
ly. Multitudes  of  cross-state  ties  have 
developed  through  innovations  in 
communications  and  transportation.  In 
Desert  Storm,  we  relied  on  the  help  of 
our  allies  for  political  support  through 
the  United  Nations.  We  were  logistical- 
ly  dependent  on  them  for  food,  sup- 
plies and  fuel  to  keep  our  troops  and 
equipment  running. 

• Tactical  ballistic  missiles  will 
continue  to  pose  a significant 
political  and  military  threat  to  U.S. 
interests  and  military  forces.  Iraq’s 
use  of  the  primitive  SCUD  missile 
system  to  terrorize  the  Israeli  and  Saudi 
populations  demonstrated  the  political 
impact  that  even  a rudimentary  missile 
system,  employed  in  relatively  few 
numbers,  can  have.  The  proliferation  of 
nuclear  weapons  and  ballistic  missiles 
will  pose  a growing  threat  to  U.S.  in- 
terests. 

• Emphasize  improvements  in 
carrier-based  aircraft.  Although  car- 
rier aircraft  were  used  successfully  in 
the  Gulf  War,  they  lacked  the  precision 
“smart”  weapons  that  many  Air  Force 
aircraft  were  equipped  with. 

• Emphasize  improvements  in 
mine  countermeasures.  Ground 
forces  were  able  to  employ  some 
quickly-fielded  anti-mine  equipment 
with  an  amazing  degree  of  success.  The 
Air  Force  used  “Daisy  Cutter”  bombs 
to  help  to  clear  the  way  for  ground 
forces.  These  efforts  should  continue 
to  be  developed  so  that  they  can  be 
employed  when  needed  in  the  event  of 
another  conflict.  At  sea,  it  was 
discovered  that  mines,  even  of  the 
World  War  II  vintage,  were  tying  up 
terrible  amounts  of  naval  resources  that 
could  have  been  otherwise  more 
strategically  occupied.  The  U.S.  Navy 
must  develop  more  modern  and  effi- 
cient systems  to  detect  and  dispose  of 
sea  emplaced  mines. 

• Maintain  amphibious  assault 


Tactical  ballistic 
missiles  will  continue 
to  pose  a significant 
political  and  military 
threat  to  U.S.  interests 
and  military  forces. 


capabilities  and  sufficient  expedi- 
tionary forces.  The  Marines  have  long 
been  and  will  continue  to  be  essential 
to  defense  planning  as  an  expedition- 
ary force.  The  mere  threat  of  a sea  land- 
ing was  enough  to  tie  up  more  than  10 
Iraqi  divisions  during  Desert  Storm. 

• Exploit  the  revolution  in  infor- 
mation technology  with  command, 
control,  and  communications  sys- 
tems, integrated  into  a battle 
management  architecture,  in- 
teroperable throughout  the 
theater,  as  one  of  the  key  military 
systems  of  the  future.  The  fledgling 
JSTARS  and  the  time  tested  AWACS 
proved  to  be  invaluable  in  the  Gulf  War. 
Used  in  conjunction,  the  systems  great- 
ly aided  in  providing  real  time  data  to 
those  who  needed  it  on  the  battlefield. 

• The  participation  of  U.S.  Army 
national  guard  and  reserve  combat 
units  in  contingency  operations 
must  be  re-examined.  The  combat 
support  and  combat  service  support 
units  were  deployed  with  little  difficul- 
ty in  enough  time  to  allow  them  to  pro- 
vide the  much  needed  logistical 
support  to  operations  Desert  Shield 
and  Desert  Storm.  The  plan  to  use 
“round-out”  units  to  complement  ac- 
tive duty  combat  units  proved  difficult 
to  implement  in  the  Gulf  War.  Units 
which  were  intended  to  be  fleshed-out 
with  reserve  or  national  guard  com- 
ponents were  not  called  up  in  time  to 
deploy  with  their  active  divisions. 
Those  divisions  instead  had  to  be  rein- 
forced with  other  active  duty  soldiers 
while  the  “round-out”  units,  when 
finally  activated,  were  sent  off  to  train- 
ing centers  to  be  trained  to  combat  stan- 
dards. Desert  Storm  demonstrated  the 
infeasibility  of  some  aspects  of  the  pre- 
sent reserve/national  guard  mobiliza- 
tion plan  for  responding  to  immediate, 
large-scale  conflicts. 

• The  ability  to  employ  military 


space  capabilities  in  support  of 
theater  and  tactical  operations 
proved  vital  in  the  Gulf  War. 

Satellites  proved  indispensable  from 
the  strategic  level  down  to  the  lowest 
tactical  level.  Small  unit  leaders  on  the 
ground  depended  on  the  Global  Posi- 
tioning System  for  accurate  positioning 
data.  Intelligence  generated  from 
reconnaissance  satellites  gave  com- 
manders at  the  brigade  level  and  higher 
a “God's-eye  view”  of  the  battlefield. 

There  are  three  major  forces  which, 
when  combined  together,  will 
drastically  change  our  ability  to  re- 
spond effectively  to  a potential  threat 
to  our  national  security  or  to  interna- 
tional stability.  As  mentioned  earlier, 
due  to  the  advent  of  new  weapons  and 
command  and  control  technologies, 
the  nature  of  warfare  has  changed 
dramatically.  Also,  because  of  the 
warming  between  the  United  States  and 
the  Soviet  Union,  and  the  simultaneous 
rise  of  regional  powers,  the  nature  of 
the  potential  threat  to  our  national 
security  has  changed  as  well. 

Finally,  because  of  political  and 
economic  considerations,  both  interna- 
tionally and  within  our  own  country, 
our  ability  and  willingness,  as  a nation, 
to  field  and  finance  a military  force,  of 
the  scale  that  has  been  maintained  for 
the  duration  of  the  Cold  War,  is  no 
longer  up  to  Cold  War  levels.  These 
forces  will  indeed  change  our  ability  to 
ensure  security,  for  our  own  nation  and 
the  international  community. 


JASON  T.  HOFFMAN  is  a first  class 
cadet  (senior)  at  the  U.S.  Military 
Academy  at  West  Point.  Cadet  Hoff- 
man spent  several  weeks  this  sum- 
mer as  a research  analyst  at  the 
Center  for  Strategic  and  Interna- 
tional Studies  (CSIS),  a Washington 
based  think  tank.  He  intends  to  be 
stationed  overseas  as  a combat 
arms  officer 


November-December  1991 


Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin  3 


PHYSICAL 

SECURITY 

EQUIPMENT 

MANAGEMENT 

A New  Challenge  for  AMC 


On  Oct.  13,  1989,  the  assistant  secretary  of  the  Army  for  research,  development 
and  acquisition  appointed  MG  Joe  W.  Rigby,  deputy  chief  of  staff  for  development, 
engineering,  and  acquisition,  Army  Materiel  Command  (AMC),  as  the  Army  executive 
agent  for  physical  security  equipment  (PSE).  This  appointment  brought  with  it  a new 
challenge  for  AMC  to  establish  a central  management  structure  for  Army  PSE. 


Background 

During  recent  years,  Congress 
developed  a perception  that  the 
military  services  were  duplicating  PSE 
programs,  resulting  in  unnecessary  ex- 
penditures. As  a result,  the  Department 
of  Defense  issued  Directive  3224.3 
which  assigned  specific  responsibilities 
for  PSE  research,  development  and  ac- 
quisition (RDA)  to  the  services  and  the 
Defense  Nuclear  Agency  (DNA).  The 
Army  was  assigned  responsibility  for 
interior  PSE,  barriers,  security  lighting 
and  command  and  control  systems. 
The  Navy  was  tasked  with  overseeing 
shipboard  and  waterside  physical 
security  systems,  explosive  detection 
systems  and  anti-compromise  emer- 
gency destruct  systems.  Exterior  PSE, 


By  Emmanuel  J.  Nidhiry 
and  LTC  Larry  J.  Petcu 


aerial  intrusion  detection  systems  and 
entry  control  systems  responsibilities 
were  assigned  to  the  Air  Force.  The 
Defense  Nuclear  Agency  (DNA)  was 
given  responsibility  for  all  PSE-related 
technology  base  exploratory  develop- 
ment (6.2)  work. 

Beginning  in  1989,  Congress  con- 
solidated all  PSE  Research,  Develop- 
ment, Test  and  Evaluation  (RDT&E) 
funding  at  the  DOD  level.  According- 
ly, PSE  RDT&E  programs  were  remov- 
ed from  the  normal  review  and 
prioritization  process  of  the  military 
departments  and  put  under  the  direct 
control  of  the  Office  of  the  Secretary 
of  Defense  (OSD).  A DOD  PSE  Action 
Group  (PSEAG),  chaired  by  an  OSD  staff 
assistant  along  with  a number  of 


subgroups,  was  formed  from  elements 
of  OSD,  the  services  and  the  DNA  to 
coordinate  DOD  PSE  RDA  efforts  and 
to  disburse  PSE  RDT&E  funds. 

On  Feb.  17,  1989,  OSD  reissued 
DoDD  3224.3,  substantially  broaden- 
ing the  scope  of  this  directive.  Among 
other  things,  it  established  a DOD  PSE 
Steering  Group  (PSESG)  consisting  of 
general/flag  officer-level  represent- 
atives from  various  DOD  components 
to  provide  oversight  for  DOD  PSEAG 
actions.  Also,  DoDD  3224.3  required 
the  military  services  to  identify  a single 
point  of  contact  for  PSE  who  would  ad- 
dress and  manage  PSE  programs  and 
represent  the  services  at  the  DOD 
PSESG.  The  Army  responded  to  this 
direction  by  appointing  MG  Rigby  as 
the  executive  agent. 

Army  PSE  Action  Group 
(APSEAG) 

The  APSEAG  was  established  by  MG 
Rigby  in  October  1989  to  advise  and 
support  him  in  centrally  coordinating 
and  managing  the  Army  PSE  program. 
Mirrored  after  the  DOD  PSEAG  and 
chaired  by  MG  Rigby’s  staff,  the 
APSEAG  includes  all  key  operational,  as 
well  as  RDA,  PSE  activities  of  the  Ar- 
my. Primary  members  of  the  APSEAG 
are: 

• The  Security  Force  Protection  and 
Law  Enforcement  and  Nuclear  Surety 
and  Management  Divisions  of  the  Of- 
fice of  Deputy  Chief  of  Staff  for  Opera- 
tions and  Plans,  Headquarters, 
Department  of  the  Army  (HQDA); 

• Office  of  Deputy  Chief  of  Staff  for 
Logistics,  (HQDA); 

• U.S.  Army  Training  and  Doctrine 
Command; 

• U.S.  Army  Corps  of  Engineers; 

• U.S.  Army  Military  Police  Opera- 
tions Agency; 

• Project  Manager,  Nuclear  Muni- 
tions; and 

• Project  Manager,  PSE. 

Army  PSE  Program  Thrusts 

In  a 1990  address  at  the  American 
Defense  Preparedness  Association’s 
Sixth  Annual  Joint  Government- 
Industry  Symposium  on  Security 
Technology,  MG  Rigby  outlined  four 
primary  evolving  thrusts  for  the  Army 
PSE  Program.  These  thrusts  are: 

• Infuse  emerging  technologies 
such  as  artificial  intelligence  and 
robotics.  This  is  the  key  for  solving 


4 Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin 


November-December  1991 


'®5'r  *-  ^ _ 

■ ■ ~ : 

* % ,t 


Figure  1. 

Integrated  Commercial  Intrusion  Detection  System  (ICIDS)  Deployment  in  a typical 
Army  installation. 


our  current  expensive  dependency  on 
manpower  to  accomplish  our  security 
tasks; 

• Buy  commercially-developed 
products.  This  is  a good  common 
sense  approach  as  our  RDT&E  budget 
shrinks. 

• Centralize  acquisitions.  Again, 
this  is  a common  sense  strategy  to 
realize  savings  and  economies  of  scale 
associated  with  large  procurements. 
Centralized  acquisitions  by  our  com- 
modity commands  and  sister  services 
should  be  the  rule  of  the  future. 

• Build  moveable,  transportable 
PSE  systems.  This  is  a lesson  learned 
from  recent  developments  in  Europe. 
We  have  made  substantial  investment 
there  in  fixed  site  physical  security 
facilities.  Because  these  facilities  were 
not  designed  to  be  removed  and  trans- 
ported, we  will  be  forced  to  abandon 
many  of  them  as  we  execute  our  force 
withdrawal  plans. 

The  APSEAG  has  progressed  on  a 
number  of  actions  to  translate  these 
evolving  thrusts  into  viable  Army  PSE 
RDA  efforts. 

Integrated  Commercial 
Intrusion  Detection  System 
(ICIDS) 

The  ICIDS  is  a non-developmental 
item  acquisition  intended  to  meet  the 
joint  service  requirements  for  all  securi- 
ty applications.  The  program  is  design- 
ed to  take  advantage  of  rapid  advances 
in  the  commercial  state-of-the-art 
technology  in  intrusion  systems.  It  will 
provide  DOD  installation  commanders 
with  a standardized,  fully  evaluated, 
centrally  procured  turnkey  intrusion 
detection  system.  This  system  will  con- 
sist of  commercially  available  sensors, 
control  units,  assessment  and  entry 
control  devices,  command  and  control 
consoles  and  additional  equipment. 
Components  will  be  employed  in  vary- 
ing quantities  and  configurations 
depending  on  the  unique  physical 
security  requirements  and  operational 
and  environmental  characteristics  of  in- 
dividual sites.  Figure  1 is  a representa- 
tion of  the  ICIDS  deployment  in  a 
typical  Army  installation. 

The  ICIDS  contracting  strategy  is  for 
a firm  fixed  price,  indefinite  delivery/ 
indefinite  quantity,  competitive  pro- 
curement including  associated  site 
survey  validation,  site  specific  design, 
installation,  contractor  logistic  sup- 


port, and  training  efforts.  A contract 
award  and  the  first  unit  equipped  are 
scheduled  for  completion  by  mid-1992 . 
The  first  unit  equipped  will  be  sub- 
jected to  all  the  required  technical  and 
user  testing  and  the  remaining  systems 
will  be  ordered  only  if  the  outcome  of 
these  tests  are  satisfactory.  Substantial 
procurement  commitment  for  the 
ICIDS  has  already  been  received  from 
the  Air  Force.  Also,  potential  ICIDS 
system  applications  have  been  iden- 
tified by  the  Navy. 

Mobile  Detection  Assessment 
Response  System  (MDARS) 

MDARS  will  apply  robotic  and  ar- 
tificial intelligence  technology  to  intru- 
sion detection  systems  to  enhance 
physical  security.  It  will  consist  of  fixed 
and  mobile  robotic  sensor  platforms  in- 
terfaced with  an  intrusion  detection 
console  and  will  conduct  the  tasks  of 
detection,  assessment,  intrusion  delay, 
response  and  communications  in  in- 
terior and  exterior  environments.  This 
will  be  achieved  through  the  applica- 
tion of  interoperable  mobility,  artificial 
intelligence,  sensor,  communications, 
weapon,  mechanical  and  electronic 
technologies.  Figure  2 is  an  artist’s  con- 
cept of  MDARS  deployment  in  a weapon 
storage  site. 


MDARS  will  be  developed  in  three 
phases.  Phase  I will  begin  with  an 
alarm/barrier/product  assessment 
capability  of  a unit  that  follows  a pre- 
programmed or  tele-operated  patrol 
path.  Its  primary  function  will  be 
assessment.  Phase  II  will  expand  these 
capabilities  to  include  local  human 
intruder  detection,  autonomous 
movement  to  areas  in  alarm,  operator- 
controlled  non-lethal  response,  and  en- 
try/inventory control.  Phase  III  com- 
pletes the  expansion  with  capabilities 
to  recognize  evidence  of  intrusion, 
navigate  via  natural  landmarks,  delay 
intruders  and  respond  under  operator- 
control  with  lethal  force  as  rules 
permit. 

The  fabrication  and  evaluation  of 
prototype  Phase  I MDARS  are  current- 
ly underway.  During  1993-95,  13  to  15 
systems  are  planned  for  production  and 
deployment. 

Barrier  Applications  Systems 
(BAS)  Programs 

The  BAS  programs  are  envisioned  to 
enhance  the  Army’s  nuclear  weapons 
security  and  reduce  manpower  re- 
quirements through  the  use  of  state-of- 
the-art  delay  techniques  for  various 
conventional  and  non-conventional 
weapon  storage  configurations.  One  of 


November-December  1991 


Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin  5 


During  a 1990  Security  Concepts 
R&D  Conference  at  Fort  Belvoir, 
VA,  the  Army  presented  a 
prioritized  list  of  16  proposals 
to  DNA  for  inclusion  in  its 
1992-97  PSE  6.2  program. 


the  projects  being  pursued  under  the 
BAS  programs  is  the  Sticky  Foam  Dis- 
pensing System  (SFDS).  The  SFDS  will 
supplement  the  Weapons  Access  Delay 
System  which  has  been  the  Army’s 
primary  nuclear  weapons  delay  system 
since  1983-  Shown  in  Figure  3,  the  basic 
component  of  this  system  is  a commer- 
cially available  product  commonly 
called  “sticky  foam”  which  is  kept  in  a 
pressurized  vessel  and  when  perforated 
or  ruptured,  either  on  command  or  by 
forced  penetration,  expands  the  pro- 
duct into  a sticky  foam  mass  34  times 
the  volume  it  occupied  under  pressure. 
Developmental  efforts  concentrate  on 
new  applications  of  this  foam. 

SFDS  is  a continuation  of  the  DNA  6.2 
effort.  It  was  transitioned  to  the  Army 


for  advanced  development  in  mid-1990; 
a developmental  prove-out  model  test 
is  scheduled  in  early  1992  and  the  even- 
tual production  of  about  30  systems 
during  1993-94. 

Tactical  Force  Protection 

The  Army’s  Tactical  Force  Protection 
Technology  (TFPT)  program  seeks  to 
enhance  the  protection  of  U.S.  forces 
deployed  worldwide,  particularly  in  a 
low-intensity  conflict  or  in  rear  area  en- 
vironments through  the  development 
and  production  of  rapidly  deployable 
and  disbandable  security  equipment 
packages,  The  thrust  of  the  TFPT  pro- 
gram is  to  provide  the  user  with  a selec- 
tion of  ever-evolving  technology  in  the 
tactical  protection  environment,  par- 


ticularly against  a terrorist  threat. 

Security  and  Force  Protection 

The  Security  and  Force  Protection 
Enhancement  Resources  (SAFER) 
package  is  a Limited  Procurement 
(Urgent)  production  program  that  evolv- 
ed from  the  Army  TFPT  effort.  It  is  an 
integrated  system  of  commercial  and 
military  equipment  using  manpower, 
equipment  and  procedures  to  detect, 
assess,  delay  and  respond  to  personnel 
attempting  to  gain  unauthorized  access 
to  U.S.  sites. 

A typical  company-size  SAFER 
package,  which  takes  no  more  than  four 
hours  to  set  up  or  tear  down,  includes: 
passive  and  active  infrared  sensors, 
seismic  and  microwave  sensors,  razor 
tape  concertina  sensor  and  barrier,  light 
intensifying  closed  circuit  television 
cameras  for  remote  assessment,  night  vi- 
sion devices  for  enhanced  manual 
assessment,  hand-held  radios  for  secure 
communications,  electronic  call-to- 
arms  alarm,  and  portable  display  con- 
soles for  rapid  response  decision 
making. 

Initial  production  of  the  SAFER 
package  started  in  August  1989.  Since 
then,  11  company-size  packages  were 
produced  and  deployed  worldwide,  in- 
cluding a few  in  support  of  Operations 
Desert  Shield  and  Storm.  Lessons 
learned  from  these  deployments  are  us- 
ed to  enhance  the  system  as  part  of  the 
SAFER  pre-planned  product  improve- 
ment plan.  The  Miniature  Intrusion 
Detection  System,  a component  of 
SAFER,  is  a potential  candidate  to 
replace  the  Army  standard  Platoon  Ear- 
ly Warning  System  that  is  in  extensive 
use  for  platoon  level  tactical  perimeter 
and  rear  area  protection. 

PSE  Exploratory 
Development 

During  a 1990  Security  Concepts 
R&D  Conference  at  Fort  Belvoir,  VA,  the 
Army  presented  a prioritized  list  of  16 
proposals  to  DNA  for  inclusion  in  its 
1992-97  PSE  6.2  program.  Some  of  the 
technologies  that  will  be  investigated 
under  these  proposals  are: 

• the  non-lethal  uses  of  low  frequen- 
cy sound  and/or  pulsed  laser  systems  as 
delay  devices; 

• inventory  macro-anomaly  recog- 
nition; 

• application  of  presence  and/or 
point  sensing  and  advanced  object 


Figure  2. 

An  artist’s  concept  of  the  Mobile  Detection  Assessment  Response  System  (MDARS) 
deployment  in  a weapon  storage  site. 


6 Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin 


November-December  1991 


BARRIER  APPLICATION  SYSTEM-1 

(STICKY  FOAM  DISPENSING  SYSTEM) 


Figure  3. 

The  basic  component  of  the  Barrier  Application  System-1,  “sticky  foam”  is  a commer- 
cially available  product  which  is  kept  in  a pressurized  vessel  and  can  be  expanded 
into  a mass  34  times  its  pressurized  volume. 


recognition  technology  to  identify 
human  intruders; 

• advanced  tagged  material  detec- 
tion/position locator; 

• platter  charge  and  air-intrusion 
countermeasure  systems;  and 

• applications  of  digital  signal  pro- 
cessing, ultrasonic  pulses,  artificial 
neural  network  technology  and  cover, 
concealment  and  deception  to  enhance 
physical  security,  etc. 

It  is  anticipated  that  these  tech- 
nologies, when  they  mature  during 
the  late  1990s  or  early  2000s,  will 
remedy  the  present  vulnerabilities  of 
our  physical  security  systems  against 
ever-increasing  threats. 

DOD  Security  Operational 
Test  Site  (SOTS) 

This  unique  facility  is  totally 
dedicated  to  the  test  and  evaluation  of 
security  systems,  concepts  and  doctrine 
in  a realistic  environment.  Located  in  a 
remote  130-acre  maneuver  area  12  miles 
away  from  the  Fort  McClellan  canton- 
ment, the  DOD  SOTS  is  the  only  facili- 
ty available  for  the  military  services  to 
determine  how  well  PSE  can  stop  or 
delay  a ground  or  airborne  attack  using 
real  weapons  and  explosives  against  our 
most  sensitive  facilities.  Initially  built  by 
DNA  in  1983  to  support  all  services,  the 
DOD  SOTS  consists  of: 


• a complete  special  weapons  storage 
facility  which  includes  NATO  standard 
fencing/lighting,  a site  security  control 
center,  a maintenance  and  assembly 
building,  two  earth-covered  storage 
bunkers,  a free-standing  headwall  for 
blast  test,  and  two  towers; 

• an  operations  building  for  on-site 
administrative  support  personnel  and 
staff;  and 

• an  extensive  network  of  under- 
ground conduit  and  fiber  optic  data  link 
for  remote  data  collection. 

DOD  SOTS  is  unique  because  of  its 
availability  of  the  replica  of  a fully- 
operational  small  nuclear  storage  site, 
and  its  capability  to  conduct  live-fire 
testing,  and  the  ability  to  close  access 
to  direct  view  for  classified  testing.  In 
October  1985,  DNA  transferred  DOD 
SOTS  to  the  Army  and,  since  then,  it  has 
been  operated  by  the  U.S.  Army  Military 
Police  School  with  Training  and  Doc- 
trine Command  (TRADOC)  oversight. 

Even  though  the  importance  of  DOD 
SOTS  to  the  PSE  RDA  mission  is  without 
question,  it  was  not  immune  from  the 
effects  of  the  ongoing  budget  reduc- 
tions. Current  fiscal  realities  forced 
TRADOC,  whose  primary  mission  does 
not  include  test  and  evaluation,  to  lower 
the  DOD  SOTS  resourcing  package  to 
the  bottom  of  their  priorities.  Conse- 
quently, it  remained  unfunded  and  fac- 
ed potential  shut  down  by  the  fall  of 


1991.  Alarmed  at  this,  the  APSEAG 
sought  and  obtained  resource  com- 
mitments from  DOD  PSE  Action  Group 
for  the  continued  operation  of  this 
facility.  Actions  are  underway  to  transfer 
the  oversight  responsibility  of  the  DOD 
SOTS  from  TRADOC  to  AMC. 

Future  Actions 

The  APSEAG  plans  to  meet  at  least 
quarterly  to  build  a consensus  on  Army 
PSE  issues.  The  overall  objective  is  to 
continue  efforts  to  ensure  that  quality 
PSE  is  acquired  and  made  available  to 
the  Army  user,  consistent  with  the  pro- 
gram thrusts  outlined  by  MG  Rigby. 


EMMANUEL  J.  NIDHIRY  is  the 
AMC  system  staff  engineer  respon- 
sible for  physical  security  equip- 
ment. He  has  a bachelor 's  degree  in 
electrical  engineering  from  India 
and  a master's  degree  in  business 
administration  from  Fairleigh 
Dickinson  University. 

LTC  LARRY J.  PETCU  is  the  prod- 
uct manager  for  physical  security 
equipment.  He  holds  a B.S.  degree 
from  the  U.S.  Military  Academy  and 
an  M.S.  degree  in  nuclear  engineer- 
ing from  Georgia  Institute  of  Tech- 
nology. He  is  a member  of  the  Army 
Acquisition  Corps. 


November-December  1991 


Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin  7 


TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER  — 
IT’S  THE  LAW 


By  James  A.  Ball 


Introduction 

To  many  in  the  military  community, 
the  term  ‘technology  transfer”  con- 
jures up  visions  of  military  espionage 
that  results  in  American  technology 
winding  up  in  the  hands  of  our  adver- 
saries. In  the  recent  past,  U.S. 
computer-assisted  manufacturing 
technology  has  enabled  the  Soviet 
Navy  to  produce  more  silent  submarine 
propellers.  The  Soviet  space  shuttle  and 
front  line  Soviet  aircraft  bear  a striking 
resemblance  to  our  own;  and  the  Ira- 
qis almost  got  away  with  buying  new 
high-tech  furnaces  that  they  intended 
to  use  to  make  nuclear  weapon  devices. 
But  this  was  not  the  kind  of  technology 
transfer  on  the  minds  of  laboratory 
directors  and  their  legal  and  technical 
staff,  who  assembled  recently  in 
Washington,  DC,  for  the  Army’s  first 
Domestic  Technology  Transfer  Con- 
ference. The  topic  of  concern  was  how 
to  better  move  technology  developed 
in  Army  programs  and  laboratories  to 
the  commercial  marketplace,  thus  us- 
ing Army  technology  to  benefit  the 
American  economy  and  enhance  our 
international  competitiveness. 

For  more  than  10  years,  the  Congress 
has  become  increasingly  concerned 
about  our  loss  of  leadership  in 
technology  areas,  especially  when  so 
much  of  our  national  budget  goes  for 
R&D.  Of  special  concern  is  the 
technology  which  comes  from  the 
military  share  of  R&D  (over  60  percent) 
which  has  applications  to  commercial 
products,  but  is  perceived  as  difficult 


for  the  commercial  sector  to  access. 

Because  of  these  concerns,  Congress 
has  passed  several  pieces  of  legislation 
to  make  it  the  mission  of  all  federal 
laboratories  to  find  ways  to  transfer 
their  technologies  to  the  private  sector 
for  commercial  purposes.  Principal 
among  these  laws  is  the  Stevenson- 
Wydler  Act  of  1980,  which  was  “beef- 
ed up”  by  the  Federal  Technology 
Transfer  Act  of  1986  and  subsequent 
legislation.  The  bottom  line  to  all  of  this 
is  that  technology  transfer  is  now  “the 
law”  for  federal  R&D  activities;  not  a 
punitive  law,  but  rather  one  that  will 
benefit  the  R&D  community,  the  Army, 
and  the  nation. 

Because  technology  transfer  is  now 
the  law,  the  Army  has  moved  forward 
to  incorporate  all  of  the  many  respon- 
sibilities, policies,  legal  implications, 
and  procedures  into  a newly  issued 
regulation  (AR  70-57).  The  Army 
Domestic  Technology  Transfer  Con- 
ference was  triggered  by  the  release  of 
this  regulation.  Cliff  Lanham,  Army 
program  manager  for  domestic  tech- 
nology transfer,  served  as  the  principal 
host.  The  conference  objective  was  to 
provide  a uniform  concept  of  the 
Army’s  response  to  Congressional 
legislation  and  to  review  proactive  Ar- 
my policy  on  these  issues. 

Army  Technology  Transfer 
Policy 

The  first  day  of  the  conference  was 
devoted  to  an  overview  of  technology 
transfer  policy,  its  legal  ramifications, 


and  the  mission  of  Army  laboratories. 
Army  laboratory  directors  were  expos- 
ed to  a full  spectrum  of  issues  ranging 
from  direct  mission  responsibilities  and 
importance,  to  legal  issues,  re- 
quirements, and  procedures. 

Bruce  M.  Fonoroff,  deputy  chief  of 
staff  for  technology  and  management, 
U.S.  Army  Materiel  Command,  opened 
the  conference  with  welcoming  com- 
ments. He  emphasized  the  importance 
of  technology  transfer  to  both  the  Ar- 
my mission  as  well  as  the  national 
economy.  Dr.  Daphne  Kamely,  director 
for  research  and  laboratory  manage- 
ment, Office  of  the  Assistant  Secretary 
of  the  Army  (Research,  Development 
and  Acquisition)  delivered  the  keynote 
address.  She  maintained  that  military 
technological  preeminence  must  be 
coupled  with  contributions  of  fed- 
erally-funded science  and  technology 
to  the  successful  commercialization  of 
new  products. 

The  Congressional  viewpoint  was 
provided  by  James  Turner,  staff  direc- 
tor, Subcommittee  on  Technology  and 
Competitiveness,  U.S.  House  of 
Representatives.  Turner  discussed  Con- 
gressional concerns  for  domestic 
technology  transfer,  and  the  need  to 
implement  the  technology  transfer 
statutes  as  a way  to  shield  against 
foreign  competitors  commercializing 
federally-funded  technology  before 
American  companies.  According  to 
Turner,  Congress  has  the  federal 
laboratories  under  a microscope  with 
respect  to  funding  vs.  productivity  and, 


8 Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin 


November-December  1991 


TECHNOLOGY  TRANSFER 
IT’S  THE  LAW! 


while  support  for  technology  transfer 
must  come  from  the  top  levels  of 
government,  the  real  work  lies  with  the 
laboratory  personnel  supported  by 
their  laboratory  directors. 

Dr.  Loren  C.  Schmid,  chairman  of  the 
Federal  Laboratory  Consortium  (FLC), 
presented  an  overview  of  the  FLC’s 
background,  functions,  and  mission. 
He  stressed  the  importance  of  coopera- 
tion and  networking  among  the  Army 
Office  of  Research  and  Technology  Ap- 
plications (ORTAs)  and  other  FLC 
members  to  promote  and  facilitate 
technology  transfer. 

The  assistant  secretary  for  tech- 
nology policy,  U.S.  Department  of 
Commerce,  provided  the  first  day 
luncheon  address.  Deborah  Wince- 
Smith’s  remarks  clearly  focused  on  the 
challenge  of  improving  our  ability  to 
use  the  assets  of  knowledge  and 
technology  that  reside  within  our 
federal  labs.  She  stated  that  if  we  can  ef- 
fectively use  these  assets,  we  will  be 
able  to  maintain  our  national  com- 
petitiveness. Her  comments  supported 


the  fact  that,  according  to  recent 
studies  by  the  White  House  and  the 
Department  of  Commerce,  military 
technologies  are  vitally  important  to 
the  future  economic  growth  of  the  na- 
tion. She  stressed  the  concept  of  ‘ ‘con- 
current utilization’  ’ of  new  technology 
in  parallel  applications  which  can  help 
speed  the  commercialization  process 
and  emphasized  the  important  role  that 
the  laboratories  could  have  in  this 
process. 

Anthony  T.  Lane,  intellectual  proper- 
ty counsel  of  the  Army,  Office  of  the 
Judge  Advocate  General,  gave  an  over- 
view of  new  authorities  and  legal  issues 
of  technology  transfer  that  reside  in  the 
Technology  Transfer  Act  of  1986.  He 
stressed  that  laboratory  directors  must 
see  that  ORTAs  become  a full-time, 
priority  activity  at  each  laboratory.  He 
also  said  that  maintaining  the  difficult 
balance  between  the  main  mission  and 
technology  transfer  mission  will  be  a 
major  challenge  for  laboratory  man- 
agers, but  one  that  must  be  met. 

The  first  day’s  formal  sessions  con- 


cluded with  an  executive  overview  of 
the  job  of  the  laboratory  ORTAs.  The 
overview  provided  the  laboratory 
directors  with  a full  view  of  the  difficul- 
ty of  the  job  and  the  need  for  their  full 
support.  The  day  concluded  with  Lucy 
Reilly,  senior  staff  reporter  for 
Washington  Technology  who  spoke  at 
dinner  about  federal  laboratory 
technology  transfer,  industry  and  com- 
petitiveness. 

New  Authorities  and 
Legal  Issues 

The  second  day  of  the  conference 
focused  on  intellectual  property  and 
legal  issues  of  technology  transfer.  Saul 
Elbaum,  assistant  command  counsel 
for  intellectual  property  law,  U.S.  Army 
Materiel  Command,  discussed  Intellec- 
tual Property  and  How  It  Is  Protected. 
He  addressed  the  right  to  exclusivity 
and  the  stringent  requirements  for  ade- 
quate descriptions  of  new  technology. 
He  also  discussed  the  aspects  of  in- 
tellectual property  applicable  to 


November-December  1991 


Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin  9 


technology  transfer,  including 
trademarks,  copyrights,  and  patents 
and  the  distinctions  among  them. 

The  key  provisions  of  the  Tech- 
nology Transfer  Act  of  1986  and  its  new 
authorities  were  explained  by  Earl  T. 
Reichert,  deputy  division  chief,  In- 
tellectual Property  Law  Division,  Of- 
fice of  The  Judge  Advocate  General.  His 
presentation  left  no  doubt  that 
technology  transfer  responsibilities  of 
R&D  activities  are  well  established  in 
the  law. 

Troublesome  issues  on  conflict  of  in- 
terest were  addressed  by  MAJ  Murray  B. 
Baxter,  intellectual  property  attorney, 
Intellectual  Property  Law  Division,  Of- 
fice of  the  Judge  Advocate  General. 
Conflict  of  interest  issues  involved  in 
technology  transfer  include  participa- 
tion of  inventors  in  negotiations,  struc- 
tures of  small  corporations  involving 
the  inventors,  inside  information  issues 
and  dealing  with  technology  brokers. 
Baxter  made  it  clear  that  there  were 
rewards  for  successful  transfer,  but  the 
process  had  to  be  “squeaky  clean.” 

Michael  Zelenka,  chief,  Intellectual 
Property  Law  Division,  U.S.  Army 
Communications-Electronics  Com- 
mand Legal  Office,  spoke  about  Licens- 
ing, including  grant  requirements, 
export  control,  and  infringement.  His 
presentation  touched  on  the  problems 
of  providing  enough  information  to 
facilitate  domestic  technology  transfer 
while  inhibiting  the  flow  of  militarily 
critical  technology  offshore.  This  is  a 
difficult  act  to  balance,  yet  there  are 
mechanisms  in  place  that  make  this 
process  easier  than  most  realize. 

Cooperative  Research  and  Develop- 
ment Agreements  or  CRDAs  are  a ma- 
jor element  of  the  new  technology 
transfer  regulation,  and  were  discuss- 
ed by  Kathy  A.  Kurke,  assistant  chief 
counsel  for  research  and  development, 
U.S.  Army  Corps  of  Engineers.  Kurke 
examined  CRDAs  partnerships,  the  pur- 
pose of  CRDAs,  the  legislation  that 
shaped  them,  and  the  regulations 
affecting  them.  Her  presentation  was 
followed  by  a panel  of  four  government 
representatives  who  provided  the  au- 
dience with  details  of  their  experience 
with  CRDAs  and  the  knowledge  gained 
in  developing  and  implementing  them. 
Closing  out  day  two  was  Barry  G.  Ber- 
inger,  Republican  general  counsel, 
Committee  on  Science,  Space  and 
Technology,  U.S.  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives, who  spoke  at  dinner 


on  Changes  in  Copyright  Law  - Legal 
and  Political  Lssues.  The  second  ses- 
sion clearly  demonstrated  the  need  for 
a close  working  relationship  between 
the  ORTAs  managers  and  their  legal 
counsel  in  managing  technology  trans- 
fer actions. 

The  Job  of  the  ORTAs 

The  third  and  final  day  of  the  con- 
ference was  devoted  to  the  ORTAs 
managers  and  their  difficult  job  of 
fostering  technology  transfer  in  an  en- 
vironment that  may  not  initially  be 
receptive  to  the  task.  Cliff  Lanham 
defined  the  mission  of  ORTAs  managers 
by  exploring  and  examining  such  issues 
as  technology  identification  and  assess- 
ment; managing  the  internal  laboratory 
process  and  motivating  laboratory  per- 
sonnel; publicizing  availability  of  new 
technology  through  outreach  resources 
such  as  state,  local,  and  professional 
networks;  understanding  the  commer- 
cialization process;  and  providing 
technical  assistance  to  entrepreneurs. 

The  role  of  state  and  local  economic 
development  organizations  as  a vital 
element  in  the  technology  transfer  in- 
frastructure was  discussed  by  Dr.  Walter 
Plosila,  president,  Suburban  Maryland 
High  Technology  Council.  State  and 
local  organizations  of  this  type  play  a 
key  role  in  effective  two-way  com- 
munication with  the  nation’s  small 
businesses  and  entrepreneurs  and  must 
be  a part  of  any  successful  technology 
transfer  program. 

The  conference  concluded  in  an 
upbeat  mode,  with  a summary  of  prog- 
ress and  a charge  that  all  Army  R&D 
personnel  must  make  technology  trans- 
fer a conscious  part  of  their  daily 
activities.  In  the  past  four  years,  the 
Army  has  accomplished  nearly  100 
CRDAs  and  has  a dozen  new  licensing 
agreements  on  new  technology  with 
many  more  in  process.  The  new  laws 
and  regulations  will  most  surely  con- 
tribute to  successful  technology 
transfers;  creating  new  products  and 
processes,  royalties  to  inventors  and 
laboratories,  and  a positive  impact  on 
jobs  and  economic  growth. 

New  Priorities 

As  the  dust  settles  from  Desert 
Storm,  new  priorities  are  emerging  for 
America  and  one  of  the  sectors  most  af- 
fected could  be  military  R&D.  The 
linkages  between  military  R&D  and  the 


commercial  sector  needs  are  well 
established.  A recent  White  House 
report  on  critical  technology  has  made 
it  clear  that  military  strength  clearly 
depends  on  the  health  of  the  nation’s 
commercial  industries,  and  that  com- 
petitiveness and  national  security  are 
intertwined  through  their  mutual  need 
for  “dual  use”  technologies. 

At  no  time  in  the  past  has  it  been  any 
more  propitious  to  turn  our  national  at- 
tention  to  maintaining  a strong 
technology  base  in  the  interest  of  na- 
tional security  as  well  as  national 
economic  strength.  A major  factor  in 
this  effort  is  the  leverage  of  technology 
from  military  laboratories  to  commer- 
cial applications,  and  that  is  what  the 
Army  Domestic  Technology  Transfer 
program  is  all  about.  Technology 
transfer — it’s  not  only  the  law,  it’s  the 
future. 


JAMES  A.  BALL  is  the  senior  pro- 
gram manager  for  technology 
development  with  Systems 
Engineering  and  Management 
Associates , Inc.  A retired  Air  Force 
colonel,  with  bachelor's  and 
master's  degrees  in  aerospace  and 
mechanical  engineering,  he  has  ex- 
tensive experience  in  R&D  and 
technology > transfer.  He  is  the  former 
director  of  technology  applications 
for  the  Strategic  Defense  Initiative 
Organization. 


10  Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin 


November-December  1991 


The  Army  and  its  inventors  are  star- 
ting to  reap  rewards  as  a result  of  the 
1986  Technology  Transfer  Act.  A 
government  inventor  recently  received 
a cheek  for  110,000  as  his  portion  of 
initial  licensing  fees  paid  for  his  inven- 
tion under  the  act.  The  subject  inven- 
tion, a “Dual  Mode  Quartz  Thermo- 
metric Sensing  Device,”  is  expected  to 
generate  substantial  royalties  for  the  in- 
ventor, Stanley  Schodowski,  and  the 
Electronics  Technology  and  Devices 
Laboratory  (ETDL),  U.S.  Army  Lab- 
oratory Command,  with  licenses  being 
held  by  three  major  corporations  and 
four  small  businesses. 

Schodowski’s  invention  provides 
more  than  an  order  of  magnitude  im- 
provement in  frequency  stability  that  is 
crucial  for  low-power,  high  accuracy 
timekeeping  and  frequency  control  ap- 
plications. It  has  wide-ranging  com- 
mercial applications  such  as  in 
communications  (satellite,  cellular 
phones  and  pagers);  navigation  (Global 
Positioning  System);  telecommunica- 
tions (digital),  and  highly  accurate 
digital  thermometers.  Schodowski  was 
also  selected  for  the  New  Jersey  Inven- 
tor of  the  Year  Award  and  inducted  in- 
to the  New  Jersey  Inventor  Hall  of  Fame 
for  the  invention  of  his  dual  mode 
sensor. 

Under  the  guidelines  of  the  Tech- 
nology Transfer  Act,  as  implemented  by 
the  Department  of  Defense  (DOD),  an 
inventor  receives  20  percent  of  licens- 
ing fees  and  royalties,  up  to  the  sum  of 
$100,000  annually,  with  the  laboratory 
where  the  invention  was  conceived 
receiving  the  remainder.  Licensing  in- 
come is  used  to  further  the  laboratory’s 
technology  transfer  program  and  to 
reward  top  scientists  and  engineers. 

Government  scientists  and  engineers 
who  generate  patents  related  to  their 
work  assign  the  rights  to  their  patents 
over  to  the  government.  Prior  to  the 
Technology  Transfer  Act,  the  only 
remuneration  received  was  $100.00 
upon  invention  disclosure  and  $300.00 
upon  patent  issuance.  Today,  these  fees 
have  increased  to  $300.00  and  $500.00 
respectively.  Potentially  millions  of 
dollars  in  patent  royalties  and  fees  were 
lost  by  the  government  and  its  inven- 
tors prior  to  the  act. 

ETDL  is  in  the  process  of  negotiating 
patent  license  agreements  for  the 
Planar  Doped  Barrier  (PDB)  Semicon- 
ductor Device  which  could  provide 
licensing  fees  and  royalties  income  to 


ETDL 

INVENTOR 

RECEIVES 

$10,000 

FROM 

PATENT 

FEES 


By  Carol  A.  Widmaier 


the  inventor  and  to  the  laboratory.  This 
device,  a major  advance  in  solid-state 
device  technology,  was  invented  at 
ETDL  by  Roger  J.  Malik,  a former  ETDL 
employee.  It  was  modeled  and 
fabricated  in  ETDL’s  molecular  beam 
epitaxy  and  fabrication  facility  and  has 
led  to  several  new  solid-state  devices  for 
millimeter- wave  radar  and  communica- 
tion components  and  systems. 

ETDL  has  been  aggressively  market- 
ing its  patents,  and  under  the  direction 
of  Richard  Stern,  ETDL’s  technology 
transfer  and  small  business  manager, 
has  developed  and  implemented  a 
variety  of  marketing  plans  including 
advertisement  in  the  Federal  Register 
and  direct  mail.  As  a result,  the 


laboratory  has  received  $36,000  in 
licensing  fees  to  date,  and  is  negotiating 
several  additional  licenses. 

ETDL  has  taken  the  lead  in  im- 
plementing the  Technology  Transfer 
Act  and  related  guidance.  This  high 
technology  research  and  development 
government  laboratory  is  responsible 
for  the  development  of  85  percent  of 
the  electronics  in  the  U.S.  Army’s 
military  systems.  ETDL  is  one  of  seven 
laboratories  of  the  U.S.  Army 
Laboratory  Command,  Adelphi,  MD., 
and  is  located  at  Fort  Monmouth,  NJ. 

Under  the  dynamic  leadership  of  Dr. 
C.  G.  Thornton,  the  laboratory  direc- 
tor, this  outstanding  Army  laboratory 
has  set  the  pace  for  technology  transfer, 


November-December  1991 


Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin  11 


Protecting  Your  Invention 


In  today’s  fast  paced  technology 
race,  it  is  more  important  than  ever  for 
scientists  and  engineers  to  maintain 
good  laboratory  notebooks,  docu- 
ment their  results,  and  file  invention 
disclosures.  This  should  all  be  follow- 
ed by  a patent  application,  and 
publication  within  “one  year.” 

When  an  inventor  wants  to  protect 
his  invention,  whether  for  a new  pro- 
cess, machine,  manufacture  or  com- 
position of  matter  or  to  improve  an 
old  device  or  process,  he  is  granted  a 
utility  patent.  If  a scientist  or  engineer 
believes  he  has  a patentable  item,  he 
should  immediately  prepare  an  inven- 
tion disclosure  form  and  meet  with  a 
government  patent  attorney.  The  at- 
torney reviews  the  documentation, 
helps  search  for  prior  patents,  and  ad- 
vises if  the  invention  should  be  for- 
warded to  the  Invention  Evaluation 
Committee. 

The  next  step  is  preparation  of  a pa- 
tent application  which  the  attorney 
files  with  the  U.S.  Patent  and 
Trademark  Office.  From  the  date  of 
the  application,  there  is  a “patent 


pending.”  However,  this  provides  no 
protection.  When  the  Patent  Office 
issues  a patent,  then  and  only  then,  is 
the  invention  protected.  The  patent 
application  must  be  filed  within  one 
year  of  the  first  public  disclosure 
(publication  or  presentation),  sale  or 
offer  for  sale  of  the  invention.  This 
procedure  is  unlike  that  used  in  Japan 
or  Europe  where  public  disclosure  is 
an  immediate  statutory  bar  with  no 
grace  period. 

There  are  many  reasons  for  inven- 
tors to  protect  their  inventions,  in- 
cluding credibility,  potential  financial 
gain,  peer  respect,  and  personal 
recognition.  It  also  protects  the 
government  from  law  suits  for  in- 
fringement and  generates  income  for 
our  government  laboratories. 

One  has  only  to  follow  the  Texas  In- 
struments (TI)  court  fights  over  patent 
infringement  to  see  how  important  fil- 
ing disclosure  can  be.  According  to 
their  newsletter  TekBriefs , TI  would 
be  showing  huge  losses  if  not  for  pa- 
tent royalties  they  are  collecting  from 
Japanese  and  American  companies. 


due  partly  to  a cultural  change  and  its 
“open  laboratories  program”  that  has 
created  a complementary  environment 
for  innovation. 

ETDL’s  “open  laboratories  program” 
strongly  encourages  academic  and  in- 
dustrial personnel  to  engage  in  on-site 
cooperative  efforts  with  ETDL  scien- 
tists and  engineers  at  ETDL’s  Tech- 
nology Centers  of  Excellence.  Up  to  150 
students,  professors  and  other  scien- 
tists and  engineers  from  academia  and 
industry  work  part-time  for  the  lab- 
oratory on  projects  of  mutual  interest. 
The  laboratory,  which  has  170  scien- 
tists and  engineers  on  staff,  and  pro- 
duces between  35  to  55  patents 
annually,  (this  is  20  percent  of  the 
patents  produced  by  the  total  Army), 
has  successfully  negotiated  eight  patent 
licenses  to  date. 

The  laboratory  holds  significant 
patents  in  the  following  technology 
areas:  magnetics,  ferrite  devices,  crystal 
oscillators,  optical  switches,  nanoelec- 
tronics, batteries,  displays,  millimeter- 
wave  photonics,  surface  acoustic  wave 
(SAW)  devices,  and  infrared  (IR) 


detectors. 

The  laboratory,  in  concert  with  other 
government  laboratories  and  agencies, 
expects  to  continue  to  develop 
technological  seed  patents  and  transi- 
tion 30  to  50  new  electron  devices  and 
military  technologies  each  year  into 
developmental  systems. 

ETDL  has  been  recognized  national- 
ly for  its  initiative  and  leadership  role 
in  technology  transfer  as  well  as  by  the 
Federal  Laboratory  Consortium  (FLC) 
and  DOD.  ETDL’s  Richard  Stern  was 
selected  as  the  1991  FLC  representative 
of  the  year  from  over  700  competing 
government  laboratories,  and  has 
testified  before  the  House  Subcommit- 
tee on  Science  and  Technology  on 
ETDL’s  innovative  technology  transfer 
techniques.  ETDL  was  also  cited  in  a 
Secretary  of  Commerce  Report  to  the 
president  and  Congress  for  its  im- 
plementation of  the  Technology 
Transfer  Act. 

ETDL  has  also  been  successful  in  ef- 
fecting Cooperative  Research  Develop- 
ment Agreements  with  industry 
(CRDAs)  and  has  legally  negotiated  12 


CRDAs  to  date,  with  several  more  pend- 
ing. CRDAs  are  a new  and  innovative 
method  of  operation.  Participants  are 
able  to  leverage  their  manpower, 
facilities  and  financial  resources  by 
working  together  as  a team  to  solve 
common  technological  problems.  The 
government,  industry  and  academia  all 
benefit  as  the  technology  base  grows 
and  the  technology  is  more  effectively 
and  efficiently  transferred  to  the  com- 
mercial sector.  Many  of  the  CRDAs  are 
targeted  at  small  businesses. 

The  U.S.  Government  took  a major 
step  toward  helping  the  U.S.  regain  its 
technical  leadership  position  and  the 
respect  of  the  world-wide  scientific 
community  with  passage  of  the 
Stevenson-Wydler  Technology  Innova- 
tion Act  of  1980,  the  follow-on 
Technology  Transfer  Act  of  1986  and 
the  related  executive  order.  These 
sweeping  changes  were  necessary  to 
meet  the  ever  increasing,  competitive 
global  market,  and  to  improve  the 
economic,  environmental  and  social 
well-being  of  the  United  States. 

The  Technology  Transfer  Act  en- 
courages cooperative  efforts  among 
academia,  industry  and  federal  lab- 
oratories. Included  under  this  umbrella 
are  Cooperative  Research  and  Develop- 
ment Agreements,  and  the  licensing 
of  government-owned  inventions 
through  patent  licensing  agreements. 

According  to  Anthony  T.  Lane,  In- 
tellectual Property  Council  of  the 
Army,  “The  number  of  inventions  from 
federal  laboratories  has  increased  by  68 
percent  (since  the  Technology  Transfer 
Act)  with  3,619  disclosures  in  FY90 
alone.“ 

The  act  has  created  a WIN-WIN  situa- 
tion for  both  the  government 
laboratories  and  its  patent  holders. 


CAROL  A.  WIDMAIER  is  an  in- 
formation specialist  with  the  U.S. 
Army  Electronics  Technology  and 
Devices  Laboratory  where  she  heads 
up  the  Plans,  Publications  and 
Presentations  Branch  of  the  Tech 
Plans  and  Programs  Office.  She 
holds  a degree  in  communications 
and  is  currently  pursuing  an  ad- 
vanced degree  in  journalism. 


12  Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin 


November-December  1991 


ENVIRONMENTAL 
CLEAN-UP 
OF  EXPLOSIVES 
CONTAMINATED  SOILS 


By  LTC  Larry  A.  Sparks 
and  MAJ  Craig  A.  Myler 


Background 

The  U.S.  Army  is  now  actively  pur- 
suing ways  to  clean  up  explosives- 
contaminated  soils  in  an  effort  to 
preclude  any  adverse  impact  on  the  en- 
vironment. Past  solutions  for  the  treat- 
ment of  contaminated  water  from 
explosive  processing  operations  did 
not  address  the  problem  of  con- 
taminating underground  aquifers, 
which  are  underground  reservoirs  of 


water  used  for  drinking  purposes.  Pro- 
duction plants,  load,  assemble,  and 
pack  facilities  and  washout  operations 
discharged  explosives-laden  waste 
streams  to  lagoons  and  settling  basins, 
which  contributed  to  current  con- 
tamination problems.  Over  time,  ex- 
plosives accumulated  in  these  waste 
pits  and  eventually  migrated  into  the 
groundwater.  Only  recently  has  the 
Army  discovered  the  problems  caused 


by  these  lagoons  and  settling  basins. 

A major  concern  in  accomplishing 
the  Army’s  clean-up  mission  is  the  cost 
of  remediating  the  soil  contamination 
at  such  sites.  While  incineration  of  the 
explosives-contaminated  soils  has  been 
proven  effective,  it  is  also  costly  and  not 
always  readily  acceptable  to  the  public. 
One  alternative  to  incineration  of  con- 
taminated soils  is  composting,  which 
offers  a potentially  cheaper,  more  ac- 
ceptable method  of  clean-up. 

The  concept  for  composting  explo- 
sives-contaminated soils  started  as  a 
project  to  investigate  treatment  of  off- 
specification  manufactured  explosives. 
Studies  sponsored  by  the  Army  in  the 
mid-1970s  demonstrated  the  ability  to 
treat  the  explosives  TNT,  RDX  and 
HMX.  In  the  early  1980s,  after  identi- 
fying a need  to  treat  explosives- 
contaminated  soil,  the  U.S  Army  Toxic 
and  Hazardous  Materials  Agency 
(USATHAMA),  located  at  Aberdeen 
Proving  Ground,  MD,  initiated  research 
into  ways  to  accomplish  soil  remedia- 
tion. Immediately,  incineration  was 
developed  as  a way  to  treat  contami- 
nated soil.  Other  technologies  were 
reviewed,  but  composting  was  selected 
to  undergo  continued  testing,  based 
largely  on  the  work  done  with  pure  ex- 
plosives. 

Bench  scale  studies  conducted  in  test 
tubes  and  flasks  were  followed  by  pilot- 
scale  composting  performed  in  large 
tanks.  Success  at  the  pilot-scale 
prompted  a demonstration  test  of  the 
technology.  During  demonstration 


Figure  1. 


Umatilla  Depot  Activity  Explosives  Washout  Facility  and  Expiosives-Contaminated 
Lagoons. 


November-December  1991 


Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin  13 


testing,  three  percent  soil  by  volume 
was  mixed  with  horse  manure,  wood 
chips  and  horse  feed  then  allowed  to 
compost  in  static  piles.  Explosive 
degradation  was  extensive  and  tox- 
icological testing  of  the  finished  prod- 
uct indicated  it  was  safe  to  replace  on 
the  land.  The  demonstration  was  suc- 
cessful as  a proof-of-principle,  but 
design  of  a full  scale  implementation  re- 
quired additional  operating  infor- 
mation. 


Site  Selection 

To  acquire  this  information,  an  op- 
timization study  was  developed.  The 
objective  of  the  study  was  to  establish 
operating  parameters  for  a remedial  ac- 
tion using  composting  to  treat 
explosives-contaminated  soils.  Since 
explosives-contaminated  sites  are  not 
restricted  to  a particular  climate,  the 
optimization  study  had  to  reflect  opera- 
tions under  severe  climatic  conditions 
to  establish  the  operability  of  systems 
at  any  location.  Umatilla  Depot  Activi- 
ty (UMDA)  in  Hermiston,  OR,  was  the 
site  selected  for  the  study. 

In  the  1960s,  a facility  for  recovering 
explosives  from  unserviceable  muni- 
tions was  operated  at  UMDA  (Figure  1). 
Steam  was  used  to  melt  explosives  out 
of  munition  bodies,  and  upon  cooling, 
the  explosives  were  substantially 
recovered  for  reuse  or  for  sale.  Large 
quantities  of  water  were  used  in  this 
operation  and  when  contacted  with  the 
explosives,  the  water  became  con- 
taminated. The  contaminated  water 
was  discharged  into  two  settling  basins. 
Explosives  contained  in  these  waters 
consisted  of  TNT,  RDX  and  HMX.  Con- 
tamination levels  currently  approach 
10  percent  in  some  areas  of  the  two  set- 
tling basins.  Explosives  have  migrated 
50  feet  downward  to  the  water  table 
and  pose  a potential  threat  to  the  en- 
vironment. The  site  was  placed  on  the 
EPA’s  National  Priorities  List  in  1987. 

UMDA  experiences  temperatures  be- 
tween 115  degrees  and  -25  degrees 
Fahrenheit,  has  an  average  annual  rain- 
fall of  9 inches,  and  is  subject  to  very 
high  winds.  These  conditions  are  most 
detrimental,  because  composting  re- 
quires biologically  generated  heat  and 
high  moisture  at  all  times.  Unprotected 
compost  piles  are  subject  to  dispersion 
by  wind.  The  optimization  had  to  ac- 
count for  this  harsh  climate. 


Figure  3. 

Pilot  Scale  Mechanical  Composter. 


14  Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin 


November-December  1991 


Figure  4. 

Composting  Optimization  Study  Static  Pile  Computer  Data  Acquisition  and  Control 
System. 


Optimization  Study 

To  conduct  testing,  the  parameters  to 
he  studied  had  to  be  selected.  Cost 
analysis  demonstrated  that  the  two 
most  significant  parameters  for  com- 
posting explosives  contaminated  soil 
were  the  rate  at  which  explosives  were 
metabilized  and  the  amount  of  con- 
taminated soil  in  the  compost  mixture. 
Initial  tests  were  designed  to  establish 
operating  limits  for  these  two  param- 
eters as  well  as  to  obtain  operating  data 
pertinent  to  full  scale  design. 

Since  bench  scale  testing  could  not 
be  directly  applied  to  full-scale  opera- 
tions and  full-scale  testing  was  cost  pro- 
hibitive, a pilot  scale  test  was  selected. 

Two  separate  types  of  composting 
were  used  to  investigate  a broad  range 
of  conditions.  Aerated  static  piles  were 
used  to  determine  the  maximum  possi- 
ble soil  loading.  The  simple  design  of 
static  piles  allowed  multiple  systems  to 
be  operated  concurrently  (Figure  2).  To 
conduct  kinetic  rate  optimization 
studies,  a specially  fabricated 
mechanical  composter  was  acquired 
(Figure  3).  Composts  containing  up  to 
40  percent  soil  by  volume  were  used  to 
determine  the  rate  of  explosives 
degradation,  the  temperature  profiles 
within  each  system,  the  moisture  con- 
tent, pH,  oxygen  level  and  water  con- 
sumption. 

A computer-based  data  acquisition 
and  control  system  was  used  to  regulate 
the  reactions  in  each  of  the  eight  com- 
post systems.  The  computer  auto- 
matically sampled  temperature, 
oxygen,  and  moisture  levels  and 
recorded  the  data  electronically.  A 
schematic  of  the  computer  control 
system  is  shown  in  Figure  4. 

Implementing  the 
Technology 

Results  from  the  optimization  study 
at  UMDA  are  being  used  to  develop  a 
design  for  full  scale  remediation  at 
UMDA.  Half  lives  of  less  than  10  days 
in  the  well-mixed  systems  indicate 
economic  viability  at  the  20  percent 
soil  loading.  Other  environmental  fac- 
tors such  as  moisture  and  temperature 
control  are  still  being  evaluated  but 
pose  no  special  difficulty  in  designing 
a full  scale  treatment  system  for  UMDA. 

The  decision  to  use  composting  for 
full  scale  remediation  is  expected  in 
1991  This  implementation  will  be  the 
first  full-scale  application  of  biotech- 


nology for  the  treatment  of  explosives 
contaminated  soils. 

Conclusion 

Results  indicate  that  composting  can 
be  a cost  effective  alternative  to  in- 
cineration for  remediation  of 
explosives-contaminated  soils,  even 
under  the  harshest  conditions. 
Estimates  of  Army-owned  explosives 
contaminated  sites  indicate  the  poten- 
tial for  several  million  tons  of  con- 
taminated soil  requiring  treatment.  In 
addition  to  treating  explosives- 
contaminated  soils,  the  Army  is 
prompting  increased  development  by 
the  private  sector  in  using  composting 
as  a means  to  treat  hazardous  wastes. 
Composting  of  explosives  is  one  pro- 
gram which  maintains  the  Army  as  a 
leader  in  environmental  action  through 
improved  technology  while  reducing 
the  burden  on  installation  restoration 
resources. 


LTCLARRYA.  SPARKS  is  the  com- 
mander of  Umatilla  Depot  Activity 
in  Hermiston,  OR.  He  holds  a 
bachelor ’s  degree  in  chemistry  from 
Ohio  University  and  a master's 
degree  in  logistics  management 
from  the  Florida  Institute  of 
Technology.  He  is  a resident 
graduate  of  the  Command  and 
General  Staff  College. 

MAJ  CRAIG  A.  MYLER  is  a 
chemical  engineer  and  recently 
worked  in  the  Research  and 
Technology > Development  Branch  of 
the  U.S.  Army  Toxic  and  Hazardous 
Materials  Agency  at  Aberdeen  Prov- 
ing Ground,  MD.  He  is  currently 
assigned  to  the  chemistry  depart- 
ment, U.S.  Army  Military  Academy, 
West  Point,  NY.  He  has  a bachelor 's 
degree  in  chemistry  from  the 
Virginia  Military  Institute  and 
master's  and  doctorate  degrees  in 
chemical  engineering  from  the 
University  of  Pittsburgh.  MAf  Myler 
is  a member  of  the  Army  Acquisition 
Corps. 


November-December  1991 


Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin  15 


THE  ARMY  CENTER 
OF  EXCELLENCE 
FOR 

ADVANCED  PROPULSION 
SYSTEMS  RESEARCH 


Introduction 

The  Army  has  hundreds  of 
thousands  of  vehicles  driven  by  diesel 
engines.  In  addition,  there  are  approx- 
imately 150,000  generator  sets,  some 
diesel  and  some  gasoline.  Gasoline  is 
being  replaced  by  diesel  because,  in  the 
European  theater,  all  Army  engines 
must  be  capable  of  using  JP-8  as  a fuel. 

Tactical  vehicles  use  commercial 
diesel  engines  but  combat  vehicle 
engines  are  typically  developed  for  a 
special  application.  Engine  power  den- 
sity is  a major  factor  in  vehicle  design, 
especially  for  combat  vehicles.  Further- 
more, in  combat,  the  ability  of  an 
engine  to  use  any  available  fuel  is  a 
desirable  attribute.  Thus,  the  availabili- 
ty of  compact,  high  power  density,  fuel 
efficient  and  fuel  tolerant  engines,  both 
on  commercial  and  on  a specialized 
basis,  is  crucial  to  the  Army. 

In  order  to  provide  the  basic  infor- 
mation needed  to  develop  such 
engines,  as  well  as  to  provide  trained 
manpower  for  industrial  and  Army 
laboratories,  the  Army  decided  to 
establish  a center  for  advanced  propul- 
sion systems  research.  One  of  the  Army 
centers  supported  by  the  DOD  Univer- 
sity Research  Initiative,  The  Center  of 
Excellence  for  Advanced  Propulsion 
Systems  was,  after  national  competi- 
tion, established  at  the  University  of 
Wisconsin-Madison  in  1986. 

The  center  at  Madison  is  a continua- 
tion and  consequence  of  engine 
research  at  Wisconsin  which  has  been 
ongoing  since  construction  of  the 


By  Dr.  Gary  Borman, 
Dr.  Phil  Myers  and 
Dr.  David  Mann 


Mechanical  Engineering  Building  in  the 
1930s.  Prior  to  World  War  II,  Professors 
G.C.  Wilson  and  R.A.  Rose  pioneered 
work  on  pressure  pickups  and  diesel 
fuel  additives  to  reduce  ignition  delay. 

During  World  War  II,  Phil  Myers  in 
the  Department  of  Mechanical 
Engineering  and  Otto  Uyehara  in  the 
Department  of  Chemical  Engineering 
developed  instrumentation  capable  of 
measuring  the  rapidly  varying  combus- 
tion temperatures  in  diesel  engines. 

During  the  two  decades  following 
World  War  II,  research  on  engines  was 
conducted  by  a total  of  some  100 
graduate  students  in  a “temporary” 
building,  T-25.  In  1969,  the  research 
moved  to  expanded  facilities  in  the 
newly-constructed  Engineering  Re- 
search Building.  These  are  the  facilities 
used  by  the  center.  In  1964  Gary  Bor- 
man, the  director  of  the  Engine 
Research  Center  (ERC),  joined  the  facul- 
ty. Today,  13  faculty  members  and  their 
associated  35  to  40  graduate  students 
participate  in  the  ERC. 

With  core  funding  provided  by  the 
Army  Center  of  Excellence,  the  ERC  has 
grown  through  the  continuation  and 
expansion  of  many  of  the  research  pro- 
jects under  way  at  the  time  the  center 
was  established.  Funding  for  these  ef- 


forts has  come  from  other  Army  and 
government  agencies.  General  Motors, 
Chevron,  Mercury  Marine,  Intevep  S.A. 
Venezuela,  Komatsu,  Chung  Chen  In- 
stitute of  Technology,  KIA  Motors,  and 
Outboard  Marine  have  provided  partial 
support  typically  in  the  form  of  student 
stipends  or  fellowships.  Cummins, 
Ford,  General  Motors  and  Navistar  have 
donated  equipment.  Cray  Research  and 
the  San  Diego  Super  Computer  Center 
have  supplied  valuable  computer  time. 

Program  Objectives 

To  help  meet  Army  needs,  the  center 
has  three  primary  objectives.  The  first 
is  to  develop  and  systematize  informa- 
tion on  basic  processes  that  occur  in 
engines  so  this  information  can  be  used 
during  engine  design  to  rapidly  pro- 
duce more  compact  power  systems. 
Obtaining  this  basic  information  on 
engine  processes  is  difficult  because  the 
phenomena  being  studied  cover  wide 
ranges  of  pressure  and  temperature,  oc- 
cur in  milliseconds,  and  are  encased  in 
thick,  high-pressure  containers  (engine 
cylinders)  penetrated  only  by  the 
various  mechanisms  essential  for 
engine  operation.  Because  of  these  fac- 
tors, lasers  and  optical  diagnostics, 
essential  to  obtaining  needed  ex- 
perimental information,  require  special 
techniques  when  applied  to  practical 
engines.  At  the  same  time,  the  develop- 
ment of  super  computers  permits  more 
sophisticated  simulation  programs 
which,  when  modified  and  validated 


16  Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin 


November-December  1991 


Crank  Angle  (Degrees) 


Figure  1. 

Oil  Film  Thickness  for  Ring  1 Near  Top  Center.  The  upper  solid  line  represents  the  ring-wall 
clearance.  The  lower  traces  are  measured  film  thickness:  The  solid  line  is  the  average  of 
20  cycles,  while  broken  lines  are  maximum  and  minimum  values. 


by  experimental  data,  should  help  to 
speed  up  the  engine  design  process. 

The  second  objective  is  to  provide 
trained  employees,  knowledgeable 
about  engines,  for  government,  in- 
dustry and  universities.  There  is 
evidence  that  the  most  effective 
transfer  of  technology  from  university 
research  labs  occurs  through  the 
employment  of  graduates,  trained  in 
the  latest  approaches  and  techniques, 
by  government  and  industry.  Army 
laboratories  must  have  personnel  who 
understand  the  strengths  and 
weaknesses  of  new  design  tools  and  the 
way  they  can  be  used  to  obtain  more 
compact  power  systems  for  Army 
vehicles.  Industry  must  have 
knowledgeable  personnel  to  use,  dur- 
ing the  engine  design  process,  new 
diagnostic  instruments,  and  soph- 
isticated simulation  codes. 

The  third  objective  is  to  ensure  the 
availability,  when  needed,  of  a reser- 
voir of  persons  who  can  advise  and 
assist  the  Army  in  making  judgmental 
decisions  regarding  future  engines  and 
vehicles.  This  is  achieved  through  the 
exposure  of  the  center  faculty  to  the 
performance  demands  of  Army  engines 
and  the  exposure  of  Army  personnel  to 
the  latest  tools  and  findings  in  engine 
research.  Through  the  combination  of 
such  exposure,  plus  the  basic  research 
projects,  the  center’s  faculty  expands 


its  expertise  and  becomes  a valuable 
resource  for  consultation  on  Army 
problems. 

Developing  Basic 
Information 

Research  projects  conducted  by  the 
center  cover  such  diverse  topics  as  in- 
cylinder modeling,  engine  combus- 
tion, fuels  and  emissions,  in-cylinder 
and  heat  exchanger  heat  transfer,  spray 
dynamics,  lubrication,  materials,  and 
design.  Results  of  this  research  are 
available  to  the  general  technical  public 
through  professional  society  presenta- 
tions and  publications,  through  special 
workshops  at  Madison,  and  through 
visits  to  Army  labs.  Since  it  is  impossi- 
ble to  describe  all  of  these  projects  in 
detail,  only  two  projects,  cold  starting 
and  cylinder  lubrication,  are  discussed 
to  illustrate  center  activities. 

Cold  Starting.  Engines  in  Army 
vehicles  are  required  to  operate  under 
arctic  as  well  as  desert  conditions. 
Diesel  engines  are  difficult  to  start  at 
low  temperatures  when  it  becomes 
hard  to  reach  the  high  in-cylinder 
temperatures  and  pressures  necessary 
for  autoignition  of  the  fuel  during 
cranking.  Special  starting  kits,  which 
are  bulky,  are  currently  fitted  to  diesel 
engines  to  assure  starting  at  temper- 
atures below  -10  C.  Any  approach  that 


can  lower  the  unaided  starting 
temperature,  and  reduce  the  need  for 
the  starting  kits,  would  be  of  great 
benefit.  Consequently,  the  ERC  has 
conducted  analytical  studies  of  cold 
starting  in  an  attempt  to  determine  the 
controlling  factors  during  cold  start. 
Two  different  analytical  approaches 
were  used.  The  first  was  thermo- 
dynamic cycle  analysis  and  the  second 
was  three  dimensional,  multiphase, 
computational  fluid  dynamics  (CFD) 
calculations  of  in-cylinder  gas  and  fuel 
spray  properties  during  and  following 
fuel  injection. 

Four  different  strategies  to  reach 
higher  peak,  mass-averaged  cylinder 
temperatures  were  studied.  These 
were:  heating  of  coolant  to  increase  in- 
take manifold  and  cylinder  metal 
temperature;  increased  cranking  speed; 
inlet  air  heating;  and  using  the  “filling” 
process  to  produce  higher  gas 
temperature  at  the  start  of  compres- 
sion. A combination  of  the  last  three 
items  seemed  to  be  the  most  effective 
approach. 

The  most  significant  finding  of  the 
study  was  that  low  fuel  vaporization 
rates  seem  to  be  responsible  for  the 
failure  to  achieve  starting.  However,  the 
contribution  of  normal  changes  in  fuel 
volatility  to  fuel  vapor  concentration  is 
small.  The  study  confirmed  that  fuel 
mass  reaches  the  crevice  regions  dur- 


November-December  1991 


Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin  17 


ing  cold  starting,  adding  to  the  fuel 
amount  in  the  chamber  for  successive 
cycles.  Also,  the  high  blow-by  at  low 
cranking  speeds  reduces  the  peak 
temperature  of  the  cycle  and  removes 
fuel  from  the  combustion  chamber.  An 
important  future  task  is  to  use  the 
modeling  to  improve  understanding  of 
experimental  cold  starting  data  (being 
obtained  at  Wayne  State  University 
under  TACOM  and  ARO  sponsorship). 

Cylinder  Lubrication.  Cylinder 
friction  accounts  for  about  40  percent 
of  total  engine  friction.  Low  heat  rejec- 
tion engines,  which  are  of  interest  to 
the  Army  because  of  potential  reduc- 
tions in  power  system  volume,  have 
higher  cylinder  wall  temperatures 
which  decrease  the  viscosity  and  in- 
crease the  consumption  of  the  lubri- 
cant. Oil  control  is  of  increasing  interest 
in  meeting  low  particulate  exhaust 
emission  standards.  Thus,  understand- 
ing cylinder  lubrication  phenomena  is 
of  design  interest  for  both  commercial 
and  combat  vehicle  engines. 

Two  different  studies  of  lubrication 
were  conducted  at  the  ERC.  The  first 
study  measured  oil  film  thickness  at  top 
ring  reversal  location  using  three 
0.64mm  diameter  capacitance  probes. 
The  probes  were  separated  by  120 
degrees.  The  study  also  measured  heat 
transfer  using  three  surface  thermo- 
couples located  adjacent  to  the  capaci- 
tance probes.  A later  study  used  a 50 
micron  fiber  optic  to  guide  laser  light 
through  the  liner  to  the  oil  film.  The 
laser  light  caused  the  oil  to  fluoresce  at 
a different  wavelength  than  the  laser 
with  an  intensity  related  to  the  volume 
of  oil  fluorescing.  Thus,  the  intensity 
of  the  light  returning  through  the  fiber 
is  a measure  of  the  oil  film  thickness. 

The  capacitance  probes  showed  dif- 
ferences in  thickness  and  variation  of 
thickness  of  the  oil  film  at  the  three  dif- 
ferent locations.  The  oil  film  thickness 
was  unexpectedly  insensitive  to  normal 
changes  in  oil  viscosity,  cylinder 
pressure  and  engine  rpm.  However, 
there  was  a considerable  change  in  film 
thickness  over  a single  cycle,  with  the 
oil  film  thickness  much  larger  on  the 
exhaust  stroke  than  the  compression 
stroke.  This  may  provide  a source  of 
high  oil-generated  emissions. 

Static  tests  using  the  oil  fluorescence 
technique  showed  that  temperature 
and  additive  packages  affect  fluo- 
rescence. This  indicates  a need  for  an 


in-cylinder  calibration.  The  fluo- 
rescence signal  was  linear  with  oil  film 
thickness  up  to  about  40  microns.  The 
engine  tests  clearly  show  the  passage 
of  the  ring  pack  and,  in  many  cases,  it 
was  possible  to  discern  both  the  pro- 
file and  movement  of  the  ring.  Figure 
1 shows  experimental  data  for  ring  1 in 
the  top  center  region  under  fired  con- 
ditions. The  upper  solid  line  shows  the 
ring- wall  separation.  The  lower  traces 
show  the  measured  film  thickness  with 
the  solid  line  representing  the  average 
of  20  cycles  and  the  dashed  lines  the 
maximum  and  minimum  values.  Note 
that  in  the  top  center  region  the  ring 
still  covers  the  probe.  The  ring  profile 
appears  distorted  because  it  is  shown 
as  a function  of  crankangle,  not  of  time 
or  distance  along  the  ring,  and  the 
velocity  of  the  ring  varies.  Also  note 
that  the  bottom  profile  of  the  ring  ap- 
pears in  the  top  center  region  while  the 
top  profile  appears  at  earlier  and  later 
crankangles. 

Analyzing  only  the  data  repeated 
from  cycle  to  cycle,  the  trends  ob- 
served on  a motored  engine  with  the 
head  removed  did  not  follow  trends 
predicted  by  theory.  The  trends  with 
speed  followed  theory  in  the  fired 
engine,  but  other  data  showed  abnor- 
mal behavior.  The  unique  data  ob- 
tained in  this  study  will  guide  the 
development  of  reliable  models  for  the 
analysis  of  engine  lubrication,  leading 
to  improved  engine  reliability  and 
durability. 

Providing  Trained  Personnel 

Center  support  for  training  of 
graduate  students  came  in  the  form  of 
research  assistantships  and  a separate 
graduate  fellowship  program.  Both 
have  been  essential  in  recruiting  and 
training  students.  The  graduate 
fellowship  program  was  especially 
helpful  in  recruiting  top  U.S.  Ph.D.  can- 
didate students  for  the  program  by  pro- 
viding a competitive  stipend  with  a 
three  year  guarantee  of  support. 

To  date,  19  master’s  degree  (four  of 
these  continued  on  at  Wisconsin 
towards  the  Ph  D.  degree)  and  17  Ph.D. 
degree  students  have  graduated  from 
the  program.  Twenty-five  of  these  36 
students  have  gone  to  industry,  one  to 
government,  and  two  to  academic 
research. 

Via  short  visits,  the  faculty  has  in- 
creased considerably  its  understanding 


of  the  demands  placed  on  Army 
engines.  In  addition,  Army  personnel 
exposed  to  center  research  have  in- 
creased their  understanding  of  advanc- 
ed instrumentation  and  simulation 
programs  and  how  the  results  might  be 
used  to  improve  Army  engines.  A joint 
program  with  researchers  at  TACOM 
has  been  instituted  to  obtain  two- 
dimensional  maps  of  piston  surface 
temperature. 

Technical  Assistance 

When  the  Army  makes  decisions 
regarding  new  research,  new 
developments,  new  engines,  new  pro- 
grams, etc.,  it  is  extremely  helpful  to 
have  input  from  persons  who  under- 
stand both  Army  needs  and  potential 
future  engine  developments.  The 
center’s  program  has  helped  to  develop 
persons  to  fill  this  need.  Center  facul- 
ty members  have  made  approximately 
40  trips  to  Army  laboratories  in  connec- 
tion with  this.  They  have  also  par- 
ticipated in  the  Board  on  Army  Science 
and  Technology  and  Strategic  Tech- 
nologies for  the  Army  study  and  served 
the  Navy,  NASA  and  DOE  in  a similar 
capacity. 

Summary 

The  Army  Center  of  Excellence  for 
Advanced  Propulsion  Systems  has  pro- 
vided an  infusion  of  personnel  and 
equipment  to  solve  basic  engine  system 
problems.  The  center  has  achieved  this 
through  training  and  the  transfer  of  in- 
formation on  engine  research  to  engine 
designers  and  manufacturers.  The  Ar- 
my, the  engine  industry  and  the  educa- 
tional system  have  all  benefitted 
through  the  resulting  increase  in 
understanding  between  Army  person- 
nel and  center  faculty. 


DR.  GARY  BORMAN  is  the  direc- 
tor of  the  Engine  Research  Center 
DR.  PHIL  MYERS  is  the  assistant 
director  of  the  Engine  Research 
Ce)iter. 

DR.  DAVID  MANN,  who  is  with 
the  Army  Research  Office,  is 
technical  monitor  for  the  Center  of 
Excellence  for  Advanced  Pro- 
pulsion. 


18  Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin 


November-December  1991 


IMPLEMENTING 
THE  IN-PLANT 
QUALITY 
EVALUATION 
PROCESS 


According  to  the  Secretary  of 
Defense’s  Defense  Management  Report 
to  the  President,  July  1989,  “a  series  of 
major  studies  since  the  Packard  Com- 
mission have  documented  an  alarming 
erosion  in  the  U.S.  defense  industrial 
base,  including:  a decline  in  the  total 
number  of  defense  suppliers;  ac- 
celerating import  penetration  and 
growing  dependency  on  foreign 
sources  for  vital  components  and 
subassemblies;  and  decreasing  returns 
on  fixed  assets,  declining  capital  in- 
vestments, and  lagging  productivity  in 
key  defense  sectors.”  These  trends  over 
the  long  term  will  significantly  affect 
our  national  security  readiness.  To 
combat  this  situation,  commanders  in 
the  Defense  Logistics  Agency  (DLA) 
decided  to  adopt  Total  Quality  Manage- 
ment (TQM). 

TQM  principles  include  stimulating 
innovation  and  reducing  variation  of 
processes  in  the  defense  industry.  The 
government  quality  section’s  new 
system  to  promote  these  changes  is  In- 
Plant  Quality  Evaluation  (IQUE). 

Defense  industrialists,  DLA  senior 
executives,  and  military  officers  with 
procurement  specialties  will  have  an  in- 
terest in  the  implementation  of  IQUE. 

Beginning  in  January  1990,  senior  of- 
ficials at  the  DLA  directed  the  initiation 
of  classes  to  train  personnel  on  the  pro- 
cedures of  this  new  system.  To  what 
degree  have  the  Quality  Assurance 
Representatives  (QARs)  at  a Defense 
Plant  Representative  Office  (DPRO)  im- 
plemented IQUE  and  is  the  government 
achieving  its  objectives?  This  article  in- 
cludes a retrospective  analysis  of 
whether  the  goals  of  IQUE  are  material- 
izing. Also,  there  is  a discussion  on  the 
events  that  preceded  IQUE  implemen- 
tation (old  system),  the  DPRO  missions, 
a discussion  of  IQUE  foundations,  and 
an  analysis  of  factors  associated  with 
the  implementation  of  IQUE.  These 
factors  include  contractor  and  DPRO 
teamwork,  openness,  flexibilities  of  the 
DPRO,  resistance  to  change,  job  securi- 
ty, and  quality  section  tools. 

Old  System 

To  ensure  that  DOD  funds  of  more 
than  seven  hundred  billion  dollars  were 
effectively  spent,  the  government 
previously  used  Contractor  Quality 
Assurance  Program  (CQAP)  methods. 
These  methods  focused  on  the  stand- 
ard American  industry  principles  of 


By  CPT  William  J.  Belknap 


production  and  discipline.  Specific  in- 
struments used  by  the  government 
were  product  inspection  at  rigid  inter- 
vals, emphasis  on  telling  the  contrac- 
tor how  to  conduct  processes,  and 
actions  in  a policeman’s  role. 

Looking  at  the  success  of  Japanese  in- 
dustry, the  DLA  understood  that  the  old 
way  of  administering  defense  contracts 
was  not  conducive  to  promoting  inter- 
nationally competitive  organizations 
nor  the  principles  of  TQM.  Before 
discussing  what  has  changed,  it  is 
helpful  to  describe  briefly  the  missions 
and  structure  of  the  DPRO. 

DPRO  Missions 

The  DPRO  is  collocated  with  the 
contractor.  Its  major  missions  are  en- 
suring that  the  contractor  ships  only 
quality  products  to  the  government, 
monitoring  contractor  performance  to 
facilitate  efficient  operations,  oversee- 
ing compliance  with  contract  terms, 
and  providing  the  best  possible  support 
to  the  program  managers  and  procur- 
ing activities. 


The  DPRO  includes  a contract  sec- 
tion, a quality  section  and  an  engineer 
section.  IQUE  implementation  is  the 
responsibility  of  the  quality  section. 
What  follows  is  a synopsis  of  IQUE 
foundations. 

IQUE  Foundations 

The  foundations  of  IQUE  are  con- 
gruent with  the  major  principles  of 
TQM.  Two  of  the  most  important  are 
using  statistical  analysis  to  determine  if 
processes  are  in  control  (a  process  is  in 
control  when,  after  statistical  sampling, 
it  conforms  to  the  upper  and  lower 
control  limits  as  agreed  upon  by  the 
contractor  and  the  government)  and 
encouraging  continuous  improvement. 
The  QAR  achieves  these  goals  through 
several  methods.  They  include  proof- 
ing contractor  processes,  conducting 
product  audits,  performing  data  collec- 
tion and  analysis,  and  completing  cor- 
rective action  requests  (CAR)  and 
continuous  improvement  oppor- 
tunities (CIO). 

Proofing  the  adequacy  of  the  process 


November-December  1991 


Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin  19 


Greater 

motivation 

in 

supporting 
the 
tenets 
of  IQUE 
and 
Improved 
Productivity 
would 
result 
from 
assuring 
the  QARs 
that 
they 
have 
job 
security. 


includes  determining  how  well  the 
contractor  blends  inputs  (people, 
machines,  tooling,  materials  and 
methods)  to  achieve  the  desired  out- 
come or  product. 

Periodically,  the  QAR  conducts  prod- 
uct audits  and  performs  detailed  data 
analysis  to  ensure  that  the  processes  are 
still  in  control.  This  is  done  by  various 
data  collection  means  and  then  using 
statistical  analysis  for  confirmation. 
Processes  that  are  not  in  control  are 
remedied  by  informing  the  contractor 
through  corrective  action  requests.  In 
addition,  if  any  procedures  can  be  im- 
proved, then  the  QAR  submits  a CIO  to 
the  contractor.  These  actions  form  the 
basis  for  IQUE. 

Contractor  and  DPRO 
Teamwork 

The  goals  of  IQUE  implementation 
are  customer  satisfaction,  continuous 
process  improvement,  improved  prod- 
uct quality,  and  reduced  overall  costs. 
Primary  vehicles  to  achieve  these  goals 
are  teamwork  between  the  government 
and  the  contractor,  flexibilities  within 
contract  administration,  and  the 
knowledge  of  whether  processes  are  in 
control.  This  knowledge  requires  an 
openness  by  the  contractor  in  pro- 
viding information  for  analysis  to  the 
government,  trusting  that  the  govern- 
ment will  not  use  the  information  in  a 
negative  way. 

As  Rosabeth  E.  Kanter,  a professor  at 
the  Harvard  Business  School,  purports 
in  the  Change  Masters,  both  organiza- 
tions to  achieve  TQM  goals  must 
“reduce  rancorous  conflict  and  isola- 
tion between  (them);  and  create 
mechanisms  for  exchange  of  informa- 
tion and  new  ideas  across  organiza- 
tional boundaries;  and  ensure  that 
multiple  perspectives  will  be  taken  in- 
to account  in  decisions;  and  provide 
coherence  and  direction.”  What  occurs 
is  similarity  of  focus  by  both  of  the 
organizations.  And,  unit  energies  are 
not  solely  directed  to  protecting  self  in- 
terests. Instead,  resources  are  more  ef- 
ficiently used  to  improve  joint  quality 
goals.  Besides  improved  quality,  cost 
reduction  is  a major  goal. 

Statistical  Process  Control 

To  reduce  costs  in  a product,  there 
must  be  less  time  spent  on  reworking 
failed  or  flawed  processes  (thus  reduc- 


ing labor  costs),  more  efficient  use  of 
materials  (thus  requiring  the  contractor 
to  purchase  less),  and  devoting  more 
time  to  improving  the  product  (thus 
making  the  contractor  more  com- 
petitive and  offering  competitive 
prices). 

With  statistical  process  control  pro- 
cedures, the  government  and  contrac- 
tor can  jointly  discover  what  is  causing 
variations  in  the  process  and  then  seek 
ways  to  reduce  the  variations.  These 
situations  demand  openness  between 
both  parties.  Previously,  the  QAR  was 
responsible  for  identifying  non-con- 
forming materials  and  products  and  en- 
suring they  were  not  delivered  to  the 
government.  The  contractor  was  on  his 
own  to  correct  the  deficiencies.  Now, 
with  the  advent  of  IQUE,  the  QAR  is 
part  of  the  solution. 

During  a discussion  with  a software 
specialist  at  a major  defense  contractor, 
he  stated  “under  the  new  system  I can 
inform  the  QAR  of  many  more  of  my 
problems  and  know  he  will  assist  in  im- 
proving the  process.” 

Although  the  contractor  is  still 
responsible  for  the  end  product,  the 
QAR  will  facilitate  correcting  deficien- 
cies and  exhibit  more  patience  before 
elevating  the  deficiencies  to  senior  level 
management. 

Another  indicator  of  openness  oc- 
curs with  the  transfer  of  information  to 
the  government.  Data  from  some 
automated  machines  is  fed  directly  in- 
to government  offices.  The  govern- 
ment can  now  receive  information  on 
the  performance  of  the  machines  the 
same  time  that  company  managers 
receive  it.  Two  examples  of  this  exist  in 
a contractor’s  plant  in  the  northeastern 
United  States.  These  two  machines 
record  data  on  thousands  of  processes 
and  express  the  data  on  yield  charts. 
One  machine  alone  is  responsible  for 
producing  over  5,000  antennae 
elements  for  the  Patriot  Radar  System. 
With  this  information,  the  QAR  spends 
less  time  inspecting  end  products 
because  the  machine  conducts  an  in- 
spection and  sends  the  information  to 
government  terminals  automatically. 


Flexibility 

This  openness  leads  directly  into  the 
subject  of  flexibility.  Gone  are  the  rigid 
schedules  of  inspection.  Now,  the  QAR 
only  conducts  a product  audit  if  a pro- 
cess is  not  in  control.  This  again  saves 


Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin 


November-December  1991 


Use  of  continuous  improvement  opportunities 
directly  translates  into  conforming  with  one  of 
the  major  tenets  of  IQUE— continuously  improving  processes 

and  saving  money. 


the  contractor  labor  hours  because  he 
now  spends  little  time  preparing  for  in- 
spections. Fewer  labor  hours  result  in 
a less  expensive  price.  Likewise,  more 
capital  can  be  spent  on  automation 
such  as  with  an  automatic  inspection 
machine.  This  programmable  machine 
inspects  printed  circuit  boards  at  a rate 
10  times  greater  than  what  a human 
could  accomplish.  The  machine  is 
almost  infallible.  Process  variation  is 
reduced  and  a higher  quality  product 
is  produced  because  there  is  less  varia- 
tion between  individual  commodities. 
Furthermore,  because  rework  is 
minimized,  the  products  are  produced 
at  a lower  cost.  Simultaneously,  the 
government  is  kept  informed  on  the 
status  of  the  process. 

Resistance  to  Change 

A factor  hindering  IQUE  implemen- 
tation is  resistance  to  change  from  ex- 
perienced QARs.  QARs  are  still  held 
accountable  for  the  acceptance  of  the 
commodity.  Some  have  relied  on  the 
inspection  process  for  over  20  years. 
They  know  there  will  still  be  some 
(although  minimal)  variation  in  the 
products.  The  IQUE  initiative  has  only 
been  on-going  for  20  months.  Adapting 
to  cultural  changes  requires  time.  Thus, 
it  will  probably  take  several  years  for 
these  cultural  barriers  to  breakdown. 
Job  security  is  another  issue  affecting 
implementation. 

Job  Security 

Some  QARs  believe  they  are  con- 
tributing to  the  demise  of  their  job. 
Other  than  the  already-in-place  tenure 
system,  there  has  been  little  said  about 
job  security  or  promotions.  This 
hinders  the  full  implementation  of 
IQUE.  As  Kanter  explained,  “When 
everything  is  highly  uncertain  ...  it  is 
difficult  to  invest  in  or  to  believe  in 


change,  or  even  to  stop  worrying  long 
enough  to  have  the  extra  energy  it  re- 
quires.’’ More  information  from  DLA 
senior  officials  on  job  security  would 
assist  in  this  change  process. 

Greater  motivation  in  supporting  the 
tenets  of  IQUE  and  improved  produc- 
tivity would  result  from  assuring  the 
QARs  that  they  have  job  security. 

QAR  Tools 

Another  significant  facet  of  the  im- 
plementation is  the  tools  the  QAR  uses 
to  induce  the  contractor  to  increase  in- 
novation and  productivity.  These  are 
corrective  action  requests  (CARs),  and 
continuous  improvement  opportun- 
ities (CIOs).  The  QAR  uses  CARs  to 
motivate  the  contractor  to  keep  pro- 
cesses under  control.  With  a CAR,  the 
contractor  must  indicate  what  action 
he  will  take  to  correct  a deficiency. 

Many  contractor  actions  were  to  in- 
spect more.  These  “solutions’’ 
however,  were  incongruent  with  TQM 
principles.  Now  when  this  occurs  the 
government  requires  the  contractor  to 
identify  what  changes  will  occur  to  im- 
prove the  flawed  processes.  This  helps 
shift  the  contractor’s  focus  from  con- 
ducting more  inspections  to  achieving 
controlled  processes  with  minimal 
variations. 

Another  tool  is  the  continuous  im- 
provement opportunity,  whereby  the 
contractor  is  notified  of  an  opportuni- 
ty to  improve  a process.  The  QAR  for- 
wards it  to  the  manager  involved  and 
to  the  plant  manager.  CIOs  are  not 
mandatory  — the  contractor  may 
choose  to  adopt  or  disregard  these  sug- 
gestions. The  government  works  more 
as  a team  member  to  improve  the  effi- 
ciency of  the  processes,  not  as  a 
policeman  diverting  valuable  time  from 
the  contractor.  Use  of  continuous  im- 
provement opportunities  directly 
translates  into  conforming  with  one  of 


the  major  tenets  of  IQUE-continuously 
improving  processes  and  saving  money. 

Conclusion 

Most  Quality  Assurance  Represen- 
tatives fully  support  the  tasks 
associated  with  the  adoption  of  the 
program.  There  is  much  evidence  to 
suggest  that  the  new  system  of  IQUE  is 
motivating  contractor  results.  These 
results  include  improving  contractor 
processes,  reducing  costs,  developing 
teamwork  between  the  government 
and  contractor  and  developing  flex- 
ibilities allowing  the  QAR  to  conduct 
product  audits  when  necessary.  There 
are  still  some  challenges  to  overcome. 
These  include  more  education,  defin- 
ing more  succinctly  what  comprises  a 
successful  program  and  what  needs  to 
be  improved,  and  providing  greater  job 
security. 

With  the  successful  outcome  of  these 
challenges  the  reduction  of  variation 
and  continuous  improvement  will  pro- 
ceed at  an  even  greater  rate. 


CPT  WILLIAM  ].  BELKNAP  is  a 
primary  contracting  officer  in  the 
Directorate  for  Production  and  Pro- 
curement at  the  US.  Army  Tank- 
Automotive  Command.  He  served 
previously  as  a Training  With  In- 
dustry student  in  the  Defense  Plant 
Representative  Office,  Raytheon, 
Burlington,  MA,  after  completing 
assignments  as  an  armor  officer  in 
the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany 
and  Fort  Stewart,  GA.  He  is  a 1981 
graduate  of  the  U.S.  Military 
Academy. 


November-December  1991 


Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin  21 


CHEMICAL 

WEAPONS 

TREATY 

VERIFICATION 


By  Richard  W.  Hutchinson, 
Robert  E.  Lentz, 
and  Stephen  L.  English 


Introduction 

In  1984,  Vice  President  Bush  in- 
troduced a draft  Chemical  Weapons 
Convention  (CWC)  to  the  40-nation 
Conference  on  Disarmament.  This  U.S. 
proposal  supported  a verifiable 
worldwide  ban  on  the  use,  stockpiling 
and  production  of  chemical  weapons 
(CW).  This  document  served  as  a 
baseline  from  which  subsequent  ver- 
sions of  the  CWC  draft  text  have 
evolved.  Negotiations  continue  to 
finalize  the  draft  text.  More  recently, 
the  U.S.  entered  bilateral  negotiations 
with  the  USR.  In  June  1990,  the  coun- 
tries signed  an  agreement  calling  for  the 
cessation  of  production  and  the 
destruction  of  existing  stockpiles  to  a 
5,000-ton  residual  ceiling. 

Verification  is  a key  U.S.  concern  for 
both  the  CWC  and  the  U.S. -USSR 
bilateral  agreements.  U.S.  negotiators 
need  to  know  how  and  to  what  extent 
the  CWC  and  bilateral  agreements  can 
be  verified  in  order  to  produce  CW 
agreements  favorable  to  U.S.  interests. 
The  U.S.  Army  Chemical  Research, 
Development  and  Engineering  Center 
(CRDEC)  has  the  technical  lead  within 
the  Department  of  Army  for  CW  trea- 
ty verification  R&D,  and  is  executing  a 


major  portion  of  the  DOD  CW  treaty 
verification  program.  The  Defense 
Nuclear  Agency  (DNA)  is  the  executive 
agent  for  the  overall  DOD  program. 

This  article  presents  a discussion  of 
the  CW  verification  problem,  the  R&D 
program  addressing  the  problem,  and 
preliminary  findings. 

CW  Verification  Problem 

The  parameters  of  CWC  verification 
have  two  main  components:  the  first  is 
the  verification  requirements  and  aims 
of  the  CWC,  and  the  second  is  the 
technical  and  physical  constraints 
within  which  those  requirements  must 
be  applied.  This  article  is  limited  to 
technical  aspects,  recognizing  that 
political  and  national  security  con- 
siderations do  and  will  have  a major  im- 
pact on  the  verification  procedures 
ultimately  implemented. 

The  CWC  requires  the  destruction  of 
existing  CW  stockpiles  and  production 
facilities  over  a 10  year  period,  and  pro- 
hibits CW  developments,  production, 
acquisition,  stockpiling,  assistance  to 
others,  and  use.  The  CWC  will  establish 
a technical  secretariat  with  a staff  of  in- 
ternational inspectors  to  perform 


verification  inspections. 

The  CWC  identifies  three  schedules 
of  chemicals  and  assigns  different  con- 
trol, reporting  and  verification 
measures  to  each  schedule.  Schedule  1 
chemicals  include  known  CW  agents, 
related  compounds,  binary  agent  com- 
ponents, and  two  toxins,  ricin  and  sax- 
itoxin.  It  permits  production  of  one 
metric  ton  per  year  of  Schedule  1 
agents  to  support  CW  defense,  medical, 
and  other  non-CW  research.  Schedule 
2 chemicals  are  precursors  for  produc- 
ing Schedule  1 agents.  A majority  of 
these  are  also  produced  commercially 
for  purposes  not  associated  with  CW. 
Schedule  3 chemicals  are  industrial 
chemicals  such  as  phosgene  that  might 
be  used  for  CW  purposes.  These  are 
called  “dual  use”  chemicals. 

The  CWC  provides  for  verification 
activities  for  10  situations  or 
“scenarios”  to  ensure  that  the  overall 
objectives  are  met.  (Table  1).  The  first 
five  verification  scenarios  in  Table  1 
deal  with  declared  CW  facilities  and 
stockpiles.  The  CWC  requires  that 
signatory  nations  declare  their  CW 
stockpiles  and  production  facilities. 
The  worldwide  number  of  such 
facilities  is  thought  to  be  less  than  100. 


22  Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin 


November-December  1991 


Thus,  the  scope  of  the  verification 
problem  for  declared  CW  facilities  is 
bounded  by  the  relatively  small  number 
of  facilities. 

Verification  of  permitted  Schedule  1 
CW  agent  production  is  also  limited  in 
scope  because  each  country  can  have 
only  one  declared  facility  that  pro- 
duces up  to  one  metric  ton  per  year  of 
agent.  These  quantities  of  agent  are  not 
considered  militarily  significant. 

Verification  of  the  declared  commer- 
cial production  of  Schedule  2 CW 
precursors  and  Schedule  3 dual-use 
chemicals  must  consider  hundreds  of 
commercial  chemical  plants  operating 
within  the  U.S.  and  possible  thousands 
operating  worldwide.  The  CWC  pro- 
vides for  periodic  inspection  of 
Schedule  2 facilities  and  an  annual  pro- 
duction declaration  for  Schedule  3 pro- 
ducers. Since  the  production  of 
Schedule  2 and  3 chemicals  is  allowed, 
the  thrust  of  verification  is  to  detect 


diversion  of  these  chemicals  into  CW 
through  records  review.  However,  the 
ease  with  which  records  can  be  falsified 
is  a critically  limiting  factor  in  consider- 
ing how  effectively  these  scenarios  can 
be  verified. 

Scenario  9 involves  the  use  of 
challenge  inspections  which  in- 
vestigate possible  noncompliance  at 
“suspect  sites.”  Here  lies  the  most  dif- 
ficult verification  problem  of  the  CWC. 
Signatures  of  CW  activities  are  very 
limited  and  a CW  munition  often  looks 
identical  to  a high  explosive  round.  A 
CW  stockpile  could  be  hidden  under- 
ground or  placed  in  a warehouse 
presenting  no  external  signature. 
Chemical  process  equipment  required 
to  produce  CW  agents  is  not  unique  and 
is  found  in  many  commercial  chemical 
production  facilities.  A CW  production 
facility  could  be  hidden  within  many 
of  the  world’s  10,000  commercial 
chemical  plants  and  not  be  apparent 


from  a plant  tour.  How  can  CW  ac- 
tivities, i.e.,  “suspect  sites,”  be  iden- 
tified within  such  a broad  universe  of 
potential  sites? 

Consensus  is  that  the  technical 
secretariat  will  have  limited  assets  to 
conduct  challenge  inspections  at 
suspect  sites.  Furthermore,  it  seems 
unlikely  that  it  will  have  the  ability  to 
identify  suspect  sites.  Therefore,  na- 
tional intelligence  assets  will  need  to  be 
used  to  detect  possible  cheating  and 
focus  challenges  on  suspect  sites.  Upon 
request,  the  technical  secretariat  would 
then  use  challenge  inspections  to  in- 
vestigate whether  cheating  has  oc- 
curred. 

This  last  step  is  not  straight  forward. 
There  is  evidence  that  a CW  agent  pro- 
duction facility  could  be  cleaned  up 
and  switched  to  a legitimate  commer- 
cial product  within  12  hours.  Traces  of 
CW  agents,  intermediates,  or  degrada- 
tion products  may  not  be  detectable 


TABLE  1 

VERIFICATION  SCENARIOS 

I. 

El imination 

of  Existing  CW  Stocks  and  Production  Facilities. 

Scenario  1. 

CW  Stockpile  Declaration 

Scenario  2. 

Movement  of  CW  Stocks  to  Destruction  Facility 

Scenario  3. 

Destruction  of  CW  Stocks 

Scenario  4. 

CW  Production  Facility  Declaration  and  Closure 

Scenario  5. 

Destruction  (Conversion)  of  CW  Production  Facility 

II. 

CW  Related  Activities  Not  Prohibited  by  Treaty 

Scenario  6. 

Production  of  (<1000  kg)  Schedule  1 (CW  Substances) 

Scenario  7. 

Production  of  Schedule  2 Materials 
(CW  Precursor  Substances) 

Scenario  8. 

Production  of  Schedule  3 Materials 
(Dual  Use  Chemicals) 

III. 

Fact  Finding 

Missions 

Scenario  9. 

Challenge  of  Facilities  and/or  Stocks 

Scenario  10. 

Challenge  or  Investigation  of  Use 

November-December  1991 


Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin  23 


after  several  days.  Conversely,  a 
1,000-ton  CW  stockpile  could  be 
moved  within  2-3  days.  Thus,  the  abili- 
ty to  confirm  cheating  is  dependent  on 
the  speed  with  which  challenge  inspec- 
tions can  be  conducted. 

A goal  of  the  CWC  verification  R&D 
program  underway  within  DOD  is  to 
evaluate  verification  procedures  and 
equipment  that  could  realistically  be 
employed  by  the  technical  secretariat 
given  the  realities  of  the  CW  verifica- 
tion problem  discussed  above.  Some  of 
the  effort  applies  to  the  problem  of 
identifying  suspect  sites,  but  that  objec- 
tive is  being  addressed  within  the  in- 
telligence community  and  is  not 
further  discussed  here. 

Treaty  Verification 
R&D  Program 

The  overall  structure  of  the  CRDEC 
effort  is  depicted  in  Figure  1.  The  foun- 
dation of  the  program  is  the  provisions 
of  the  CWC  draft  text  which  serve  as  re- 
quirements for  CW  verification.  Results 
from  the  program  are  provided  through 

Figure  1 

Program 

Structure 


DNA  and  the  Office  of  the  Secretary  of 
Defense  to  the  U.S.  negotiators.  This 
dynamic  feed-back  loop  provides 
technical  assessments  to  the  CWC 
negotiators  and  verification  re- 
quirements to  the  R&D  program. 

Because  of  the  difficulty  and  scope 
of  the  CW  verification  problem, 
CRDEC  requested  assistance  from  a 
wide  array  of  U.S.  research  organiza- 
tions. Five  Department  of  Energy  Na- 
tional Laboratories  are  participating  in 
field  testing  and  other  specialized  areas. 
The  U.S.  Army  Medical  Research  In- 
stitute of  Infectious  Disease  is  working 
on  toxin  analysts  and  Dugway  Proving 
Ground  is  assisting  in  field  testing.  In 
addition,  EAI  Corporation  is  assisting 
CRDEC  with  data  integration,  field 
testing  and  equipment  surveys. 

Existing  sampling  equipment,  meth- 
ods, and  draft  protocols  are  being 
evaluated  for  on-site  and  off-site  sam- 
ple analysis,  and  a shipping  container 
for  chemical  samples  is  being  fabricated 
for  possible  use  by  CWC  international 
inspectors.  Evaluation  of  configura- 
tions and  detailed  requirements  for  in- 


L  J 


ternational  and  national  laboratories  to 
support  the  CWC  are  also  underway. 
These  tasks,  taken  together,  will  evolve 
into  recommendations  on  a sampling 
and  analytical  system  needed  to  imple- 
ment the  CWC. 

An  international  market  survey  is  be- 
ing conducted  to  identify  off-the-shelf 
equipment  appropriate  for  inspections 
under  the  CWC.  The  equipment 
selected  for  evaluation  includes 
chemical  sensors,  physical  measuring 
devices,  physical  protective  equipment, 
tags  and  seals,  monitoring  devices,  and 
medical  support  kits.  For  practical  use, 
these  are  being  integrated  into  air- 
transportable  systems. 

The  third  task,  field  demonstration 
of  available  technology,  provides  the 
opportunity  to  field  test  verification 
procedures,  equipment  and  systems 
under  Tasks  1 and  2.  Verification  con- 
cepts are  developed  for  each  verifica- 
tion scenario,  and  are  based  on  the 
CWC  draft  text.  A project  team  then 
takes  the  concepts  to  a model  U.S.  site, 
a CW  stockpile  for  example,  and  con- 
ducts a baseline  survey  to  refine  the 
verification  concepts.  The  survey 
results  are  used  to  prepare  a first  order 
estimate  of  verification  effectiveness, 
cost  and  intrusiveness  for  a range  of 
verification  concepts. 

The  equipment  selected  from  market 
surveys  is  then  tested  in  an  equipment 
field  trial  at  a model  U.S.  site  to  deter- 
mine its  suitability.  The  recommended 
equipment  from  this  field  test  is  in- 
tegrated into  air-transportable  verifica- 
tion modules  and  tested  as  a total 
system  in  a system  field  demonstration. 
National  trial  inspections  (NTIs)  are 
conducted  by  the  Arms  Control  and 
Disarmament  Agency  (ACDA)  to  exer- 
cise U.S.  policy  in  areas  such  as  the 
diplomatic  procedures  for  entering 
country,  provision  of  escorts,  and 
translators,  etc.,  in  addition  to  inspec- 
tion procedures  and  equipment.  The 
CRDEC  has  played  a key  role  in  the  four 
U.S.  NTIs  conducted  to  date.  This 
iterative  testing  process  will  provide 
fully  demonstrated  verification  systems 
and  procedures  for  each  verification 
scenario. 

Preliminary  Findings 

Preliminary  verification  concepts 
were  identified  for  each  of  the  10 
scenarios.  The  concepts  provide  a 
range  in  effectiveness,  intrusiveness 


24  Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin 


November-December  1991 


SITUATION 

INITIAL  DECLARATION 

LONG  TERM  SECURITY 

Verification 

Aim 

Confirm  accuracy  of 
declaration 

Ensure  no  undetected 
removal 

Operational 

Concept 

100%  stack  count 
Sample  boxes/containers 
Sample  agent  (100  items) 
On-site  analysis 
Non-destructive  Test 
Physical  measurement 

Re-inventory  50%/6  mo. 
Spot  sample  agent 

Cost* 

1.2  Million 

1. 4-2.0  Million 

* Five  Year  Cost 


Figure  2. 

Recommended  Verification  System  for  CV\J  Stockpile. 


and  cost  in  order  to  provide  flexibility 
to  U.S.  negotiators  as  they  develop  trea- 
ty provisions. 

Preliminary  verification  concepts 
were  taken  to  Tooele  Army  Depot,  a 
major  U.S.  CW  stockpile  site,  and  refin- 
ed with  the  input  of  site  personnel  and 
observations.  The  refined  operational 
concepts  were  evaluated  for  effec- 
tiveness, intrusiveness  and  cost.  These 
three  factors  were  balanced  and  a 
recommended  verification  system  was 
proposed  (Figure  2).  The  recommend- 
ed approach  is  the  lowest  cost  option 
that  achieves  a reasonable  effectiveness 
in  meeting  verification  aims  and  a 
moderate  level  of  intrusiveness  to  site 
operations  and  security. 

Findings  from  the  Tooele  baseline 
survey  were  used  to  evaluate  the  pro- 
visions of  the  CWC  draft  text.  At  the 
detail  level,  a number  of  the  current 
CWC  provisions  were  found  to  require 
possible  modification.  These  findings 
were  provided  to  the  Office  of  the 
Secretary  of  Defense  in  a timely  man- 
ner for  use  in  CWC  and  bilateral 
negotiations.  To  date,  baseline  surveys 
are  completed  on  Scenarios  1 through 


8.  Equipment  field  trials  are  underway. 

Conclusion 

Verifying  the  CWC  is  a daunting 
challenge.  The  unbounded  number  of 
potential  cheating  sites  and  lack  of 
unique  signatures  precludes  absolute 
verification  of  compliance.  A rational 
fail-back  position  is  to  use  verification 
as  a deterrence  to  cheating  by  creating 
some  risk  that  a cheating  state  party 
would  be  caught.  To  achieve  this  objec- 
tive the  verification  measures  must  be 
credible  and  practical  — they  must  have 
a reasonable  effectiveness  at  an  ob- 
tainable cost  and  acceptable  level  of  in- 
trusiveness. 

Based  on  program  progress  to  date, 
the  extent  to  which  the  CWC  can  be 
verified  could  be  estimated  within  a 
year.  This  information  will  provide  a 
technical  basis  for  the  very  difficult 
policy  decisions  that  lie  ahead  in 
reaching  a final  Chemical  Weapons 
Convention. 


DR.  RICHARD  HUTCHINSON  is 
chief  of  the  CW  Treaty  Office,  Muni- 
tions Directorate,  U.S.  Army 
Chemical  RD&E  Center.  He  holds  a 
B.S.  degree  in  chemical  engineering 
from  Penn.  State  University  and  a 
Ph.D.  in  chemical  engineering  from 
Lehigh  University  and  is  a graduate 
of  the  U.S.  Army  War  College. 

ROBERT  E.  LENTZ  is  deputy  of 
the  CW  Treaty  Office,  Munitions 
Directorate,  U.S.  Army  Chemical 
RD&E  Center  He  holds  a B.S.  degree 
in  chemical  engineering  from  Johns 
Hopkins  University. 

STEPHEN L.  ENGLISH  is  a team 
leader  in  treaty  verification 
technology  with  the  U.S.  Army 
Chemical  RD&E  Center  He  holds  a 
B.S.  degree  in  science  from  Gannon 
University,  an  M.A.  degree  in 
management  and  supervision  from 
Central  Michigan  University,  and  is 
a graduate  of  the  U.S.  Army  Com- 
mand and  General  Staff  College. 


November-December  1991 


Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin  25 


COMMANDING  GENERAL 
U.S.  ARMY  TACOM 

MG  LeoJ.  Pigaty  was 
commissioned  a second 
lieutenant  through  the 
ROTC  program  upon 
graduation  from 

Lafayette  College  in 
Pennsylvania,  where  he 
earned  a bachelor's 
degree  in  civil  engineer- 
ing. MG  Pigaty  also 
received  a master  of 
science  degree  in 
logistics  management 
from  the  Air  Force  In- 
stitute of  Technology. 

His  military  education 
includes  the  Basic  and  Advanced  Officer  Courses  at  the  Ord- 
nance School,  U.S.  Army  Command  and  General  Staff  Col- 
lege, U.S.  Army  War  College,  and  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff 
Capstone  Course.  Other  important  command  and  staff  posi- 
tions he  has  held  include:  logistics  officer,  Office  of  the  Depu- 
ty Chief  of  Staff  for  Logistics,  Headquarters,  Department  of 
the  Army,  Washington,  D.C.;  commander.  1st  Maintenance 
Battalion;  chief,  800th  Materiel  Management  Center,  and  assis- 
tant chief  of  staff  for  materiel,  2d  Corps  Support  Command, 
VII  Corps,  U.S.  Army  Europe;  commander,  Anniston  Army 
Depot,  Anniston,  AL;  deputy  commanding  general  for 
research  and  development  at  the  Troop  Support  Command, 
St.  Louis,  MO;  and  commander,  Defense  Industrial  Supply 
Support  Command,  St.  Louis,  MO;  and  commander,  Defense 
Industrial  Supply  Center,  Defense  Logistics  Agency, 
Philadelphia,  PA. 

Mission  and  Organization 

The  U.S.  Army  Tank-Automotive  Command  (TACOM)  is  a 
major  subordinate  command  of  the  U.S.  Army  Materiel  Com- 
mand. TACOM’s  mission  is  integrated  commodity  manage- 
ment of  tanks,  automotive  ground  vehicles,  construction 
equipment,  materials  handling  equipment,  and  other  assigned 
materiel.  Other  mission  areas  include  research  and  develop- 
ment, design,  acquisition,  engineering,  safety,  materiel 
readiness,  integrated  logistics  support,  sustainment,  and 
seeurity  assistance  services. 

The  command  conducts  basic  and  applied  research  and 
related  technologies  for  assigned  vehicle  systems  and  other 
associated  developmental  programs.  TACOM  manages  the 
RDE  Center  for  all  tank  science  and  technology  and  executes 
assigned  missions  in  support  of  other  AMC  or  DOD  elements 
worldwide. 


TACOM  COMMAND  GROUP 

Warren,  MI  48397-5000 


Commanding  General 

Deputy  Commander 
for  Research, 
Development  and 
Engineering 
Deputy  Commanding 
General  for 
Procurement  and 
Readiness 


MG  LeoJ.  Pigaty 
Dr.  Kenneth  J.  Oscar 

BG  James  W.  Monroe 


DSN:  786-5131 
Comm:  (313)  574-5131 
DSN:  786-6144 
Comm:  (313)  574-6144 


DSN:  786-5134 
Comm:  (31.3)  574-5134 


MI-SERIES  ABRAMS 

The  Miseries  Abrams  tank  is  an  impressive  performer  and  is 
tanks  of  the  past.  Its  1,500  horsepower  gas  turbine  engine 
20  mph  in  seven  seconds.  Gun  stabilization  advanced  fire  control 
main-gun  accuracy  that  has  been  successfully  demonstrated  repeal 
tions  and  exercises. 


U.S.  ARM 
TANK-AUTOM 
COMMAND  (TK 


U.S.  ARI\if 
TANK-AUTOM 
RESEARCH,  DEVIi! 
AND  ENGINED 
CENTER  (TAB 


November-December  1991 


26  Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin 


I f 

DTIVE 

COM) 

ir 

E)TIVE 

LOPMENT 

RING 

DEC) 


i 

1 5/e  and  less  costly  to  maintain  than 
■ ! 0-  to  67-ton  tanks  from  standing  to 
J i ermal  imaging  combine  for  deadly 
: in  numerous  international  competi- 


TACOM  DEPUTY  COMMANDER 
FOR  RESEARCH,  DEVELOPMENT 
AND  ENGINEERING 
AND  DIRECTOR,  TARDEC 

Dr.  Kenneth  J.  Oscar  holds  a B.S.  degree  in 
physics  from  Clarkson  University  and  M S.  and 
Ph.D.  degrees  in  physics  from  American  Univer- 
sity. His  previous  positions  include:  director, 
Combat  Engineer  Support  Laboratory,  Belvoir 
RDE  Center;  associate  technical  director  for 
research  and  development,  U.S.  Army  Troop 
Support  Command;  and  assistant  deputy  chief 
of  staff  for  development,  engineering  and  ac- 
quisition, HQ,  Army  Materiel  Command.  At  the 
beginning  of  Operation  Desert  Shield  in  1990, 
Dr.  Oscar  was  temporarily  assigned  as  TACOM  acting  deputy  commander  for  pro- 
curement and  readiness,  where  he  served  until  the  conclusion  of  the  Persian  Gulf 
War. 

Mission  and  Organization 

TARDEC  is  the  Department  of  Defense  (DOD)  lead  agency  for  research,  develop- 
ment and  engineering  of  the  U.S.  Armed  Forces’  ground  mobility  fleet  and  is  one 
of  three  CRAY  supercomputer  sites  in  the  Army.  More  than  550  of  the  center’s  925 
employees  are  engineers  and  scientists. 

In  addition  to  maintaining  close  interface  with  TACOM  s commanding  general, 
deputy  commander  for  procurement  and  readiness,  and  Army  program  executive 
officers,  TARDEC  engineers  and  scientists  also  work  closely  with  their  counterparts 
throughout  the  U.S.  Army  Materiel  Command,  other  Army  agencies,  and  DOD. 

Committed  to  excellence,  TARDEC  has  implemented  a Total  Quality  Management 
(TQM)  program  with  a bias  for  action.  By  encouraging  employee  participation  in 
every  aspect  of  its  operations,  TARDEC’s  TQM  program  has  unleashed  the  creative 
forces  of  the  center’s  personnel  in  improving  processes  ranging  from  technical  data 
package  generation  to  the  acquisition  and  management  of  lab  equipment. 

Customer  identification  and  satisfaction  are  a vital  part  of  TARDEC’s  TQM 
philosophy.  The  TARDEC  Business  Plan  is  an  innovative  marketing  strategy  that 
revolves  around  customer  needs.  AMC  has  recognized  TARDEC  as  being  one  of  the 
first  RDE  Centers  to  develop  a comprehensive  Business  Plan. 

The  Business  Plan  contains  the  strategy  by  which  TARDEC  manages  resources, 
increases  quality,  and  pursues  new  customers.  TARDEC  actively  interacts  with  its 
customers  through  customer  site  visits  and  an  annual  customer  conference.  This 
bold  program  identifies  TARDEC  as  a leader  among  Army  RDE  Centers. 

TARDEC  has  a strong  commitment  to  promoting  equal  opportunity  in  the 
workplace,  as  well  as  in  the  local  community.  The  center  is  presently  establishing 
a pre-engineering  and  science  program  for  Detroit  area  high  school  students.  The 
students  will  be  brought  to  TARDEC  to  work  on  a variety  of  engineering  projects 
to  stimulate  their  interest  in  the  field  of  science  and  engineering.  The  center  has 
also  formed  a recruiting  team  that  visits  minority  colleges  and  universities 
throughout  the  country  to  interview  students  interested  in  pursuing  federal  employ- 
ment. Additionally,  an  annual  Engineering  Open  House  affords  entry-  and 
journeyman-level  minority  and  female  engineers  and  scientists  the  chance  to  join 
the  TARDEC  work  force. 

TARDEC  conducts  research  and  development  of  new  technologies  in  the  following 
areas:  vehicle  electronics,  survivability,  ground  propulsion,  simulation,  track  and 
suspension,  robotics  and  technical  integration.  These  technologies,  with  those 
developed  in  other  DOD  laboratories  and  RDE  centers,  industry  and  friendly  foreign 
countries,  are  integrated  at  the  appropriate  time  into  new,  combat-ready  fielded 
systems. 

TARDEC  not  only  assists  in  the  development  of  systems  but  also  supports  all 
ground-vehicle  systems  throughout  the  full-scale  development,  production  and 
fielding  phases.  Continued  on  page  28 


November-December  1991 


Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin  27 


Looking  Ahead 

An  important  objective  at  TARDEC  is  to  develop  new,  more 
combat-effective  systems  capable  of  surviving  the  rigors  of  tomor- 
row’s battlefield.  To  help  meet  this  goal,  TARDEC  is  focusing  at- 
tention on  several  key  technological  areas: 

• VETRONICS  (VEhicle  ElecTRONICS).  A long-term 
VETRONICS  program  is  under  way  to  develop  a computer- 
controlled  electrical  and  electronic  system  with  common  hardware 
and  software  modules  that  will  support  both  combat  and  tactical 
vehicles  planned  for  introduction  during  the  mid-  1990s  and 
beyond.  The  design  of  this  system  is  known  as  the  Standard  Army 
VETRONICS  Architecture  (SAVA). 

Current  sophisticated  vehicle  designs  use  separate  electrical  and 
electronic  components  to  handle  specific  tasks,  which  results  in 
significant  duplication  of  electronic  functions  and  an  overwhelm- 
ing number  of  controls  and  displays  for  the  crew.  The  SAVA  will 
partition  a vehicle  according  to  functions  rather  than  subsystems, 
thereby  making  it  possible  to  provide  for  common  functions  such 
as  data  processing,  memory,  and  multifunctional  controls  and 
displays  that  can  be  shared  by  several  vehicle  subsystems.  This 
reduces  the  size  and  weight  of  the  vehicle  electronics  and  makes 
it  easier  for  the  crew  to  operate.  A first-generation  vehicle  SAVA 
was  tested  in  FY92  in  the  new  M1A2  tank,  and  the  results  are  a leap 
ahead  in  battlefield  performance. 

•Survivability.  TARDEC  s priority  technical  objectives  include 
revolutionary,  non-traditional  approaches  toward  surviving  on 
highly  lethal  future  battlefields.  Emphasis  is  on  improving  signature- 
reduction  materials  and  techniques,  fire  suppression,  advanced  ar- 
mor technologies  and  integration,  and  crew  and  system  reaction 
techniques. 

In  two  major  thrust  areas,  TARDEC  is  actively  developing 
countermeasures  to  protect  U.S.  combat  vehicles  against  acquisi- 
tion and  targeting.  First,  it  is  developing  engineering  models  that 
aid  in  the  design  of  vehicles  with  minimum  infrared,  acoustic, 
millimeter  wavelength  and  radar  signatures.  TARDEC  is  also  striv- 
ing to  develop  models  in  the  visible  area  of  the  spectrum.  These 
models  are  being  provided  to  all  vehicle  system  contractors  and 
are  being  used  to  aid  in  the  design  of  the  Armor  System  Moder- 
nization vehicle  family. 

The  second  signature  thrust  area  is  in  the  modification  of  ex- 
isting combat  vehicles  through  the  application  of  signature  sup- 
pression materials  and  designs.  This  effort  aids  in  the  evaluation 
of  the  impact  of  various  levels  of  signature  reduction  against  smart 
munitions  and  target  acquisition,  and  in  the  definition  of  re- 
quirements for  new  vehicle  systems. 

In  “hit  avoidance”  countermeasures  (where  threat  weapons  can 
be  interrupted  at  some  point  in  their  delivery),  TARDEC  s efforts 
are  directed  toward  modular  integration  of  electronic  warfare  threat 
warning  receivers  and  countermeasure  reactions.  This  is  ac- 
complished through  incorporation  of  the  U.S.  Army 
Communications-Electronics  Command’s  Vehicle  Integration 
Defense  System  (VIDS).  VIDS  utilizes  the  SAVA  VETRONICS  ar- 
chitecture, including  the  central  processor,  the  communication 
busses  and  the  crew  controls  and  displays  to  identify  and  prioritize 
threats  and  select  and  initiate  the  optimum  countermeasure 
reactions. 

TARDEC  is  working  with  the  U.S.  Army  Ballistic  Research 
Laboratory  to  develop  various  armors  in  support  of  the  Army’s  Ar- 
mored Systems  Modernization  Program.  This  program  requires  the 
development  of  armors  for  all  applications  to  the  armored  family 
of  vehicles,  in  both  the  medium  and  heavy  threat  categories. 
TARDEC’s  damage  reduction  efforts  include  work  in  spall  protec- 
tion, fuel  and  ammunition  fire  suppression,  and  in  directed  energy 
hardening.  Fire-suppression  and  laser-hardening  technology  and 
systems  have  been  developed  and  fielded  in  the  current  combat 
vehicle  fleet. 

• Mobility.  TARDEC  has  a world-class  ground-vehicle  propul- 
sion, track  and  suspension  and  vehicle  design  capability.  Its  super- 


computer is  netted  throughout  the  command  to  rapidly  integrate 
the  U.S.  Army  Missile  Command’s  missiles  and  the  U.S.  Army  Ar- 
mament, Munitions  and  Chemical  Command’s  guns  into 
sophisticated,  new  vehicle  designs. 

• Composites.  In  a long-term  research  program  under  way  to 
fill  a growing  need  for  lightweight,  air-transportable  combat 
vehicles  suitable  for  rapid  deployment  anywhere  in  the  world, 
TARDEC  plans  to  develop  a Composite  Armored  Vehicle  Advanc- 
ed Technology  Transition  Demonstrator  (CAV  ATTD).  This  vehi- 
cle will  help  engineers  evaluate  advanced  lightweight  composite 
materials,  survivability,  and  two-man-  crew  technologies  required 
to  meet  future  sophisticated  battlefield  threats. 


TARDEC  COMMAND  GROUP 


Director, 

TACOM  RDE  Center 
Acting  Deputy  Director 
for  Engineering 
and  Acquisition 
Deputy  Director 
for  Research 
and  Development 
Deputy  Director 
for  Technical 
Operations 


Warren,  MI  48397-5000 

Dr.  Kenneth  J.  Oscar 

Richard  E.  Minnis 


DSN:  786-6144 
Comm:  (313)  574-6144 
DSN:  786-6113 
Comm:  (313)  574-6113 


Wayne  K.  Wheelock  DSN:  786-5494 

Comm:  (313)  574-5494 


Richard  E.  Minnis 


DSN:  786-6539 
Comm:  (313)  574-6113 


M2/M3  BRADLEY  FIGHTING  VEHICLE 
(BFV) 

More  than  just  an  armored  personnel  carrier,  the  Bradley  represents  the  first 
armored  vehicle  to  allow  the  American  infantry  squad  to  fight  while  moving 
at  high  speed.  The  BFV  fleet  first  added  the  dimension  of  infantry  fighting- 
from-under-armor  when  it  replaced  M113  series  APCs  at  the  2nd  Armored 
Division  in  1983.  The  Bradley  fleet  consists  of  M2-series  Infantry  Fighting 
Vehicles  designed  for  a nine-man  infantry  squad  and  M3-series  Cavalry 


Fighting  Vehicles  designed  for  a five-man  cavalry  squad  serving  in  armored 
cavalry  units  and  as  scouts  for  mechanized  infantry  and  tank  battalions. 


28  Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin 


November-December  1991 


M998-SERIES  HIGH-MOBILITY  MULTIPURPOSE 
WHEELED  VEHICLE  (HMMWV) 

In  the  early  1980s,  facing  changes  in  battlefield  technology,  the 
Army  focused  on  the  need  for  a high-mobility,  light  truck  capable  of 
performing  a variety  of  missions.  The  Army  needed  an  air- 
transportable,  reliable,  maintainable  and  survivable  vehicle  to  fill 
cargo-carrier,  troop-carrier  and  armament  requirements,  as  well  as 
certain  ambulance  and  shelter-roles  in  the  1 /4-ton  to  1-1/4  ton 
range.  The  HMMWV  meets  all  of  these  requirements. 


M9  ARMORED  COMBAT  EARTH  MOVER 
(M9  ACE) 

The  Army’s  M9  ACE  digs  as  fast  as  the  most  ef- 
ficient bulldozer,  travels  30  mph  cross-country,  is 
air-transportable  and  offers  armor  protection 
equal  to  that  of  the  M113-series  armored  person- 
nel carrier  (APC).  The  M9  enhances  the  ability  of 
engineer  platoons  and  divisional  engineer  bat- 
talions to  perform  vital  support  missions.  These 
include  constructing  antitank  ditches,  digging  in 
infantry,  artillery  and  armor,  and  tasks  once 
handled  by  many  different  pieces  of  slow-moving 
civilian  construction  equipment  that  lacked  the 
armor  protection  needed  to  survive  in  combat. 


M 977-SERIES  HEAVY  EXPANDED  MOBILITY 
TACTICAL  TRUCK  (HEMTT) 

This  truck,  which  performs  cross-country  military  missions,  car- 
ries payloads  up  to  11  tons  and  performs  well  both  on  and  off 
the  road.  The  design  objectives  gave  prime  consideration  to 
industry-proven  heavy-duty  truck  components,  ease  of 
maintenance,  and  interchangeability  of  major  parts  within  the 
vehicle  series.  The  truck  is  used  for  direct  re-arming  of  the 
multiple  Launch  Rocket  System,  transport  of  Patriot  erec- 
tor/launchers, resupply  of  field  artillery  ammunition  and  forward 
area  re-arm  vehicles  in  armor,  cavalry  and  infantry  units,  refuel- 
ing of  tracked  and  wheeled  vehicles  and  helicopters  in  the  for- 
ward areas,  and  recovery  of  disabled  wheeled  vehicles. 


November-December  1991 


Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin  29 


THE  ARMY 
INDUSTRIAL 
MODERNIZATION 
INCENTIVES 
PROGRAM 


By  Eddie  Japzon 


The  IMIP  focuses 
on  factory- 
wide or  single  product 
or  process  line  improvements 

by  analyzing 
the  total 
business  environment 
and  by  considering 
well  established 
and  state-of-the-art 
technologies. 


Introduction 

Since  the  fielding  of  quality  weapons 
systems  to  American  soldiers  is  depend- 
ent on  industry’s  ability  to  produce 
them,  a strong  industrial  base  is  a key 
element  in  the  U.S.  acquisition  process. 
One  effort  to  achieve  a strong  industry 
base  is  the  DOD’s  Industrial  Modern- 
ization Incentives  Program  (IMIP) 
which  assists  military  contractors  in 
manufacturing  quality  products. 

IMIP  offers  incentives  to  contractors 
so  that  they  can  modernize  their 
facilities  and  improve  the  defense  in- 
dustrial base.  It  entails  a structured 
engineering  analysis  and  creates  a more 
cost-efficient  defense  production 
capability  for  weapon  systems,  equip- 
ment and  material.  Under  the  IMIP — 
which  is  implemented  through  a 
“business  agreement,”  the  government 
offers  contractors  certain  incentives  for 
financing  capital  investments  to  expand 
their  industrial  productivity  when 
market  forces  are  normally  insufficient 
to  motivate  such  expansion. 

The  IMIP  focuses  on  factory-wide  or 
single  product  or  process  line  im- 
provements by  analyzing  the  total 
business  environment  and  by  consider- 
ing well  established  and  state-of-the-art 
technologies. 

The  IMIP  evolved  from  the  Air 
Force  Technology  Modernization 
(TECHMOD)  Program  and  the  Army  In- 
dustrial Productivity  Improvement 
(IPI)  Program.  In  1982,  DOD  integrated 
these  separate  programs  into  the  IMIP 
to  enhance  and  revitalize  the  defense 
industrial  base.  In  1985,  policies  regard- 
ing the  IMIP  were  implemented  under 
the  DOD  Directives  5000.44  and  the 
accompanying  DOD  Guide  5000. 44G. 

Objectives 

Short-term  objectives  are  to  increase 
productivity;  shorten  lead  times;  im- 
prove product  quality,  maintainability 
and  reliability;  and  reduce  costs.  The 
long-term  objectives  are  to  maintain  a 
strong  defense  industrial  base  which 
meets  current  defense  needs  and  to  re- 
spond to  surge  and  mobilization  re- 
quirements. 

Accomplishments 

During  the  1980s,  the  Army’s  IMIP 
efforts  were  primarily  centered  at  the 
Stratford  Army  Engine  Plant  (SAEP)  and 
the  General  Dynamics  Land  Systems 


Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin 


November-December  1991 


(GDLS)  Division  facilities.  These 
facilities  produced  and  assembled  the 
Ml  tank  engines  and  the  tank  main 
frames  respectively.  These  facilities 
permitted  the  Army  to  motivate  con- 
tractors to  invest  approximately  $1.70 
for  every  $1.00  of  Army  investment. 
This  Army-contractor  effort  resulted  in 
FY87  through  FY91  savings  of  approx- 
imately $153  million  which  were  pass- 
ed on  to  the  Army  in  a reduced  cost  of 
the  Ml  tank.  These  savings  translated  to 
a return  on  investment  of  $4.25  for 
every  $1.00  of  Army  investment. 

Some  of  the  modernization  projects 
undertaken  at  SAEP  were: 

• Group  Technology  Concept 
Manufacturing  guided  the  rearrange- 
ment of  the  factory  into  manufacturing 
cells  that  machined  groups  of  similar 
parts.  It  also  guided  the  layout  of  the 
factory  into  a logical  process  flow,  with 
incorporation  of  an  advanced  material 
handling  system. 

• Master  Planning  and  Control 
System  computerized  all  decisions  and 
activities  regarding  material  flow  and 
allocation  of  resources  while  in- 
tegrating these  activities  with  design 
and  process  development.  Examples  of 
subsystems  were:  master  schedule,  con- 
tract material  planning,  design 
engineering,  inventory  control, 
manufacturing  engineering,  shop  floor 
control  and  capacity  requirements 
planning,  tool  inventory  management 
system. 

• Manufacturing  Equipment 
Modernization  initiated  the  rebuild- 
ing of  some  equipment  if  the  cost  to 
rebuild  was  less  than  65  percent  of  the 
cost  of  the  new  machine  and  acquired 
new  equipments,  i.e.,  gear  grinding  us- 
ing cubic  boron  nitride,  cutting  and 
drilling  sheet  metal  using  a laser  beam, 
deburring  of  machined  metal  parts  us- 
ing a robotic  system,  and  stamping  the 
Inconel  624  recuperator  disks  using  a 
four  press  system  with  automatic  part 
transfer. 

• Material  Handling  Moderniza- 
tion integrated,  by  computer,  receiv- 
ing, receiving  inspection,  and 
inspection  buffer  storage  to  enhance 
the  receipt  of  dock-to-stock  material 
handling;  through  the  use  of  automated 
guided  vehicles  that  transport  the 
material  to  pick  up  and  drop  off  points 
inside  the  factory;  and  through  a com- 
puterized high  rise/high  density  storage 
area  for  finished  parts. 

These  modernization  efforts  at  SAEP 


Long-term  objectives 
are  to  maintain  a strong 
defense  industrial  base 
which  meets  current 
defense  needs  and  to 
respond  to  surge 
and  mobilization 
requirements. 


resulted  in  a 50  percent  reduction  in  the 
number  of  production  machines;  an  85 
percent  reduction  in  rework  and  scrap; 
tripled  output;  a 20-day  cut  (from  25 
to  five)  from  dock-to-stock,  and  a 50 
percent  increase  in  factory  efficiency. 

The  Army,  in  1984,  also  supported  a 
factory  engineering  analysis  at  four 
GDLS  facilities  — Lima,  Detroit,  Scran- 
ton and  Sterling — which  enabled  the 
contractor  to  benchmark  operations 
and  to  identify  and  prioritize  a broad 
range  of  “target  of  opportunities”  for 
productivity  improvements.  This 
analysis  resulted  in  the  installation  of 
a Manufacturing  Resource  Planning 
(MRP)  System  division-wide,  a com- 
puterized and  vision-directed  arc 
welding  robotic  system  for  the  fabrica- 
tion of  the  tank  main  frame,  and  a 
number  of  high  risk  technology 
development  projects  that  were  fund- 
ed by  manufacturing  technology 
(MANTECH).  The  installation  of  these 
advanced  systems  and  technology  pro- 
jects resulted  in  savings  that  have  been 
passed  on  to  the  Army. 

Three  Phases  Of  IMIP 

The  efforts  to  improve  productivity 
at  these  facilities  entailed  the  use  of  the 
three  phases  of  IMIP.  Phase  I deter- 
mined the  “as  is”  and  “to  be”  condi- 
tions of  the  facility  which  formulated 
the  strategic  plan  and  the  conceptual 
designs  of  the  modernization  re- 
quirements. Phase  II  detailed  the 
design,  development  and  validation  of 
the  modernization  opportunities  iden- 
tified in  Phase  I.  In  this  phase,  im- 
plementation plans  were  identified, 
hardware  and  software  requirements 
were  determined,  specific  applications 
were  validated  through  modeling  or 
method  demonstrations  and  cost 


benefit  analysis  performed.  Phase  III 
involved  the  contractor  purchase  and 
installation  of  the  equipment  needed  to 
implement  and  complete  the  modern- 
ization project.  Only  upon  completion 
did  the  Army  begin  to  realize  the  sav- 
ings and  the  contractor  rewarded  as 
negotiated.  The  Army  fully  funded  all 
Phase  I projects  and  some  of  the  Phase 
II  projects. 

Manufacturing  Technology 
Program 

In  implementing  these  projects,  the 
MANTECH  Program  complemented 
and  supported  the  IMIP  efforts,  e g., 
robotic  deburring  at  SAEP  and  im- 
plementation of  high  risk  technologies 
at  GDLS.  Both  MANTECH  and  IMIP, 
components  of  the  Industrial  Prepared- 
ness Program,  aim  to  ensure  readiness 
and  responsiveness  of  the  defense  in- 
dustrial base  to  the  needs  of  the  military 
establishment. 

MANTECH,  however,  was  employed 
in  making  first-case  manufacturing  pro- 
cesses and  equipment  improvements. 
IMIP,  on  the  other  hand,  focused  on 
further  implementing  successfully 
demonstrated  MANTECH  projects  on 
the  shop  floor. 

Key  Incentives 

The  application  of  Army  funded 
Phase  I and  II  projects  and  the  Produc- 
tivity Savings  Rewards  (PSR)  which 
were  paid  to  the  contractors  after  sav- 
ings verification,  were  the  incentives 
that  made  the  contractors  undertake 
the  modernization  of  their  facilities. 
The  PSR,  encompassing  the  savings 
sharing  ratio,  was  negotiated  between 
the  Army  and  the  contractors  before 
they  embarked  on  the  productivity 
enhancing  capital  investments  and 
related  productivity  improvement  ef- 
forts. Incentives  provided  to  the  con- 
tractors were  commensurate  with  the 
degree  of  contractor  funding,  risk  of 
the  investment,  and  other  economic 
factors. 

Business  Agreement 

The  key  document  that  was  crafted 
by  the  Army  and  the  contractors  in  the 
early  phases  of  IMIP  to  guarantee  its 
success  was  the  “Business  Agreement.” 
Instead  of  the  Army  being  simply  a 
customer  and  the  contractors  simply  a 


November-December  1991 


Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin  31 


source  of  supply,  both  parties  entered 
into  a partnership  in  which  each  shared 
the  risks  and  the  rewards  of  advancing 
production  technology  and  moderniz- 
ing industrial  plants. 

Current  and  Future 
Contractor  Participation 

Army  IMIP  funding  has  been  limited 
over  the  past  few  years.  Currently,  the 
Army  is  assisting  in  the  implementation 
of  modernization  projects  that  support 
systems  being  procured  at  the  follow- 
ing contractor  facilities: 

• Saco  Defense  Incorporated,  Saco, 
ME; 

• Alliant  Techsystems  Incorporated, 
New  Brighton,  MN; 

• Allison  Gas  Turbine  Division  of 
General  Motors,  Indianapolis,  IN; 

• Allison  Transmission  Division  of 
General  Motors,  Indianapolis,  IN; 

• Garrett  Engine  Division  of  Allied- 
Signal  Company,  Phoenix,  AZ; 

• Litton  Precision  Gear  Company, 
Chicago,  IL; 

• Bell  Helicopter  Textron  Incor- 
porated, Fort  Worth,  TX;  and 

• McDonnell  Douglas  Helicopter 
Company,  Mesa,  AZ. 

Future  plans  call  for  the  initiation  of 
IMIP  at  the  Boeing  Helicopter  facility 
at  Ridley  Park,  PA;  Sikorsky  Aircraft 


IMIP/MANTECH  Relationship. 

facility  at  Stratford,  CT,  and  various 
subcontractor  facilities  that  support  the 
development  of  the  Comanche  (Light 
Helicopter)  Air  Vehicle. 

How  To  Participate 

A contractor  normally  initiates  par- 
ticipation in  IMIP  prior  to  the  Full  Scale 
Engineering  Development  (FSED) 
phase  of  a materiel  acquisition.  Army 
contractors,  interested  in  formulating 
Business  Agreements,  should  submit 
modernization  proposals  by  way  of  the 
program  executive  office  (PEO)  to  the 
Army  major  subordinate  command 
(MSC)  with  whom  they  are  under  con- 
tract. The  MSC,  in  turn,  passes  on  con- 
tractor proposals  to  the  Office  of  the 
Deputy  Chief  Of  Staff  for  Concurrent 
Engineering  at  Headquarters,  U.S. 
Army  Materiel  Command,  for  funding 
approval. 

Project  Evaluation  Criteria 

Criteria  that  are  used  in  determining 
whether  to  fund  a project  proposal  are 
the  outyear  materiel  requirements,  two 
years  or  less  payback  on  the  Army  in- 
vestment, a short  duration  of  the  proj- 
ect, PEO /PM  support,  and  the 
estimated  contractor  or  other  govern- 
ment agency  investment. 


Conclusions 

This  is  just  a brief  overview  of  the 
Army  IMIP  and  its  role  in  the  enhance- 
ment of  the  defense  industrial  base.  It 
is  a low  key  effort,  not  robustly  fund- 
ed, but  an  essential  Army  program. 
Essential,  if  we  expect  Army  contrac- 
tors to  continue  to  manufacture  and 
assemble  quality  and  reliable  products 
that  gain  the  full  trust  and  confidence 
of  the  ultimate  user — the  soldier.  The 
superb  performance  of  the  Ml  tanks  in 
Operation  Desert  Storm  further 
demonstrated  the  value  and  benefits  of 
IMIP  as  a force  behind  the  moderniza- 
tion of  the  facilities  that  produced  these 
tanks. 


EDDIE  JAPZON  is  the  staff 
engineer  for  IMIP  in  the  Office  of 
the  Deputy  Chief  of  Staff  for  Con- 
current Engineering,  Headquarters 
U.S.  Army  Materiel  Command.  He 
has  a B.S.  degree  in  mechanical 
engineering  from  the  University  of 
San  Carlos  in  the  Philippines  and 
an  M.S.  degree  in  management 
from  Frostburg  State  University  in 
Maryland. 


32  Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin 


November-December  1991 


INNOVATIVE 

OPERATIONAL 

TESTING 

A Preview 
of  the  Future 


By  MAJ  Laurence  A.  Womack 


Introduction 

With  the  shrinking  defense  budget 
and  the  push  to  get  new  and  reliable 
systems  into  the  field  quickly,  the  test 
and  evaluation  community  must  re- 
think how  to  conduct  quality  testing  to 
ensure  quality  products.  This  testing 
must  be  thorough,  must  stress  the 
system  under  field  conditions,  and 
must  be  timely,  cost  effective,  and 
designed  to  use  minimum  resources. 

By  definition,  an  operational  test  is 
the  field  test  of  the  system  under 
realistic  combat  conditions  by  repre- 
sentative military  users.  It  uses  person- 
nel with  the  same  military  occupational 
specialty  as  those  who  will  operate, 
maintain,  and  support  the  system  when 
deployed. 

Operational  testing  is  expensive, 
which  is  why  the  need  for  innovation 
in  operational  testing  is  necessary.  An 
example  of  an  innovative  approach  was 
testing  of  the  Lightweight  Tactical  Fire 
Direction  System  (LTACFIRE)  and  the 
Forward  Entry  Device  (FED)  conducted 
by  the  Test  and  Experimentation  Com- 
mand’s Fire  Support  Test  Directorate 
during  1990  at  Fort  Ord,  CA. 

Background  and  Purpose 

In  FY  88,  Congress  directed  the 


Army  to  procure  LTACFIRE  for  light  in- 
fantry divisions.  In  the  plan  for  pro- 
curement, a force  development  test  and 
experimentation  (FDTE)  would  be  con- 
ducted after  the  first  light  infantry  divi- 
sion was  fielded  with  LTACFIRE.  The 
7th  Infantry  Division  (Light)  was  field- 
ed with  LTACFIRE  and  LTACFIRE  FDTE 
in  late  1990. 

The  purpose  of  the  LTACFIRE  FDTE 
was  to  evaluate  the  effectiveness  of 
automation  and  to  refine  future 
organization,  maintenance,  and  train- 
ing in  the  light  infantry  division. 

In  March  and  April  1990,  the  FED 
underwent  an  initial  operational  test 
and  evaluation  and  did  not  meet  its  re- 
quired operational  capabilities  in 
several  areas.  Because  of  the  potential 
impact  on  the  Army  Tactical  Command 
and  Control  System  Common  Hard- 
ware Software  Program,  a follow-on 
operational  test  and  evaluation  (FOTE) 
became  necessary.  The  purpose  of  the 
FED  FOTE,  which  was  conducted  in 
late  1990,  was  to  evaluate  the  in- 
teroperability, system  reliability,  opera- 
tional effectiveness,  and  training  of  the 
FED  in  the  light  infantry  division  fire 
support  system  and  to  verify  that  cor- 
rections identified  in  the  initial  opera 


tional  test  and  evaluation  were  im- 
plemented. 


System  Description 

The  LTACFIRE  is  an  interim  system  to 
replace  the  manual  methods  used  by 
the  light  infantry  division  artillery.  It  is 
a lightweight,  transportable,  decen- 
tralized computer  processing  system 
for  the  control  of  artillery  and  mortar 
fires  at  division,  brigade,  and  battalion 
level.  It  has  user-friendly,  menu-driven 
software,  with  a “touch  screen’’ 
method  of  entry,  which  provides  the 
light  forces  with  responsive  and  con- 
tinuous fire  support  (See  Figure  1). 

The  FED  hardware,  with  common 
software,  is  a nondevelopmental  item 
which  the  Army  will  purchase  under 
the  Army  Tactical  Command  and  Con- 
trol System  Common  Hardware  Soft- 
ware Program  to  replace  the  currently 
fielded  digital  message  device.  It  is  a 
lightweight,  hand-held,  input/output 
device  for  foot  mobile  forward  observ- 
ers and  fire  support  teams  to  use  in  con- 
ducting and  planning  fire  support 
operations  (See  Figure  2). 


November-December  1991 


Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin  33 


Test  Concerns 

The  initial  concept  was  to  conduct 
both  the  LTACFIRE  FDTE  and  FED 
FOTE  concurrently,  but  separately.  This 
concept  was  pursued  because  the  ex- 
perimentation aspect  of  the  LTACFIRE 
FDTE  allowed  maximum  flexibility  in 
correcting  test  related  problems  with 
doctrine,  scenario  inputs,  and  equip- 
ment. On  the  other  hand,  the  FED 
FOTE  was  a pure  evaluation  which  re- 
quired strict  control  to  determine  if  the 
FED  met  or  failed  to  meet  its  required 
operational  capabilities.  This  approach 
dictated  two  separate  test  directorates 
and  the  associated  duplication  of  many 
functions,  a large  increase  in  funding 
for  temporary  duty  and  civilian  local 
hire,  and  the  need  for  additional  in- 


strumentation support. 

An  additional  problem  that  was  a 
potential  “show  stopper”  was  the 
beginning  of  “Operation  Desert 
Shield,”  which  put  all  FORSCOM  sup- 
port taskings  on  hold.  The  impending 
lack  of  support  surfaced  the  need  to 
develop  an  approach  to  testing  that 
allowed  for  the  reduction  of  personnel 
and  cost  to  the  minimum  numbers  re- 
quired to  accomplish  both  missions.  At 
this  point,  the  consolidation  of  person- 
nel and  resources  was  considered  and 
the  advantages  and  disadvantages 
evaluated.  The  Test  and  Evaluation 
Command’s  Fire  Support  Test  Direc- 
torate formulated  a plan  and  presented 
it  to  the  U.S.  Army  Field  Artillery 
School;  TRADOC  system  manager,  Fire 


Figure  2. 


Support  Command  Control,  and  Com- 
munications; program  manager  (PM), 
Field  Artillery  Tactical  Data  Systems 
(FATDS);  and  Operational  Test  and 
Evaluation  Command.  All  endorsed  the 
plan  and  work  began  on  the  test  in- 
tegration design. 


Test  Integration 

A four-step  approach  was  used  to  in- 
tegrate both  tests  into  one  overall  test 
plan.  The  first  step  was  to  finalize  the 
list  of  essential  personnel  and  resources 
needed  by  the  test  directorate  to  ac- 
complish the  combined  test.  Figure  3 
illustrates  the  combined  test  direc- 
torate. This  plan  combined  tasks  and 
reduced  the  size  of  the  test  directorate 
from  123  personnel  to  71 — a 42  percent 
reduction. 

The  second  step  was  to  take  the  plan 
and  identify  where  the  resources  could 
be  obtained.  This  was  critical  because 
the  7th  Infantry  Division  Artillery  was 
tasked  to  provide  all  test  players,  data 
collectors,  and  support  personnel  iden- 
tified in  the  outline  test  plans.  This 
could  have  been  a possible  ‘ ‘show  stop- 
per” if  the  division  artillery  had  to  pro- 
vide all  of  the  personnel.  Our  efforts  to 
locate  alternate  sources  for  data  collec- 
tors and  support  personnel  were  suc- 
cessful. 

U.S.  Army  Communications- 
Electronics  Command’s  New  Equip- 
ment Training  Team  provided  all  the 
data  collectors  (13)  for  the  LTACFIRE 
equipped  nodes;  U.S.  Army  Field  Ar- 
tillery School  provided  operations  per- 
sonnel (2);  and  U.S.  Army  Test  and 
Experimentation  Command’s  Test  Ex- 
perimentation Center  provided  all  the 
FED  data  collectors  (10). 

The  third  step  was  to  integrate  the 
time-ordered  events  lists  for  both  tests. 
This  was  accomplished  by  placing  the 
FED  FIST  team  on  a separate  radio  net 
into  the  battalion  fire  support  element 
and  dedicating  a battery  fire  direction 
center  from  the  FDTE. 

The  fourth  and  final  step  was  to  brief 
all  the  key  participants  (U.S.  Army  Field 
Artillery  School;  U.S.  Army  Operational 
Test  and  Evaluation  Command;  PM 
FATDS;  TRADOC  system  manager,  Fire 
Support  Command,  Control  and  Com- 
munications; and  7th  Light  Infantry 
Division  Artillery)  concerning  how  to 
conduct  the  test  integration  and  where 
to  obtain  the  personnel. 


34  Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin 


November-December  1991 


LTACFIRE  F DTE/FED  FOTE 
TEST  DIRECTORATE 


2-  CPTs 

1-  GS12 

1-  GS12 

1-  GS12 

3-  NCOS 

3-  NCOS 

28- OFFs/NCOs 

1-  GS11 

5-  CWO/NCOs 

1-  CLERK/ 

2-  GS9s 

2-  OFFICERS 

TYPIST 

4-  WAE5s 

3-  COMPUTER 

8-  DRIVERS 

OPERATORS 

55- MILITARY 

1S-DOD  CIVILIANS 
71  TOTAL 


Funding 

In  evaluating  the  funding  re- 
quirements for  combining  these  tests, 
the  costs  of  conducting  the  tests 
separately  was  important  to  consider. 
The  cost  of  each  test  was  listed  in  the 
respective  outline  test  plans.  The  LTAC- 
FIRE FDTE  cost  was  $339K,  and  the 
FED  FOTE  would  have  cost  approx- 
imately $274K  (based  on  the  cost  of  the 
FED  initial  operational  test  and  evalua- 
tion). The  combined  test  resulted  in  the 
FED  FOTE  costing  $156. 3K,  or  a 43 
percent  savings.  This  is  intangible  sav- 
ings realized  by  comparing  the  actual 
cost  to  the  projected  cost  of  a separate 
FOTE.  The  actual  FOTE  cost  savings 
were  the  result  of  combining  and 
streamlining  existing  resources  already 
computed  into  the  LTACFIRE  FDTE.  All 
of  the  costs  required  in  the  combined 
test  for  site  support,  instrumentation, 
and  transportation  of  equipment  to  the 


Figure  3. 

test  site  at  Fort  Ord,  CA,  were  reflected 
in  the  LTACFIRE  FDTE  outline  test 
plans.  Additionally,  the  coordination 
for  the  data  collectors  and  test  players 
from  Fort  Ord  considerably  reduced 
the  overall  temporary  duty  costs. 
Through  these  and  other  cost  saving 
measures,  the  LTACFIRE  FDTE/FED 
FOTE  was  conducted  at  a 34  percent 
savings  of  allocated  funds. 

Conclusions 

Constrained  budgets  require  in- 
novative concepts  to  create  tests  that 
are  “cheap,  fast,  and  good.”  Our  efforts 
are  a first  step  in  demonstrating  that 
combining  operational  testing  is  a 
viable  method  of  reducing  resources 
and  costs. 

The  ultimate  goal  of  all  operational 
testing  is  to  ensure  the  soldiers  who  use 
the  equipment  have  an  item  which  has 


proven  it  meets  or  exceeds  the  required 
operational  capabilities.  It  is  a 
challenge  to  all  testers,  whether  opera- 
tional or  technical,  to  continue  to 
develop  and  implement  innovative 
testing  techniques  to  accomplish  this 
goal  with  minimum  resources. 


MA J LA  URENCE  A . WOMACK  is 
afield  artillery  officer  serving  as  a 
test  arid  evaluation  officer  in  the 
U.S.  Army  Test  and  Experimenta- 
tion Command's  Fire  Support  Test 
Directorate  at  Fort  Sill,  OK.  He  has 
a B.S.  degree  from  West  Virginia 
State  College  and  is  a graduate  of 
the  Materiel  Acquisition  Manage- 
ment Course. 


November-December  1991 


Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin  35 


THERAPY  IN 
HIV  POSITIVE  PATIENTS 

USING 

RECOMBINANT 
GP160  VACCINE 


By  LTC  Robert  R.  Redfield,  MC 


Introduction 

On  June  13,  1991,  The  New  England 
Journal  of  Medicine  carried  an  article 
reporting  on  the  trial  use  of  a new  vac- 
cine. The  report  brought  inquiries  from 
television,  newspapers,  magazines — 
and  just  plain  people.  For  the  first  time, 
the  researchers  reported,  a vaccine  had 
been  used  to  modify  the  body’s  im- 
mune response  to  a chronic  infection. 
The  researchers  were  at  the  Walter  Reed 
Army  Institute  of  Research  (WRAIR). 


The  vaccine  was  called  gp  160.  The 
chronic  infection  was  HIV,  the  virus 
that  causes  AIDS.  It  is  work  that  truly 
defies  more  than  100  years  of  medical 
theory  and  teaching.  Soon  after  Louis 
Pasteur  proposed  the  use  of  vaccines  as 
intervention  in  viral  infection,  other 
researchers  demonstrated  that  “it 
couldn’t  be  done.”  It  remained  an 
obscure  theoretical  possibility  until  the 
development  of  genetic  engineering 
and  the  proliferation  of  technology 


among  many  different  laboratories 
allowed  the  breakthrough  research 
presented  in  the  NEJM  paper. 

The  Known  World 

Usually,  the  introduction  of  any  an- 
tigen into  the  body  stimulates  the  pro- 
duction of  antibodies  sufficient  to 
control  an  infection.  Immune 
responses  to  HIV  antigens  during 
natural  infection  are  both  humoral 
(neutralization  antibody,  viral  receptor 
blocking  antibody,  antibody  depend- 
ent cytotoxicity),  and  cellular  (natural 
killer  cell  activity,  HIV  antigen-specific 
T-cell  proliferative  responses,  cytotox- 
ic T-cell  responses).  Yet,  despite  these 
host-directed  immune  responses,  HIV 
infection  results  in  a progressive, 
debilitating  disease  of  the  immune 
system.  The  virus  persists  despite  pro- 
duction of  anti-viral  antibodies  and 
some  evidence  of  the  production  of 
cytotoxic  T-cells  (the  cells  responsible 
for  killing  the  virus-producing  fac- 
tories). 

Based  on  today’s  still-limited  knowl- 
edge, it  appears  that  certain  antibodies, 
the  T-helper  response  to  the  virus,  and 
the  T-cytotoxic  responses,  are  blunted. 
Perhaps  the  virus  “hides”  some  impor- 
tant immunogenic  sites  which  would 
otherwise  stimulate  an  effective  viral 
immune  response,  or  perhaps  the 
primary  infection  of  the  T helper  cell 
hinders  the  efficacy  of  the  immune 
response. 

The  Walter  Reed  researchers  hypoth- 
esized that  the  host-directed  immune 


The  Walter  Reed  Staging  Classificaton  System  for  HIV  Infection 


HIV 


Stage 

Anti- 
body or 
Culture 
Status 

Chronic 

Lym- 

CD4- 

Cells 

(pL) 

Delayed  Hypersensitivity 
Skin  Test 

Thrush 

tunistic 

Infec- 

tions 

WRO 

>400 

NORMAL 

WR1 

+ 

>400 

NORMAL 

WR2 

+ 

+ 

>400 

NORMAL 

WR3 

+ 

± 

<400 

NORMAL 

WR4 

+ 

± 

<400 

PARTIAL  ANERGY 

WR5 

+ 

± 

<400 

COMPLETE  ANERGY 

+ 

WR6 

+ 

± 

<400 

PARTIAL  OR 
COMPLETE  ANERGY 

± 

+ 

Stage  Definitions:  WRO  defines  members  of  high-risk  groups;  WR1-6  requires 
proof  of  infection  by  HIV.  Patient  must  have  CD4  count  lower  than  400  per  uL 
persisting  for  3 months  or  more  to  be  classified  WR  Stage  3,  4.  5,  or  6. 

Chronic  lymphadenopathy,  CD4  cell  count  and  defects  in  delayed  skin  test 
hypersensitivity  must  be  persistent  for  3 months  or  more  for  criteria  to  be  fulfilled, 

Anergy  is  defined  as  delayed  reaction  to  an  antigen,  in  this  case  introduced  as  a 
skin  test  for  allergic  reaction. 


36  Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin 


November-December  1991 


response  to  HIV  gradually  weakens, 
resulting  in  poor  control  of  viral 
replication.  Vaccine  therapy  explores 
the  possibility  of  boosting  and  expand- 
ing the  body’s  native  immune  respons- 
es to  the  virus  that  would  help  in 
controlling  the  infection.  The  hypoth- 
esis builds  on  the  concept  that,  if 
critical  viral  proteins  could  be 
presented  to  the  immune  cells  in  a 
novel  manner,  a more  effective  anti- 
viral immune  response  could  be  gener- 
ated. Just  as  vaccines  lead  to  protection 
from  disease  in  the  unprotected  host, 
vaccines  during  infection  with  a virus 
may  be  able  to  redirect  the  immune 
system  in  a more  effective  way.  These 
concepts  are  all  hypothetical  and  re- 
main to  be  proven.  There  is  still  a 
critical  need  to  understand  which  viral 
proteins  would  generate  an  effective 
immune  response  and  improve  viral 
control. 

If  the  natural  HIV  specific  immune 
response  could  be  intentionally  altered 
in  a chronically  affected  host,  under- 
standing of  HIV  immunoregulation 
could  be  refined.  Then  the  therapeutic 
potential  of  post-infection  active  im- 
munization could  be  directed  to  pro- 
duce specific  control  reponses.  It  might 
then  be  practical  to  modify  the  natural 
history  of  HIV  infection.  Under  the 
direction  of  the  Division  of  Retro- 
virology  at  WRAIR,  the  Military  Medi- 
cal Consortium  for  Applied  Retroviral 
Research  is  conducting  a long-term 
evaluation  of  vaccine  therapy  using  a 
recombinant  HIV  envelope  protein 
called  gp  160  in  volunteers  who  are 
HIV-positive. 

The  Vaccine 

Gpl60  is  a protein  on  the  outer  sur- 
face of  the  HIV  virus.  Obtained  through 
use  of  genetic  engineering  techniques 
unavailable  even  10  years  ago,  the  vac- 
cine is  provided  to  the  Army  under  a 
Cooperative  Research  and  Develop- 
ment Agreement  (CRDA)  with  the 
manufacturer,  MicroGeneSys,  Inc.,  of 
Meriden,  CT.  Since  the  vaccine  is  made 
with  only  a part  of  the  whole  virus, 
there  is  no  chance  that  this  product  will 
cause  infection.  The  gp  160  vaccine  has 
been  administered  to  30  volunteers 
who  are  in  Walter  Reed  stage  1 or  2 (see 
attached  chart)  in  a Phase  I trial,  and 
more  than  200  non-infected  people 
and  has  been  found  to  be  safe. 

The  results  of  the  phase  I trial  were 


Research  Team  Cited 

On  July  31,  1991,  Secretary  of  the  Army  Michael  P.W.  Stone 
recognized  the  nine  members  of  the  research  team  that 
published  the  New  England Journal  of  Medicine  article.  In 
a ceremony  at  the  Pentagon,  Stone  presented  Meritorious 
Service  Medals  to  COL  Edmund  Tramont,  COL  Donald 
Burke,  LTC  Robert  Redfield,  COL  John  Brundage,  LTC 
Charles  Davis,  MAJ  Deborah  Birx-Raybuck,  MAJ  Steven 
Johnson,  and  CPT  Victoria  Polonis.  COL  Charles  Oster, 
unable  attend  the  ceremony,  received  his  MSM  at  a later  date. 

In  addition  to  The  Surgeon  General  LTG  Frank  Ledford, 
distinguished  guests  at  the  ceremony  included  Sen.  Ted 
Stevens  and  Rep.  John  Murtha,  both  of  whom  have  been 
strong  supporters  of  the  Army’s  HIV  research  program. 


recently  published  in  the  New  England 
Journal  of  Medicine.  The  trial  was 
designed  to  explore  dose  and  injection 
schedule,  toxicity,  and  immunogeni- 
city.  Briefly,  the  results  of  the  study  in- 
clude the  following:  19  of  30  volunteers 
responded  to  the  vaccine;  that  is,  they 
increased  both  their  humoral  and  cellu- 
lar anti-HIV  envelope  immunity  in  re- 
sponse to  vaccination  with  gp  160. 
Some  volunteers  were  able  to  make 
new  antibodies  against  the  virus  and 
new  T-cell  responses  to  gp  160  were 
observed.  No  one  involved  in  the  trial 
had  an  adverse  systemic  reaction,  and 
local  reaction  at  the  site  of  injection  was 
mild.  The  vaccine  did  not  cause  any 
diminution  of  immune  system  capabili- 
ties as  observed  both  in  volunteers,  and 
in  laboratory  analyses  of  blood  and 
other  samples.  After  10  months  of 
follow-up  there  was  no  decline  in  the 
mean  CD4  cell  count  for  the  19  vaccine 
responders,  while  CD4  counts  among 
the  non-  responders  declined  approx- 
imately seven  percent. 

The  phase  I trial  showed  that  gp  160 
is  a safe  and  immunogenic  vaccine  in 
the  patients  with  chronic  infection. 
Presently,  a tri-service  Phase  II  study  to 
determine  clinical  efficacy  is  ongoing. 
Additionally,  27  of  the  30  original 
Phase  I volunteers  are  involved  in  a roll- 
over study  to  examine  long  term  effects 
of  vaccination  and  duration  of  immune 
response.  Other  studies  involving  gp 
160  are  in  the  planning  stages.  It  is 
hoped  that  these  trials  with  gp  160  will 
increase  our  understanding  of  the  host- 
initiated  immune  response  in  order  to 
accentuate  the  body’s  ability  to  fight 
the  deadly  HIV  virus,  and  will  serve  to 
guide  the  DOD  program  to  develop  a 


vaccine  for  prevention. 

Having  shown  that  the  theory  of  in- 
tervention in  chronic  infection  can 
work,  researchers  will  hopefully  find 
even  wider  application  in  the  treatment 
of  other  viral  diseases. 


LTC  ROBERT  REDFIELD,  MC,  is 
chief,  Retroviral  Research,  Division 
of  Retrovi rology  Walter  Reed  A rmy 
Institute  of  Research.  He  received 
his  B.S.  degree  from  Georgetown 
University  in  1973  and  his  MD  from 
the  same  institution  in  1977.  He  is 
on  the  faculty  of  the  Uniformed 
Services  University  of  Health 
Sciences  and  has  authored  or  co- 
authored  more  than  60  papers  in 
leading  scientific  journals  world- 
wide. 


November-December  1991 


Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin  37 


APPLICATION 

OF 

LEVEL 

OF 

REPAIR 

ANALYSIS 


Introduction 

Most  of  us  are  probably  unfamiliar, 
and  maybe  even  afraid,  of  the  term 
‘ ‘ Level  of  Repair  Analysis  (LORA),’  ’ let 
alone  why  LORA  is  conducted  or  when 
it  should  be  conducted.  This  article  will 
alleviate  some  of  these  fears  and  explain 
why  and  when  LORA  is  performed. 
The  term  LORA,  as  defined  in  AMC-R 
700-27,  20  Feb  9T  LORA  Program,  is 
“an  analytical  method  used  to  deter- 
mine the  maintenance  level  at  which  an 
item  should  be  replaced,  repaired,  or 
discarded.”  In  simpler  terms,  LORA 
determines  the  most  cost  effective 
maintenance  concept  of  a system 
based  on  economic  and  non-economic 


By  Nicholas  R.  Giordano 


factors. 

The  term  LORA  is  synonymous  with 
Optimum  Repair  Level  Analysis  and 
Level  of  Repair  as  used  in  various  other 
documents  throughout  the  Depart- 
ment of  the  Army  and  Department  of 
Defense.  LORA  has  two  key  terms 
associated  with  it,  LORA  program  and 
LORA  process,  which  are  also  defined 
in  AMC-R  700-27.  The  LORA  program 
is  associated  with  a specific  hardware 
system  or  acquisition  that  establishes 
the  procedures  and  actions  necessary 
to  ensure  a cost  effective  program  for 
determining  the  repair  or  discard  of  an 
item.  The  LORA  process  consists  of 
seven  steps,  as  depicted  in  Figure  1. 


The  LORA  Process 

The  LORA  process  is  shown  as  a con- 
tinuous loop  because  it  is  iterative  in 
nature  and  must  constantly  be  updated 
and  revised  as  the  system  matures  and 
better  data  becomes  available.  The  for- 
mal definition  of  the  LORA  process,  as 
defined  in  AMC-R  700-27,  is  “iterative 
evaluations,  which  arrive  at  level  of 
repair/discard  alternative(s)  based  on 
economic  and  noneconomic  consider- 
ations.” Economic  evaluations  con- 
sider cost  factors  such  as  spare  parts, 
transportation,  inventories,  labor,  and 
training  and  performance  factors  such 
as  mean  time  to  repair  (MTTR),  opera- 
tional availability,  and  mean  time  be- 
tween failure  (MTBF). 

Non-economic  evaluations  consider 
pre-emptive  factors  such  as  safety, 
vulnerability,  mobility,  policy,  and 
manpower  that  restrict  or  constrain  the 
maintenance  level  where  repair  or 
discard  can  be  performed. 

Why  LORA  is  Conducted 

As  explained  in  the  previous  para- 
graph, the  objective  of  LORA  is  to 
establish  the  most  cost  effective 
maintenance  concept  of  a system. 
LORAs  are  to  be  conducted  on  every 
system  acquisition  program,  as  defined 
by  AR  750-1  and  AR  700-127.  These 
regulations  state  that  analytical  tech- 
niques and  models  will  be  used  to  de- 
velop and  evaluate  alternative  support 
concepts.  The  LORA  program  is  con- 
ducted as  an  integral  part  of  the  Logistic 
Support  Analysis  (LSA)  program,  as 
defined  in  MIL-STD-1388-1A  task 
303  2.7,  Repair  Level  Analyses. 

Results  of  the  LORA  are  used  for  four 
main  purposes:  to  influence  design  (i.e. , 
discard  versus  repair);  assist  in  assign- 
ment of  the  source,  maintenance,  and 
recoverability  (SMR)  codes;  provide 
development  and  assignment  of  main- 
tenance tasks  for  establishment  of  the 
Maintenance  Allocation  Chart  (MAC); 
and  assist  in  development  of  technical 
manuals. 

Systems  being  developed  for  Army 
use,  including  joint  service  systems 
with  the  Army  as  lead,  are  regulated  by 
AMC-R  700-27,  which  establishes  the 
U.S.  Army  Materiel  Command  (AMC) 
objectives  and  policies  and  assigns 
responsibilities  for  a LORA  program 
throughout  all  phases  of  a materiel 
system’s  life  cycle. 


38  Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin 


November-December  1991 


PLAN  LORA 
EFFORT 


PREPARE 

LORA 

PROGRAM 

PLAN 


COMPILE 

INPUT 

DATA 

PERFORMANCE 

COSTS 

PRE-EMPTIVE 

FACTORS 

DESIGN 

MAINTENANCE 

CONCEPTS 


PERFORM 

NONECONOMIC 

EVALUATIONS 


IDENTIFY 
CONSTRAINTS 
IMPOSED  ON 
THE  SYSTEM 


UTILIZE 

RESULTS 


INCORPORATE 
INTO  ILS 
PRODUCTS 
AND  FEED  TO 
OTHER  LSA 
RELATED 
ANALYSES 


ANALYZE  AND 
DOCUMENT 
RESULTS 


PREPARE  FORMAL 
LORA  REPORT 


LORA 

REPORT 


IMPROVED 

HIGH 

FREQUENCY 

RADIO 


} 


When  to  Perform  a LORA 

Although  LORA  is  required  by  AR 
750-1,  AR  700-127,  and  AMC-R  700-27 
and  is  applicable  to  all  system  acquisi- 
tion programs,  it  should  be  tailored  to 
fit  the  requirements  of  the  individual 
system  or  equipment  program.  There- 
fore, “when”  and  to  “what  extent” 
LORA  is  performed  is  just  as  important 
as  why  LORA  is  performed. 

As  mentioned  previously,  LORA  is 
iterative  in  nature  and,  therefore,  is  ap- 
plicable to  all  phases  of  a system's  life 
cycle.  However,  the  system's  life  cycle 
phase  will  affect  the  extent  of  the 
analysis,  or  the  scope  of  the  LORA  pro- 
gram and  tailoring  should  be  con- 
ducted to  keep  resource  requirements 
at  a minimum.  A brief  explanation  of 
what  LORA  accomplishes  and  why  it 
is  performed  in  each  phase  of  the  life 
cycle  is  provided  in  Figure  2. 

In  the  early  phases  (i.e.,  Concept/ 
Exploration  and  Demonstration/ 
Validation)  the  main  purpose  of  a LORA 
is  to  direct  the  design  of  the  system 
from  a supportability  standpoint.  The 
design  is  usually  still  very  flexible  and 
allows  the  best  opportunity  for  con- 
ducting tradeoffs,  identifying  alter- 
natives, and  directing  design  from  a 
supportability  standpoint.  This 


Figure  1. 

Seven  Steps  of  the  LORA  Process. 

includes  determining  items  and  parts 
that  should  be  clearly  designed  for 
discard  instead  of  being  repaired.  Also, 
the  LORA  may  be  used  to  evaluate  ear- 
ly considerations  of  support  equipment 
requirements  (i.e.,  built-in-test  versus 
automatic  test  equipment)  and  man- 
power and  skill  requirements. 

The  LORA  also  can  be  used  in  the 
early  phases  to  establish  early  re- 
quirements of  initial  provisioning,  in- 
cluding spare  parts  and  test  equipment, 
which  can  assist  in  development  of 
budgets  and  funding  levels  for  the  lat- 
ter stages. 

The  next  two  phases,  Full  Scale 
Development  and  Production/  Deploy- 
ment, usually  allow  less  design 
freedom.  LORAs  are  usually  conducted 
in  these  phases  to  establish  the  optimal 
support  and  maintenance  structure  of 
a system  and  assist  in  developing  the 
SMR  codes  and  MAC.  A LORA  is  also  ap- 
plicable to  fielded  systems  and  is  con- 
ducted to  assess  the  current  mainte- 
nance structure  of  the  system.  Fielded 
system  LORAs  should  be  conducted 
when  there  is  a dramatic  increase  or 
decrease  in  the  cost  or  failure  rate  of  an 
item,  when  an  engineering  change  pro- 
posal is  submitted  or  implemented, 
when  considering  changing  from  total 


contractor  support  to  organic  support, 
or  as  part  of  a scheduled  fielded  system 
review. 

Other  factors  that  may  affect  the  ex- 
tent of  the  LORA  program  are:  type  of 
acquisition  program  or  strategy  (e.g., 
non-development,  and  product  im- 
provement program);  amount  of  design 
freedom;  resources;  schedule,  and 
availability  of  data.  Since  these  factors 
also  affect  the  extent  of  the  LORA,  the 
overall  tailoring  process  should  corres- 
pond to  the  size,  complexity,  and  life 
cycle  phase  of  the  individual  system  or 
equipment  program  to  reduce  the 
resources  required. 

Sources  and  Reliability 
of  Input  Data 

Since  LORA  is  an  analytical  tech- 
nique, input  data  is  required  to  conduct 
the  LORA  evaluations  (economic  and 
non-economic)  and  collection  of  this 
data  is  usually  a major  task  of  the  LORA 
process.  Data  is  available  from  many 
sources  and  includes:  LSA  Record; 
MRSA’s  Logistics  Parameter  Library; 
other  system  engineering  analyses  and 
programs  (i.e. , transportation  analysis, 
safety  assessment,  and  reliability  pro- 
gram); and  historical  data  bases  such  as 


November-December  1991 


Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin  39 


from  existing  and  similar  systems,  and 
from  LORAs  previously  conducted  on 
similar  and  existing  systems. 

In  the  early  phases  of  the  life  cycle, 
data  may  be  based  on  engineering 
estimates,  such  as  MTBF  and  MTTR, 
that  could  be  unreliable.  Therefore, 
sensitivity  analysis  will  have  to  be  con- 
ducted to  assess  how  variations  in  these 
LORA  input  parameters  affect  the  base- 
line maintenance  concept  and  reduce 
associated  risks.  Initial  input  data  values 
are  used  to  establish  an  initial  baseline 
maintenance  concept. 

After  establishing  the  baseline  con- 
cept, a sensitivity  analysis  is  per- 
formed. The  purpose  is  to:  determine 
if  variations  in  the  selected  input 
parameters  would  result  in  assignment 
of  different  repair  levels;  assess  the 
effect  on  the  total  life  cycle  cost;  and 
determine  if  any  alternative  mainte- 
nance concept  would  be  more  eco- 
nomical. Sensitivity  analysis  involves 
the  following  steps:  identify  and  select 
the  LORA  input  data  elements  to  be 
analyzed;  establish  a numerical  range(s) 
over  which  the  selected  data  element(s) 
is  expected  to  fall  within;  execute  the 
LORA  model/technique  over  the 
established  numerical  range(s);  assess 


the  impact  on  the  baseline  maintenance 
concept  based  on  total  cost  and  repair 
level  designation;  and,  verify  or  change 
the  recommended  maintenance  con- 
cept based  on  the  results. 

As  mentioned  previously,  LORA  is  an 
iterative  process  and  is  continuously 
updated  and  revised  as  the  system 
matures.  Therefore,  as  more  reliable 
data  becomes  available,  the  LORA  will 
be  updated  and  revised  to  reflect  the 
most  current  values  of  the  input 
parameters.  This  process  results  in  the 
most  cost  effective  maintenance  con- 
cept based  on  the  most  current  infor- 
mation and  LORA  input  data. 

Utilization  of  the 
LORA  Results 

Results  of  the  LORA  will  be  used  to 
direct  design  and  assist  in  development 
of  the  maintenance  structure.  Early 
results  of  the  LORA  indicate  items  that 
can  be  discarded  at  failure  and  sepa- 
rated from  those  that  are  to  be  repaired. 
This  assists  in  establishing  early  SMR 
codes  for  provisioning.  Results  should 
also  be  analyzed  and  put  into  the  form 
of  recommended  actions  to  be  given  to 
the  equipment  designer  to  affect  the 


design.  Later  in  the  life  cycle,  the  results 
are  used  to  propose  the  maintenance 
concept  for  the  system.  This  includes 
documenting  the  results  in  the 
Logistics  Support  Analysis  Record  (e.g., 
SMR  codes,  repair  levels,  test  equip- 
ment requirements).  The  results  are 
then  used  in  formulating  the  MAC  and 
in  developing  the  technical  manuals. 
The  results  also  provide  estimates  of 
the  life  cycle  costs  of  supporting  the 
system,  which  can  be  used  to  establish 
funding  requirements  for  spares,  test 
equipment,  and  manpower. 

Examples  of  LORAs 

MRSA,  as  the  Army  LORA  support  of- 
fice, has  performed  numerous  LORAs 
on  both  developmental  and  fielded 
systems.  Examples  of  developmental 
systems  include:  Pedestal  Mounted 
Stinger;  Air-to-Air  Stinger;  and  Ml  Laser 
Range  Finder.  Fielded  system  examples 
include:  Improved  High  Frequency 
Radio  (IHFR);  and  Aviator’s  Night  Vi- 
sion Imaging  System. 

The  IHFR  is  a good  example  of  how 
a fielded  system  LORA  can  assess  the 
current  maintenance  structure  of  a 
system  and  recommend  alternatives 


CONCEPT/ 

EXPLORATION 

DISCARD 

DEMONSTRATION/  ! 

VALIDATION 

INFLUENCE  DESIGN/ 
SUPPORTABILITY 

ANALYZE  GENERAL 
CONCEPTS  BASED 
UPON  ENGINEERING 
STUDIES,  EVALUATIONS, 
HISTORICAL  DATA,  AND 
EXPERT  OPINION. 

\ / 

CONDUCT/  \ 
UPDATE  j 

LORA 

ASSISTS  IN  ESTABLISHING 
MAINTENANCE  CONCEPTS, 
AND  COST  EFFECTIVE 
RELIABILITY  AND 
TESTABILITY 
REQUIREMENTS. 

IDENTIFY  ITEMS  WHICH 
ARE  TO  BE 

DESIGNED  FOR  DISCARD. 

OPERATION  & 
SUPPORT 


ASSESSES 

CURRENT 

MAINTENANCE 

STRUCTURE 


\ 


PRODUCTION/ 

DEPLOYMENT 


ASSISTS  IN 
FINALIZATION  OF 
THE  SMR  CODES, 
MAC,  AND  TMs. 
EVALUATIONS 
ASSESS  ECPs/PIPs. 


FULL-SCALE 

DEVELOPMENT 


PERFORM  NONECONOMIC 
AND  ECONOMIC  EVALUATIONS 
TO  OPTIMIZE  THE  SUPPORT 
STRUCTURE  AND  DETERMINE 
AN  OPTIMAL  MAINTENANCE 
CONCEPT. 


Figure  2. 

The  LORA  Process  During  the  Life  Cycle. 


40  Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin 


November-December  1991 


Table  1-1. 

Summary  of  the  Repair  Levels  and  O&S  Cost. 


TOTAL  O&S  COST 

RECOMMENDED 

CURRENT 

RECOMMENDED 

CURRENT 

SYSTEM 

POLICY 

POLICY 

POLICY 

POLICY 

CONFIGURATION 

(LORA) 

(MAC) 

(LORA) 

(MAC) 

AN/PRC-104A 

End  Items 

DS  level 

ORG 

Components 

DS  level 

GS 

S22.77M 

$30.45M 

Modules 

6 at  GS, 

1 at  DS, 

1 at  DEP,  and 
1 for  discard 

DEP 

AN/GRC-213 

End  Items 

DS  level 

ORG 

i Components 
! Modules 

DS  level 
6 at  GS, 

GS 

2 at  GS, 

S32.57M 

$43.09M  j 

6 at  DS 

10  at  DEP 

AN/GRC-193A 

End  Items 

DS  level 

ORG 

Components 

Modules 

DS  level 
23  at  DS,  and 
12  for  Discard 

GS 

DEP 

$106. 59M 

$170. 76M 

NOTE:  ORG  - Organizational;  DS  - Direct  Support;  GS  - General  Support;  DEP  - Depot 


that  result  in  significant  savings  in 
operating  and  support  (O&S)  costs.  The 
IHFR  is  a family  of  radios  with  three 
configurations  (AN/PRC-104A,  man- 
pack;  AN/GRC-213,  vehicular  pack 
with  low  power;  and  AN/GRC-193A, 
vehicular  pack  with  high  power).  The 
LORA  analyzed  each  configuration 
separately  and  resulted  in  significant 
savings  over  the  current  maintenance 
structure,  as  stated  in  the  MAC.  Table  1-1 
shows  the  recommended  repair  levels 
as  a result  of  the  LORA  versus  the  cur- 
rent repair  levels  stated  in  the  MAC.  The 
table  also  indicates  the  total  O&S  cost 
for  the  recommended  policy  versus  the 
current  policy  (MAC). 

As  shown  in  Table  1-1,  the  potential 
savings  over  the  life  of  the  system  (20 
years),  if  the  recommended  policies  are 
implemented,  would  be  approximate- 
ly: $7.8M  for  the  AN/PRC-104A; 
$10. 5M  for  the  AN/GRC-213;  and 
$64. 1M  for  the  AN/GRC-193A.  The 
greatest  savings  were  realized  from  a 
decrease  in  initial  spares  and  inventory 
holding  costs.  The  recommended 
policy  for  each  configuration  was  to 
repair  the  end  item  utilizing  a direct 


support  (DS)  contact  team,  which  is  in- 
dicated as  DS  in  Table  1-1.  It  is  more 
economical  to  move  repair  of  most  of 
the  components  and  modules  forward. 

Currently,  the  components  are  being 
repaired  at  general  support  and  depot. 
On  the  AN/GRC-193A  configuration, 
12  of  the  23  modules  were  recom- 
mended for  discard  at  failure,  which 
also  contributed  to  the  overall  cost  sav- 
ings. The  results  and  recommendations 
in  the  IHFR’s  LORA  report  are  current- 
ly being  reviewed  by  the  program 
manager  (PM)  Single  Channel  Ground 
and  Airborne  Radio  System.  The  PM 
has  also  indicated  that  the  results  and 
recommendations  of  the  LORA  will  be 
used  to  reevaluate  the  maintenance 
concept  and  update  and  revise  the  MAC 
and  SMR  codes. 

Conclusion 

The  LORA  and  LORA  program  are 
important  tools  the  Army  can  use  to  get 
the  greatest  value  from  its  equipment. 
The  two  key  points  of  this  article  are: 
LORA’s  purpose  is  to  establish  the  most 
cost  effective  maintenance  concept  of 


a system;  and  the  LORA  process  is 
iterative  in  nature  and,  therefore,  is  ap- 
plicable to  all  phases  of  the  life  cycle. 
For  more  information  on  LORA  and  the 
LORA  program,  contact  the  USAMC 
Materiel  Readiness  Support  Activity  at 
DSN  745-3963  or  commercial  (606) 
293-3963-  Our  mailing  address  is: 
Commander,  USAMC  Materiel  Readi- 
ness Support  Activity,  ATTN:  AMXMD- 
EL,  Lexington,  KY  40511-5101. 


NICHOLAS  R.  GIORDANO  is  a 
senior  engineer  in  the  Logistics 
Engineering  Branch  of  the  USAMC 
Materiel  Readiness  Support  Activi- 
ty. He  holds  a bachelor's  degree 
in  mechanical  engineering  from 
Florida  Atlantic  University,  a 
master's  degree  in  business  ad- 
ministration from  East  Texas  State 
University,  and  is  graduate  of  the 
USAMC  Maintainability  Engineer- 
ing Program. 


November-December  1991 


Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin  41 


TACOM 
DEVELOPS  Ml 
MINE  CLEARING  ROBOT 


The  U S.  Army  Tank-Automotive  Com- 
mand’s (TACOM)  Research,  Development 
and  Engineering  Center,  Warren,  MI,  has 
developed  and  demonstrated  a remote- 
controlled  mine-clearing  vehicle  that  may 
someday  eliminate  much  of  the  danger 
soldiers  face  when  encountering  mine- 
fields. Such  a vehicle  would  accompany 
assault  forces  and  clear  a path  through 
minefields  for  other  vehicles  by  using  a V- 
shaped,  track-width  mine  plow  to  push 
mines  off  to  either  side. 

The  Army  currently  does  not  have  in  its 
inventory  a vehicle  specifically  designated 
for  mine-clearing.  Assault  vehicle  crews 
have  had  to  rely  mainly  on  combat 
engineers  using  hand-held  metal  detectors 
and  bayonets  to  locate  minefields,  and 
manned  Ml-series  tanks  equipped  with 
track-width  mine  plows  to  breach  them. 

A mine-clearing  vehicle  is  now  under 
development  as  part  of  the  Army’s  Armored 
Systems  Modernization  Program,  but  it  is 
not  planned  for  introduction  until  the  year 
2004.  So  late  last  December,  with  the  Per- 
sian Gulf  War  drawing  near,  the  Army  asked 
TACOM ’s  RDE  Center  to  design  and  build 
a remote  control  system  capable  of  guiding 
an  Ml  equipped  with  a mine  plow  through 
minefields. 

The  request  was  a tough  one  to  meet 
because  the  Army  wanted  the  system  in  only 
eight  weeks.  Other  requirements  were  that 
it  be  small,  easy  to  install,  and  use  transmit- 
ters and  receivers  already  in  the  field.  The 
center’s  Design  and  Manufacturing  Tech- 
nology Directorate  not  only  met  the  re- 
quirements but  completed  the  design,  fab- 
rication, installation  and  testing  of  a proto- 
type system  in  five  weeks.  Fortunately,  the 
war  was  over  by  then,  but  the  system  is 
available  for  use  in  future  conflicts,  and  we 
believe  it  could  be  applied  to  other  combat 
vehicles  in  addition  to  the  Ml. 

The  system  is  designed  to  be  compatible 
with  all  current  U.S.  military  radios  now 
in  use — the  SINCGARS  (Single-Channel 
Ground-to-Air  Radio  System)  and  the  older 
style  VRC-12  and  PRC-77  series  radios.  It 
consists  of  two  parts — the  transmitter  in- 
terface (TI)  and  the  receiver  interface  (RI). 
The  TI  is  a control  box  8-inches  by  6-inches 
by  5-inches  which  the  operator  uses  to  drive 
the  robot  vehicle  from  a safe  distance  in  a 
control  vehicle. 

The  receiver  interface  is  a shoebox-size 
unit  that  is  mounted  in  the  robot  vehicle. 


By  John  J.  Schmitz 
and  George  Taylor 


It  executes  the  driver’s  commands  by  elec- 
tronically actuating  any  of  several  elec- 
tromechanical actuators  and  electric  relays 
that  control  braking,  acceleration,  steering 
and  other  driving  functions,  as  well  as  rais- 
ing and  lowering  of  the  mine  plow. 

In  operation,  the  operator  enters  a com- 
mand into  the  transmitter  interface  to,  say, 
stop  the  vehicle,  and  a circuit  board  feeds 
appropriate  electronic  signals  into  the  con- 
trol vehicle’s  radio.  This  radio  in  turn 
transmits  the  signals  to  the  robot  vehicle 
radio,  which  feeds  them  into  a microproc- 
essor inside  the  receiver  interface.  The 
microprocessor  then  analyzes  the  data  and 
generates  a signal  to  activate  the  actuator 
that  controls  the  vehicle’s  brakes. 

The  power  requirement  for  the  transmit- 
ter interface  is  about  200  milliamperes  at  12 
volts.  Currently,  the  unit  is  powered  by  a 
gelled-cell  battery  that  can  provide  20  hours 
of  operation  between  recharges,  but  it  could 
be  wired  to  receive  power  from  the  vehi- 
cle’s electrical  system. 

The  transmitter  interface  contains  six 
switches,  but  is  capable  of  inputing  up  to 
28  switches.  The  switches  interface  with  the 
microprocessor  in  a matrix  pattern,  which 
is  adaptable  to  various  needs.  The  interface 
pads  are  already  installed  to  accept  new 
switches.  The  transmitter  interface  has  a 
two-axis  control  stick,  and  can  handle  up 
to  two  control  sticks.  The  control  stick  is 
connected  to  an  analog-to-digital  converter 
which  is  controlled  by  the  microprocessor. 

The  microprocessor  collects  switch  and 
control-stick  inputs  and  transmits  this  in- 
formation at  1299  Baud  in  both  digital  and 
tone  outputs.  The  digital  output  is  compati- 
ble with  SINCGARS,  hardwire,  and  com- 
puter ports.  The  tone  output  is  compatible 
with  analog  media  such  as  the  VRC-12  and 
PRC-77  radios  and  land  lines. 

The  receiver  interface,  which  is  also  set 
up  to  handle  both  digital  and  tone  signals, 
can  be  installed  in  an  Ml  in  less  than  an  hour 
by  two  people  without  special  tools.  Con- 
version from  manual  to  remote  operation 
of  the  Ml  requires  about  two  minutes  and 
can  be  accomplished  from  the  driver’s  com- 
partment. The  RI  mounts  in  the  hull  just 


behind  the  driver’s  seat. 

The  main  circuit  board  of  the  receiver  in- 
terface contains  14  relays.  The  gear  select 
in  the  Ml  is  controlled  via  five  relays,  (which 
are  part  of  the  14  relays  on  the  main  board) 
and  is  connected  to  the  transmission  cable, 
located  on  the  back  of  the  T-bar.  Master 
panel  functions,  such  as  engine  start  and 
stop,  are  also  performed  with  relays  and  are 
connected  through  the  master  panel  test 
jack. 

There  are  currently  seven  unused  relays, 
and  they  can  be  used  for  any  user  function 
as  required,  with  no  change  to  the  main 
board.  The  receiver  interface  has  four  pro- 
portional outputs.  These  outputs  drive  ac- 
tuator control  cards  which  in  turn  control 
electromechanical  actuators.  The  current 
system  uses  two  such  actuators,  one  to 
operate  the  service  brakes  and  another  to 
control  the  steering.  The  brake  actuator  is 
mounted  on  the  left  wall  of  the  driver’s 
compartment,  just  below  the  brake  cable. 
It  is  connected  to  the  brake  lever  at  the  end 
of  the  cable  and  allows  full  movement  of  the 
brake  pedal  at  all  times. 

The  steering  actuator  is  mounted  on  the 
ceiling  of  the  driver’s  compartment,  just 
behind  the  T-bar.  It  is  attached  to  the  T-bar 
by  a bracket  mounted  on  the  T-bar  grip  and 
is  easily  removed  by  a quick-release  pin. 
Another  output  of  the  main  board  is  a 
variable  amplitude  triangle  wave,  which 
controls  the  Ml  throttle. 

The  system  performed  very  well  in  tests 
conducted  at  TACOM.  However,  with 
Operational  Desert  Storm  having  reached 
a successful  conclusion,  it  is  not  likely  that 
the  system  will  end  up  in  the  hands  of 
troops  any  time  soon.  Despite  this,  however, 
we  are  continuing  to  improve  the  design, 
as  well  as  looking  for  alternative  uses — 
knowing  that  such  a system  has  the  poten- 
tial of  playing  an  important  role  in  future 
military  confrontations. 


JOHN  J.  SCHMITZ  is  an  electrical 
engineer  in  the  Design  and  Manufac- 
turing Technology  Directorate,  Army 
Tank-Automotive  Command  RDE 
Center. 

GEORGE  TAYLOR  is  a technical 
writer  for  the  U.S.  Army  Tank- 
Automotive  Command. 


42  Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin 


November-December  1991 


RD&A  NEWS  BRIEFS 


DOD  to  Create 
New  Simulation  Office 

Editor’s  Note:  Reprint  Courtesy  of  Defense  News 
Copyright  by  Times  Journal  Publishing  Company 
Springfield,  Virginia 

In  a long-awaited  development,  the  U.S.  Department  of 
Defense  is  moving  ahead  with  plans  to  establish  a Defense 
Modeling  and  Simulation  Office  (DMSO)  to  coordinate  the 
military  services’  disparate  simulation  efforts. 

Approved  June  21  by  Donald  Atwood,  deputy  defense 
secretary,  the  new  office  is  intended  to  support  the 
undersecretary  of  defense  for  acquisition  “in  strengthen- 
ing the  use  of  modeling  and  simulation  in  joint  education 
and  training,  research  and  development,  test  and  evaluation, 
and  operations  and  cost  analysis,”  Atwood  states  in  a 
memorandum. 

DMSO  will  serve  as  a coordinating  office  that  will  sup- 
port an  Executive  Council  for  Models  and  Simulations  (EX- 
CIMS)  also  being  established  under  the  new  management 
plan. 

Composed  of  representatives  from  each  military  service, 
EXCIMS  will  advise  the  defense  acquisition  chief  on  model- 
ing and  simulation  issues,  such  as  instituting  standards  and 
developing  funding  strategies  to  improve  simulation  tech- 
nologies, according  to  the  Defense  Modeling  and  Simula- 
tion Management  Plan.  EXCIMS  also  will  submit  a biennial 
report  to  Pentagon  acquisition  officials  detailing  the  group’s 
achievements  and  areas  that  require  greater  attention  or 
funding. 

Exactly  who  will  take  part  in  EXCIMS  remains  to  be  deter- 
mined, Pentagon  officials  say.  However,  Army  COL  Ed  Fitz- 
simmons, recently  director  of  training  policy  in  the  Office 
of  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  Defense  for  Force  Management 
and  Personnel,  has  been  named  to  head  DMSO. 

Specifically,  the  DMSO  will  undertake  the  following  ac- 
tivities: 

• Develop  policies  to  increase  the  attention  focused  on 
modeling  and  simulation  in  joint  education  and  training, 
research  and  development,  test  and  evaluation,  and  opera- 
tions and  cost  analysis. 

• Oversee  the  distribution  of  approved  modeling  and 
simulation  guidelines  to  the  individual  services  to  assist  them 
in  developing  their  own  simulation  plans. 

• Develop  a liaison  process  to  coordinate  and  assist  in 
the  development,  acquisition  and  sharing  of  modeling  and 
simulation  technology  and  standards  among  the  military 
services  and  the  defense  industry. 

• Develop  approved  means  to  increase  cooperation 
among  the  military  services  to  maximize  modeling  and 
simulation  interoperability  while  eliminating  duplicative 
development  of  advanced  modeling  and  simulation 
technologies. 

• Advise  the  Pentagon  acquisition  chief  on  matters 
relating  to  improving  the  use  of  modeling  and  simulation 
that  supports  the  Joint  Requirements  Oversight  Council, 


Defense  Planning  and  Resources  Board  and  the  Defense  Ac- 
quisition Board. 

Funded  with  $75  million  that  Congress  provided  in  the 
Pentagon’s  1991  budget,  DMSO  will  move  over  the  next 
month  to  establish  working  groups  that  will  begin  to  address 
outstanding  issues  in  the  areas  of  standards,  interoperabili- 
ty and  technology. 

Pentagon  training  officials  emphasize,  however,  that  the 
new  office  will  refrain  from  telling  the  individual  military 
services  how  to  manage  or  operate  their  own  training  and 
simulation  programs.  Instead,  DMSO  will  focus  on  ways  to 
improve  the  acquisition  of  modeling  and  simulation  systems 
and  cut  costs  by  eliminating  redundant  equipment  and  buy- 
ing more  commercially  available  products,  officials  say. 

The  formation  of  DMSO  has  generated  widespread  con- 
cern throughout  the  simulation  and  training  industry  as 
companies  have  feared  the  potential  bureaucratic  power  the 
new  organization  could  wield.  However,  since  DMSO  will 
not  be  an  advocate  for  the  acquisition  of  particular  training 
systems,  most  industry  concerns  will  be  alleviated,  Pentagon 
officials  say. 

In  directing  the  establishment  of  such  an  office  in  the  1991 
budget,  Congress  was  particularly  interested  in  establishing 
standards  for  modeling  and  simulation  systems  and  increas- 
ing the  interoperability  of  individual  service  systems. 

While  DMSO  meets  congressional  aims,  questions  still  ex- 
ist about  the  technical  expertise  and  support  the  new  of- 
fice will  possess,  a Senate  source  says.  Noting  that  DMSO 
is  envisioned  as  only  a seven-  person  office,  the  source  said 
“where  do  they  go  to  get  unbiased  help  to  proceed  with 
establishing  new  protocols?” 

Water  Purification  Equipment 
Field  Tested  Under  Fire 

The  war  in  the  Persian  Gulf  forced  the  trial-by-fire  in  the 
early  fielding  of  many  equipment  items.  Water  purifiers  were 
among  those  pieces  of  equipment  fielded  early  and  tested 
under  actual  combat  conditions. 

Adequate  potable  water  is  important  for  survival  in  any 
environment,  but  it  was  critical  in  the  harsh  desert  climate 
of  Southwest  Asia. 

“The  Army  had  adequate  water  purification  support  in 
Southwest  Asia.  Skid  units  with  a 150,000  gallon-per-day 
purification  capacity  and  barges  with  a capacity  for  300,000 
gallons-per-day  were  used  for  general  support  and  600 
gallons-per-hour  units  provided  division  support.  What  was 
needed  was  a 3 ,000  gallon-per-hour  machine  for  corps  sup- 
port to  fill  in  the  gap,”  said  SGM  Thomas  Rosenthal  of  the 
Petroleum  and  Water  Logistics  Office,  U.S.  Army  Troop  Sup- 
port Command. 

The  Troop  Support  Command  (TROSCOM),  commonly 
known  as  “The  Soldier’s  Command,”  is  in  charge  of  the 
research,  development,  fielding  and  maintenance  of  a wide 
range  of  equipment  items  including  operational  rations, 


November-December  1991 


Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin  43 


RD&A  NEWS  BRIEFS 


clothing,  shelters,  camouflage,  mine  detection  and  clearing 
equipment,  watercraft,  power  generation,  air  delivery  equip- 
ment and  fuel  handling  and  storage  equipment. 

The  Army  uses  a three-step  process  to  purify  water. 
Regardless  of  whether  the  water  began  as  brackish  or  salt 
water,  all  impurities  and  contaminants,  including  chemical 
and  biological  agents  are  removed.  The  end  product  is  water 
that  is  much  cleaner  than  the  tap-water  in  most  households. 

First,  the  water  is  passed  through  a multi-media  filter 
which  removes  the  majority  of  the  particles.  Then  it  is  forced 
through  cartridge  filters  which  remove  the  remaining  par- 
ticles. Finally,  it  goes  through  the  reverse  osmosis  element 
which  rejects  the  ions,  allowing  only  pure  water  to  pass. 

TROSCOM’s  Project  Office  for  Petroleum  and  Water 
Logistics  had  previously  recognized  the  requirement  for  an 
intermediate  capacity  reverse  osmosis  water  purification  unit 
(ROWPU),  and  had  been  developing  it  for  some  time.  Opera- 
tion Desert  Shield  created  an  ideal  situation  to  field  test  this 
new  unit. 

TROSCOM  arranged  to  have  three  3,000  GPH  prototype 
ROWPUs  air-lifted  to  Southwest  Asia  in  October  due  to  the 
need  for  a mobile  intermediate  range  machine.  Item 
managers  also  hoped  to  determine  from  this  move  if  the 
length  of  the  test  cycle  could  be  cut  by  field  trials. 

“Our  results  for  purifying  fresh  well  water  were  very 
promising.  The  units  were  easy  to  operate  and  made  good 
water,”  said  Rosenthal. 

The  82d  Quartermaster  Detachment,  Fort  Irwin,  CA., 
trained  on  the  units  and  ran  them  during  the  war  at  King 
Khalid  Military  City  (KKMC)  and  Log  Base  Charlie  in  Saudi 
Arabia.  The  units  purified  two  and  a half  million  gallons  of 
water  of  KKMC  from  October  to  January  and  eight  million 
gallons  at  Log  Base  Charlie  from  mid-January  through 
mid-April. 

“When  the  fighting  stopped  and  the  units  were  no  longer 
needed  in  the  northern  part  of  the  country  we  arranged  for 
the  3K  ROWPUs  to  be  tested  on  sea  water,’  ’ said  COL  Robert 
Weimer,  TROSCOM’s  project  manager  for  petroleum  and 
water  logistics. 

“The  units  worked  well  on  sea  water  but  the  high  salt  con- 
tent did  cause  problems,”  said  SFC  Ronald  Allen  of  the  82d 
Quartermaster  Detachment. 

“When  you  operate  on  sea  water,  maintenance  time  more 
than  doubles.  The  salt  content  in  the  Arabian  Gulf  is  two 
and  a half  times  that  of  normal  sea  water  so  we  figured  this 
would  be  the  best  place  to  test  the  units,”  said  Allen. 

The  82d  ran  the  sea  water  test  24  hours  a day,  seven  days 
a week  for  two  weeks.  The  test  data  was  then  forwarded  to 
the  project  manager  to  complement  first  article  test  data 
already  collected. 

“Overall  we  are  very  pleased  with  the  operation  of  the 
3K  ROWPU.  It  is  a very  positive  addition  to  our  existing  fami- 
ly of  water  purification  equipment,”  Weimer  said. 


Development 
of  The 

Maneuver  Control  System 

Thanks  to  the  foresight  of  a project  manager  who  used 
an  evolutionary  approach  in  developing  the  Maneuver  Con- 
trol System,  a number  of  Army  commanders  in  Operation 
Desert  Storm  were  provided  with  the  most  current  bat- 
tlefield information. 

The  Maneuver  Control  System  is  an  integrated  network 
of  computers  that  helps  commanders  and  their  staffs  at  the 
corps,  division,  brigade  and  battalion  levels  manage  infor- 
mation used  in  executing  the  commander’s  concept  of 
operations. 

“Our  original  purpose  in  using  the  ‘evolutionary’ 
approach — which  means  to  field  now  and  refine  later — ’’said 
COL  James  T.  Doyle,  the  project  manager  for  Operations  Tac- 
tical Data  Systems,  who  managed  the  development  and  ac- 
quisition of  the  system,  “was  to  get  the  system  out  to  the 
field  early  so  we  could  get  user  feedback  to  influence  the 
system’s  design  and  features,  plus  to  give  the  force  exper- 
tise in  using  it.”  As  it  turns  out,  another  benefit  of  that  ap- 
proach was  that  it  gave  some  Desert  Storm  commanders  a 
tool  to  analyze  and  disseminate  crucial  planning  informa- 
tion on  U.S.  forces,  Iraqi  forces,  and  battlefield 
characteristics — a tool  that  otherwise  wouldn’t  have  been 
available  for  some  years. 

How  does  the  system  help  a commander?  It  puts  bat- 
tlefield information  at  commanders’  fingertips. 

The  Maneuver  Control  System,  which  employs  software 
written  in  the  DOD  standard  software  language  of  ADA,  is 
not  a stand-alone  system.  Essentially,  what  it  does  is  inter- 
face with  command  and  control  systems  such  as  the  Ad- 
vanced Field  Artillery  Tactical  Data  System  and  the  Combat 
Service  Support  Control  System,  and  integrate  information 
in  its  five  databases.  These  databases  are  friendly  forces; 
enemy  forces;  control  measures;  obstacle  barriers;  and 
nuclear,  biological,  and  chemical  data. 

The  system  can  display  that  information  in  the  form  of 
charts,  reports,  maps,  or  spreadsheets,  which  users  can  zoom 
in  on,  scroll,  or  print.  Then,  with  one  keystroke,  users  can 
transmit  the  data  to  up  to  35  preprogrammed  addresses,  sav- 
ing time  on  faxing  or  other  means  of  distributing  informa- 
tion. The  transmit  feature  is  particularly  helpful  in  the  case 
of  map  overlays,  which  can  be  transmitted  and  then  viewed 
on  screens  by  recipients. 

Before  the  Maneuver  Control  System,  maps  would  most 
often  be  prepared  as  mapboards — which  are  about  4-feet  by 
8-feet,  or  about  the  size  of  a sheet  of  plywood  or  sheetrock — 
which  would  have  to  be  painstakingly  duplicated,  and  then 
loaded  on  vehicles  to  be  distributed  by  messengers  to  various 
sites — a labor-intensive  proposition. 

Another  important  Maneuver  Control  System  feature  is 
the  automatic  replication  of  database  information.  That 
feature  insures  that  if  a node  at  one  level  goes  down,  or  if 
a node  has  to  shut  down  to  be  moved  to  another  location, 


44  Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin 


November-December  1991 


RD&A  NEWS  BRIEFS 


its  database  information  is  not  lost — it  has  automatically 
been  replicated  onto  selected  other  nodes  and  can  be  ac- 
cessed from  them — thus  achieving  continuity  of  operations, 
or  CONOPS  in  military  terminology. 

Evolutionary  Approach 

The  evolutionary  approach  used  to  develop  the  Maneuver 
Control  System  placed  an  initial  version  of  the  system  in  the 
field  at  the  front  end,  with  refinements  evolving  as  the 
system  is  used  in  the  field.  This  differs  from  the  typical  five 
to  20  year  development  cycle  for  Army  materiel  where  first 
concepts  are  proven,  prototypes  are  developed  and  tested, 
and  then  production  models  are  manufactured  and  field- 
ed. The  system  is  being  developed  in  four  blocks,  represen- 
ting a further  evolution. 

Block  one  called  for  the  development,  to  military 
specifications,  of  a tactical  computer  terminal;  some  soft- 
ware; 16  preformatted  messages;  the  capability  to  transmit 
and  receive  standing  requests  for  information;  process 
queries  from  remote  nodes;  and  transmit  data  to  up  to  35 


preprogrammed  addresses.  This  block  was  completed  in  late 
1988. 

Block  two,  which  is  currently  being  completed,  will  add 
commercial  off-the-shelf  items  such  as  an  Analyst’s  Console 
and  a Tactical  Computer  Processor.  Also  included,  will  be 
the  ability  to  transmit  data  via  Mobile  Subscriber  Equipment 
and  the  Single  Channel  Ground  and  Airborne  Radio  Systems, 
as  well  as  over  commercial  telephone  lines. 

Block  three,  by  late  1992,  will  add  the  ability  to  interface 
with  other  systems  of  the  Army  Tactical  Command  and  Con- 
trol System  and  will  include  new  hardware  and  software 
from  the  Army’s  Common  Hardware  and  Software  Project. 
In  addition,  enhanced  Maneuver  Control  System  software, 
which  is  more  user  friendly,  will  be  added.  Also,  the  “mil 
spec”  Tactical  Computer  Terminal  and  the  Analyst’s  Con- 
sole and  Tactical  Computer  Processor  hardware  will  be 
replaced. 

Block  four  will  provide  software  enhancements  and  more 
capabilities  and  will  add  additional  common  hardware 
devices  such  as  the  Lightweight  Computer  Unit  and  the 
Handheld  Transportable  Unit. 


‘You  Get  What  You  Pay  For’ 

After  speaking  at  the  25th  annual  DOD  Cost  Analysis  Sym- 
posium, Stephen  K.  Conver,  the  Army  Acquisition  Executive, 
was  approached  by  a British  gentleman  who  gave  him  a 
quote  he  had  handwritten  on  a scrap  of  paper.  Mr.  Conver 
agreed  that  his  message  could  not  have  been  stated  more  elo- 
quently, and  he  asked  the  Bulletin  to  share  the  quote  with 
you: 

“It’s  unwise  to  pay  too  much, 
but  it’s  worse  to  pay  too  little. 

When  you  pay  too  much, 

you  lose  a little  money— that  is  all. 

When  you  pay  too  little, 
you  sometimes  lose  everything 
because  the  thing  you  bought 
was  incapable  of  doing  the  thing 
it  was  bought  to  do. 

The  common  law  of  business  balance 
prohibits  paying  a little  and 
getting  a lot— it  can’t  be  done. 

If  you  deal  with  the  lowest  bidder, 
it’s  well  to  add  something  for  the 
risk  you  run,  and  if  you  do  that, 
you  will  have  enough  to  pay  for 
something  better.” 

John  Ruskin 
1819-1900 


November-December  1991 


Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin  45 


LETTERS 


Dear  Sir: 

I have  been  a reader  of  the  Bulletin  and  its  predecessor 
ever  since  I was  Deputy  for  Laboratories  to  the  CGs  of  AMC 
from  1968  to  1976.  The  publication  has  been  a useful  tie 
to  the  continuing  R&D  developments  in  the  Army,  and  has 
allowed  me  to  follow  developments  which  I helped  initiate. 

However,  in  my  opinion  you  have  missed  the  mark  in  your 
stated  attempt  in  the  July/August  edition  to  review  50  years 
of  Army  R&D.  You  failed  to  identify  the  significant  contribu- 
tions of  early  Army  scientists  such  as  Harry  Diamond  and 
the  proximity  fuze,  Henry  Kalmus  the  second  greatest  pa- 
tent holder  in  U.S.  Government  history  and  inventor  of  the 
Kalmus  filter,  Ray  Bowles  and  fluidities  plus  the  founder  of 
the  Ballistics  Research  Lab  to  name  just  a few.  You  have 
overlooked  the  fact  that  the  Army  R&D  accomplishments 
are  anchored  in  individual  commitment  and  genius,  not  a 
faceless  organization. 

This  failure  to  recognize  that  talent  and  continuity  are  key 
factors  leading  to  R&D  success  is  exemplified  in  your  two 
articles  in  the  July /August  issue  depicting  the  Missile  Com- 
mand. In  developing  the  article  around  MG  Chen,  the  cur- 
rent CG,  and  a selection  of  recently  fielded  weapons,  you 
have  totally  ignored  the  work  of  the  laboratory  and  its  key 
role  in  proving  the  feasibility  and  in  developing  these 
weapons  systems  carried  out  over  the  last  two  decades.  I 
do  not  mean  to  take  away  from  General  Chen,  who  has  a 
proven  technical  background  based  on  his  successful  educa- 
tion at  the  University  of  Michigan.  I received  similar  degrees 
there  47  years  ago.  However,  the  developments  of  the 
systems  cited  were  due  to  the  vision  and  talents  of  the  Missile 
lab  during  the  time  Dr.  John  McDaniel  was  technical  direc- 
tor. As  a matter  of  fact  “Big ” John  and  I decided  to  initiate 
the  MLRS  proof  of  feasibility  while  flying  to  Huntsville  in 
a U-21  in  1973  The  system  was  to  be  as  a low  cost,  accurate, 
proliferation  answer  to  the  Russian  Organ  Pipe.  We  started 
with  money  which  became  available  when  the  OSD  forced 
us  to  stop  work  on  directed  energy  weapon  research  due 
to  the  Navy  out  politicking  the  Army.  Although  very  suc- 
cessful, the  MLRS,  as  often  happens,  grew  in  complexity  and 
cost  from  our  initial  concept. 

In  another  interesting  bit  of  the  history  of  technology,  in 
the  early  ’70s,  I brought  together  Dr.  McDaniel  and 
Optelcom,  a new  fledgling  company  doing  research  in  fiber 
optics,  to  explore  the  use  of  fiber  optics  for  data  transmis- 
sion and  vehicle  control  of  RPVs  and  missiles.  This  work  was 
a key  ingredient  to  the  development  of  the  FOGM  feasibili- 
ty which  was  proven  and  a workable  missile  system 
developed  under  the  leadership  of  Dr.  McCorkle,  the  pres- 
ent Laboratory  Technical  Director.  Optelcom  is  still  work- 
ing with  the  missile  laboratory.  The  command  leadership 
you  cite  had  nothing  to  do  with  these  key  developments  of 
enhanced  Army  fighting  capability  because  they  weren’t  on 
the  scene  at  the  time. 

Similarly,  you  omitted  a large  amount  of  key  pertinent 
laboratory  technical  recognition  in  the  article  describing  the 
new  Air  Defense  PEO  and  his  program  responsibilities, 
which  should  be  included  in  an  R&D  bulletin.  All  the  systems 
cited  are  based  on  past  laboratory  developments. 


I would  have  thought  that  you  might  have  mentioned 
some  of  the  outstanding  helicopter  research  carried  out  by 
the  Army  Aviation  Labs  which  are  collocated  with  NASA. 
The  research  on  large  lift  blade  technology  carried  out  by 
the  Ames  lab  in  the  full  scale  wind  tunnel  led  to  the  XV-15 
and  the  current  V-22  program.  The  concept  was  the  brain- 
child of  the  lab  director  in  the  early  70’s. 

Also,  from  the  historical  and  scientific  contribution 
perspective,  I was  surprised  you  omitted  mention  of  Dr.  John 
Weiss,  Director  of  the  Human  Engineering  Lab  for  the  last 
34  years  and  Dr.  Ben  Harris  who  spent  his  career  from  WW 
II  to  his  retirement,  as  Technical  Director  of  the  Chemical 
Lab  in  the  early  1980 ’s  working  to  enhance  the  Army  posi- 
tion in  all  aspects  of  Chemical  Warfare. 

I would  like  to  see  the  bulletin  try  and  concentrate  more 
fully  on  spreading  the  work  concerning  the  R&D  activities 
and  accomplishments  of  interest  to  the  R&D  community. 
With  help  from  the  numerous  retired  former  leaders  of  Ar- 
my R&D  still  available,  you  should  be  able  to  develop  an 
outstanding  issue  on  the  great  technical  contributions  of  the 
Army  technical  community  over  its  past  lifetime. 

Sincerely  yours, 

Dr.  R.  B.  Dillaway 


Army  RD&A  Bulletin  Responds: 

Thank  you  for  your  insightful  letter  regarding  these  three 
articles  in  our  July-August  issue.  We  are  sorry  you  feel  we 
“missed  the  mark”  with  these  articles  but  would  like  to  offer 
a few  words  of  explanation  which  may  clarify  our  intent  in 
publishing  them:  The  article  on  50  years  of  Army  R&D 
achievement  is  a condensation  of  a new  book  distributed 
by  the  Office  of  the  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Army 
for  Research  and  Technology.  The  intent,  as  stated  by  the 
author,  was  to  provide  an  overview  of  some  key  techno- 
logical achievements  based  on  their  relevance  to  military 
needs,  and  their  contributions  to  society  as  a whole.  These 
achievements,  unquestionably,  would  not  have  been  possi- 
ble without  the  dedicated  efforts  of  people — the  backbone 
of  any  successful  endeavor.  In  this  case,  the  people  are  Army 
scientists  and  engineers.  Failure  to  pay  tribute  to  them  should 
in  no  way  be  construed  as  an  attempt  to  downgrade  their 
importance. 

The  intent  of  the  articles  on  the  Army  Missile  Command 
and  the  PEO  for  Air  Defense  was  to  familiarize  our  readers 
with  key  RD&A  organizations  and  leaders.  Unfortunately, 
space  limitations  of  this  continuing  series  preclude  detail- 
ed discussions  of  past  laboratory  developments  and  leaders. 
Again,  this  should  not  be  interpreted  as  an  attempt  to 
denigrate  their  importance. 


46  Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin 


November-December  1991 


SPEAKING  OUT 


What  Suggestions  Do  You  Have 
for  Improving  Cooperative  R&D  Efforts 
Between  the  U.S.  and  Its  Allies? 


BG  Joseph  Raffianijr. 

Deputy  for  Program  Assessment 
for  International  Cooperation 
Office  of  the  Assistant  Secretary 
of  the  Army  (Research, 

Development  and  Acquisition) 

Cooperative  R&D  efforts,  by  their  very 
nature,  are  difficult  to  initiate,  formulate, 
and  execute.  The  key  is  obtaining  long 
term  support  from  Army,  OSD,  and  Con- 
gress. The  kind  of  support  required  transcends  budget  fluc- 
tuations and  personnel  turnover.  This  means  that  an  inter- 
national project  must  address  fundamental  military 
requirements  in  each  nation,  that  planning  begins  prior  to 
selecting  final  concepts  or  contractors,  and  that  the  project 
has  the  priority  to  be  funded  in  the  POM  and  compete 
favorably  for  future  funding.  Additionally,  the  project  has 
to  be  given  the  same  management  emphasis,  within  the  ac- 
cepted PEO/PM  structure,  as  domestic  programs.  Managing 
international  programs  “off-line”  simply  does  not  work. 

The  above  formula  does  not  guarantee  success  because 
these  factors,  plus  others,  will  be  debated  in  all  participating 
nations,  for  different  reasons  and  at  different  milestones.  To 
reduce  the  impact  of  these  debates  on  the  project  leads  one 
to  recognize  the  need  to  limit  the  number  of  participating 
nations  and,  accordingly,  the  number  of  contractors. 


LTC  David  W.  Andrews 
British  Liaison  Officer 
Headquarters,  Army  Materiel 

Command 

Allies  must  have  clear  visibility  of  each 
other’s  military  needs  and  how  our 
RD&A  programs  will  meet  these  needs. 

Windows  of  opportunity  will  appear 
when  two  or  more  nations  need  to 
replace  or  upgrade  systems  within  the 
same  timescale.  If  timescales  don’t  exactly  match,  that  will 
not  matter,  these  can  be  harmonized.  Whenever  possible, 
we  need  to  throw  across  a bridge  between  similar  projects. 
It  would  help  if  we  could  agree  on  a standard  RD&A  pat- 
tern. We  must  commit  full  and  proper  funding  up  front  in 
order  to  prevent  downstream  fiscal  ‘ ‘glitches.’  ’ We  must  also 
build  flexibility  into  our  programs  to  let  other  nations  “buy- 
in”  as  our  programs  develop  and  expand . Finally,  let  us  aim 
for  production  sharing  in  successful  RD&A  areas  because 
it  makes  military  expenditure  more  acceptable  when  it 
generates  jobs  at  home. 


Michael  F.  Fissette 
Assistant  Deputy  for  International 
Cooperative  Programs 
Headquarters,  Army  Materiel 
Command 

First,  we  must  have  recognition  and 
reinforcement  by  senior  DOD  and  Army 
leadership  regarding  the  essential  nature 
of  cooperative  R&D.  Coalition  warfare 
is  obviously  crucial,  but  this  takes 
interoperability  of  equipment,  especially  C3,  consumables 
and  spares.  Reduced  budgets  and  increasing  global  com- 
petitiveness in  dual  use  technologies  also  need  to  be 
recognized  as  factors  demanding  cooperation.  R&D 
cooperation  supports  strong  alliances  and  results  in  the  best 
equipment  for  our  soldier  with  financial  burdensharing 
reducing  our  costs. 

To  improve  cooperation,  however,  we  must  recognize  ex- 
isting technology  transfer  issues  and  must  deal  with  them 
early.  Additionally,  I believe  four  considerations  are  essen- 
tial to  a cooperative  strategy.  First,  we  must  apply  total  quali- 
ty management  concepts  to  streamline  existing  procedures. 
For  example,  current  mechanisms  for  staffing  loans  or 
Memoranda  of  Agreement,  are  too  stifling.  Second,  we  must 
start  cooperation  early  by  harmonizing  requirements  and 
developing  cooperative  ventures  in  the  technology  base. 
Third,  we  must  encourage  industry-to-industry  cooperation. 
Many  of  our  systems  are  developed  by  prime-subcontractor 
teams.  We  need  an  industry  constituency  and  they  need  to 
think  globally  and  work  with  government  in  a synergistic 
manner.  Finally,  we  need  to  understand  the  positive  results 
of  success  stories  rather  than  dwelling  on  a few  visible 
troubled  programs.  Successes  include  programs  like  the  NBC 
reconnaissance  vehicle  acquired  from  Germany  and  ex- 
cellent cooperation  in  chemical  detectors  and  alarms  with 
the  UK  and  Canada  and  also  with  France.  There  are  hun- 
dreds of  positive  exchanges  at  various  levels  with  our  allies 
and  we  must  continually  recognize  the  net  value  of  the 
various  international  programs. 


November-December  1991 


Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin  47 


SPEAKING  OUT 


LTC  Hans  Melcher 
German  Liaison  Officer 
Headquarters,  Army  Materiel 

Command 

You  can  hear  it  everywhere:  “With 
defense  budgets  shrinking,  allied  and 
friendly  nations  should  work  together 
and  cooperate  more  closely!”  But  past 
years  have  shown  the  difficulties  in 
conducting  international  projects  in 
practice.  What  is  it  that  stands  in  the  way  of  international 
cooperation,  and  who  are  the  cooperation  killers?  Well,  here 
are  a few  examples:  a misguided  strive  for  national 
technological  and  economic  independence;  outdated 
restrictions  in  technology  transfer;  politicians  and  decision- 
makers identifying  with  their  pork-barrel  interests;  pre- 
judices rooted  in  yesteryear’s  concerns;  and  a fear  that  one 
partner  might  profit  more  from  cooperation  than  the  other. 

So  how  can  international  cooperative  R&D  efforts  be  im- 
proved? Fight  the  cooperation  killers!  This  is  a never-ending 
task  for  generations  of  Armaments  Attaches  and  Liaison  Of- 
ficers. But  it  also  involves  the  tedious  process  of  educational 
efforts.  We  invite  and  encourage  the  U.S.  Army  to  participate 
more  actively  in  the  U.S.-German  Scientist  and  Engineer  Ex- 
change Program,  because  this  program  has  a long-range 
potential  for  improving  international  cooperative  efforts. 

In  the  current  German-U.S.  armaments  relationship,  we 
try  to  place  more  emphasis  on  cooperation  in  the  arena  of 
technologies,  and  the  harmonization  of  military  re- 
quirements, as  a basis  for  mutually  beneficial  R&D 
cooperation. 


Bryant  R.  Dunetz 
President,  Center  for  Industry 
Cooperation  and  Trade 
and  former  Assistant  Deputy  for 
International  Cooperation 
Headquarters,  Army  Materiel 
Command 

The  basic  principles  for  R&D 
cooperation  among  the  allies  have  not 
really  changed  in  spite  of  drastic  and 
unpredictable  world  changes  and  events  in  the  last  two  years. 
Standardization,  interoperability  and  conservation  of  scarce 
budgets  will  continue  to  be  the  main  drivers.  Desert  Storm 
produced  a compelling  list  of  high  priority  requirements  for 
cooperation. 

Unquestionably,  while  the  U.S.  technology  in  many  areas 
ranks  among  the  best  in  the  world,  it  by  no  means  is  the  on- 
ly good  technology.  Technology  cooperation  can  stimulate 
beneficial  competition  and  challenge  our  technologists  to 
develop  better  solutions.  For  example,  the  Europeans  have 
developed  many  technologically  advanced  solutions  in  the 
field  of  chemical  defense  and  CW  verification  technologies. 
The  U.S.  has  and  should  continue  to  benefit  from  these 
efforts. 

Improvements  will  be  realized  by:  maintaining  an  ag- 
gressive and  active  program  of  scientific  and  technical  ex- 
changes; monitoring  developments  in  the  foreign  civil 
sector,  particularly  technology  advances  in  the  European 
community  and  Japan;  and  keeping  the  Army  leadership  ap- 
prised of  these  developments  and  how  they  can  contribute 
to  force  requirements  of  the  future.  In  my  opinion,  there  are 
many  opportunities  for  R&D  cooperation.  Selecting  the  ones 
that  have  a good  chance  of  succeeding,  however,  is  a dif- 
ficult endeavor. 


CAREER  DEVELOPMENT  UPDATE 


Defense  Acquisition  Workforce 
Improvement  Act  (P.L.  101-510) 


This  is  the  second  installment  of  extracts  from  the 
new  legislation: 

“Subchapter  I — General  Authorities  and  Responsibilities 
Section  1705.  DIRECTORS  OF  ACQUISITION  CAREER 
MANAGEMENT  IN  THE  MILITARY  DEPARTMENTS  There 
shall  be  a Director  of  Acquisition  Career  Management  for 
each  military  department  within  the  office  of  the  service 
acquisition  executive  to  assist  the  executive  in  the  perform- 
ance of  his  duties  under  this  chapter.  The  Secretary  of  the 
Navy,  acting  through  the  service  acquisition  executive,  may 
appoint  separate  directors  for  the  Navy  and  the  Marine 
Corps.  Section  1706.  ACQUISITION  CAREER  PROGRAM 


BOARDS 

(a)  ESTABLISHMENT— The  Secretary  of  each  military 
department,  acting  through  the  service  acquisition  ex- 
ecutive, shall  establish  an  acquisition  career  program  board 
to  advise  the  service  acquisition  executive  in  managing  the 
accession,  training,  education,  and  career  development  of 
military  and  civilian  personnel  in  the  acquisition  workforce 
and  in  selecting  individuals  for  an  Acquisition  Corps  under 
section  1731  of  this  title. 

(b)  COMPOSITION  OF  BOARD. — Each  acquisition  career 
program  board  shall  include  the  Director  of  Acquisition 
Career  Management  (or  his  representative),  the  Assistant 


48  Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin 


November-December  1991 


CAREER  DEVELOPMENT  UPDATE 


Secretary  with  responsibility  for  manpower  (or  his  represen- 
tative), and  the  military  and  civilian  senior  officials  with 
responsibility  for  personnel  development  in  the  various  ac- 
quisition career  fields.  The  service  acquisition  executive  (or 
his  representative)  shall  be  the  head  of  the  board. 

(c)  SUBORDINATE  BOARDS.— The  Secretary  of  a military 
department  may  establish  a subordinate  board  structure  in 
the  department  to  which  functions  of  the  acquisition  career 
program  board  may  be  delegated. 

Subchapter  III — Acquisition  Corps  Section  1732.  SELEC- 
TION CRITERIA  AND  PROCEDURES. 

(a)  SELECTION  CRITERIA  AND  PROCEDURES — 
Selection  for  membership  in  an  Acquisition  Corps  shall  be 
made  in  accordance  with  criteria  and  procedures  establish- 
ed by  the  Secretary  of  Defense.  Such  criteria  and  procedures 
shall  be  in  effect  on  and  after  October  1,  1993- 

(b)  ELIGIBILITY  CRITERIA  — Except  as  provided  in 
subsections  (c)  and  (d),  only  persons  who  meet  all  of  the 
following  requirements  may  be  considered  for  service  in  the 
Corps: 

(1) (A)  In  the  case  of  an  employee,  the  person  must  be 
currently  serving  in  a position  within  grade  GS-13  or  above 
of  the  General  Schedule  (including  any  employee  covered 
by  chapter  34  of  title  5). 

(B)  In  the  case  of  a member  of  the  armed  forces,  the 
person  must  be  currently  serving  in  the  grade  of  major  or, 
in  the  case  of  the  Navy,  lieutenant  commander,  or  a higher 
grade. 

(C)  In  the  case  of  an  applicant  for  employment,  the 
person  must  have  experience  in  government  or  industry 
equivalent  to  the  experience  of  a person  in  a position 
described  in  subparagraph  (A)  or  (B),  as  validated  by  the  ap- 
propriate career  program  management  board. 

(2)  The  person  must  meet  the  educational  requirements 
prescribed  by  the  Secretary  of  Defense.  Such  requirements, 
at  a minimum,  shall  include  both  of  the  following: 

(A)  A requirement  that  the  person — 

(i)  has  received  a baccalaureate  degree  at  an  ac- 
credited educational  institution  authorized  to  grant  bac- 
calaureate degrees,  or 

(ii)  has  been  certified  by  the  acquisition  career  pro- 
gram board  of  the  employing  military  department  as  possess- 
ing significant  potential  for  advancement  to  levels  of  greater 
responsibility  and  authority,  based  on  demonstrated  ana- 
lytical and  decisionmaking  capabilities,  job  performance, 
and  qualifying  experience. 

(B)  A requirement  that  the  person  has  completed — 

(i)  at  least  24  semester  credit  hours  (or  the 
equivalent)  of  study  from  an  accredited  institution  of  higher 
education  from  among  the  following  disciplines:  accoun- 
ting, business  finance,  law,  contracts,  purchasing, 
economics,  industrial  management,  marketing,  quantitative 
methods,  and  organization  and  management,  or 

(ii)  at  least  24  semester  credit  hours  (or  the 
equivalent)  from  an  accredited  institution  of  higher  educa- 
tion in  the  person’s  career  field  and  12  semester  credit  hours 
(or  the  equivalent)  from  such  an  institution  from  among  the 
disciplines  listed  in  clause  (i). 


(3)  The  person  must  meet  experience  requirements 
prescribed  by  the  Secretary  of  Defense.  Such  requirements 
shall,  at  a minimum,  include  a requirement  for  at  least  four 
years  of  experience  in  an  acquisition  position  in  the  Depart- 
ment of  Defense  or  in  a comparable  position  in  industry  or 
government. 

(4)  The  person  must  meet  such  other  requirements  as 
the  Secretary  of  Defense  or  the  Secretary  of  the  military 
department  concerned  prescribes  by  regulation. 

(c)  EXCEPTIONS. — (1)  The  requirements  of  subsec- 
tions (b)  (2)  (A)  and  (b)  (2)  (B)  shall  not  apply  to  any  employee 
who,  on  October  1,  1991,  has  at  least  10  years  of  experience 
in  acquisition  positions  or  in  comparable  positions  in  other 
government  agencies  or  the  private  sector. 

(2)  The  requirements  of  subsections  (b)  (2)  (A)  and 
(b)  (2)  (B)  shall  not  apply  to  any  employee  who  is  serving 
in  an  acquisition  position  on  October  1,  1991,  and  who  does 
not  have  the  10  years  experience  as  described  in  paragraph 
(1)  if  the  employee  passes  an  examination  considered  by  the 
Secretary  of  Defense  to  demonstrate  skills,  knowledge,  or 
abilities  comparable  to  that  of  an  individual  who  has  com- 
pleted at  least  24  semester  credit  hours  (or  the  equivalent) 
of  study  from  an  accredited  institution  of  higher  education 
from  among  the  following  disciplines:  accounting,  business 
finance,  law,  contracts,  purchasing,  economics,  industrial 
management,  marketing,  quantitative  methods,  and 
organization  and  management.  The  Secretary  of  Defense 
shall  submit  examinations  to  be  given  to  civilian  employees 
under  this  paragraph  to  the  Director  of  the  Office  of  Per- 
sonnel Management  for  approval.  If  the  Director  does  not 
disapprove  an  examination  within  30  days  after  the  date  on 
which  the  Director  receives  the  examination,  the  examina- 
tion is  deemed  to  be  approved  by  the  Director. 

(d)  WAIVER. — (1)  Except  as  provided  in  paragraph  (2), 
the  acquisition  career  program  board  of  a military  depart- 
ment may  waive  any  or  all  of  the  requirements  of  subsec- 
tion (b)  with  respect  to  an  employee  of  that  military 
department  if  the  board  certifies  that  the  employee  possesses 
significant  potential  for  advancement  to  levels  of  greater 
responsibility  and  authority,  based  on  demonstrated 
analytical  and  decisionmaking  capabilities,  job  performance, 
and  qualifying  experience.  With  respect  to  each  waiver 
granted  under  this  subsection,  the  board  shall  set  forth  in 
a written  document  the  rationale  for  its  decision  to  waive 
such  requirements.  The  document  shall  be  submitted  to  and 
retained  by  the  Director  of  Acquisition  Education,  Training 
and  Career  Development. 

(2)  The  acquisition  career  program  board  of  a 
military  department  may  not  waive  the  requirements  of 
subsection  (b)  (2)  (A)  (ii). 

(e)  MOBILITY  STATEMENTS.— (1)  The  Secretary  of 
Defense  is  authorized  to  require  civilians  in  an  Acquisition 
Corps  to  sign  mobility  statements. 

(2)  The  Secretary  of  Defense  shall  identify  which 
categories  of  civilians  in  an  Acquisition  Corps,  as  a condi- 
tion of  serving  in  the  Corps,  shall  be  required  to  sign  mobility 
statements.  The  Secretary  shall  make  available  published  in- 
formation on  such  identification  of  categories.” 


November-December  1991 


Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin  49 


CAREER  DEVELOPMENT  UPDATE 


Training  with  Congress 

The  1991-92  Training  with  Congress  Fellowship  Program 
(sponsored  by  the  American  Defense  Preparedness  Associa- 
tion) is  underway.  Officers  selected  to  participate  in  this 
year’s  program  are:  LTC  Colleen  F.  Prasil,  FA  51;  LTC  Charles 
L.  Mudd,  FA  53;  and  LTC  Duwayne  W.  Jones,  FA  97. 

Army  Acquisition  Corps  officers  who  are  graduates  of  the 
Program  Management  Course  and  are  interested  in  par- 
ticipating in  next  year’s  program  should  contact  their  assign- 
ment officers  at  PERSCOM. 

Civilian  Graduate  Study  Program 

We  are  pleased  to  announce  the  panel  results  for  the  selec- 
tion of  civilians  for  the  Army  Acquisition  Corps  graduate 
study  program.  John  L.  Skrletts  and  Richard  J.  Snyder,  both 
of  the  Program  Executive  Office,  Communications  Systems, 
have  been  selected  to  attend  the  Executive  Master  of  Science 
in  Engineering  Program  at  the  University  of  Pennsylvania. 


Command  Eligibility 
for  AAC  Officers 

On  Oct.  11,  1991,  the  chief  of  staff,  Army  made  the  decision 
that  now  allows  Army  Acquisition  Corps  FA  51  and  97  officers 
to  compete  for  functional  area  Table  of  Distribution  and 
Allowances  commands  when  those  positions  are  determined 
to  be  acquisition  related  and  added  to  the  AAC  critical  position 
list. 

A listing  of  AAC  command  positions  associated  with  this  deci- 
sion will  be  published  in  the  next  issue  of  Army  RD&A 
Bulletin. 


BOOK  REVIEWS 


The  Impact  of  R&D 
Investment  on  Productivity— 
New  Evidence  Using 
Linked  R&D-LRD  Data 

By  Frank  R.  Lichtenberg  and  Donald  Siegel 
An  Article  Published  in  Economic  Inquiry,  Volume 
XXIX,  No.  2,  April  1991,  pages  203-229 

Reviewed  by  CPT  Tom  Gilbert,  an  Army  Acquisition  Corps 
officer  currently  attending  Oregon  State  University. 

This  research  article  illustrates  the  impact  of  technological 
change,  or  more  precisely,  the  effects  of  research  and 
development  (R&D)  on  the  U.S.  national  economy.  This  fac- 
tor is  important  as  it  relates  to  the  investment  business  sec- 
tors are  willing  to  place  in  future  production  capability.  This 
has  been  an  indicator  of  competitive  behavior  and  improv- 
ed performance  and  output. 

The  article  asserts  that  investment  in  R&D  has  a strong 
impact  on  the  overall  productivity  growth  of  business.  The 
authors  used  various  modeling  series  to  examine  the 
available  data  and  the  implications  of  R&D  to  productivity 
growth.  They  cited  the  diversification  of  business  as  the  most 
difficult  obstacle  to  quantify  the  analysis  of  available  data 
since  business  does  not  always  operate  in  one  specific  com- 
mercial segment. 

The  writers  explained  the  Longitudinal  Research  Database 
(LRD)  that  consolidates  the  measures  of  productivity  at  the 
business  level.  This  time  series  file  contains  a large  volume 
of  data  on  various  business  segments.  Through  the  LRD,  a 


measurement  of  business  productivity  has  been 
demonstrated  with  a correlation  between  increased  R&D 
investment  and  increased  productivity.  The  authors  cited 
a lack  of  good  quality  productivity  measurement  as  a leading 
factor  in  previous  models.  They  emphasized  the  need  to  use 
micro-level  studies  versus  the  aggregate  macro  studies  used 
on  industry-wide  comparisons.  They  were,  however,  cogni- 
zant of  the  limitations  of  the  micro  study  and  outlined  some 
of  the  predominant  factors. 

One  area  of  interest  was  the  revelation  that  federally- 
funded  R&D  programs,  and  these  include  the  military  R&D 
activities,  have  limited  measurable  impact  except  with  the 
productivity  of  the  small  industry  sector.  Measurement  of 
the  impact  of  federal  funds  may  be  difficult  due  to  the  nature 
of  the  investment  (non-industrial  related  research  and 
defense)  and  the  problem  of  measuring  the  related  industry 
benefits  to  that  research.  It  was  noted  that  federally-funded 
research  programs  appeared  to  have  little  effect  on  produc- 
tivity growth  (perhaps  through  inadequate  measurement 
criteria). 

The  researchers  did  point  out  that  it  is  apparent  that  R&D 
returns  on  investment  are  increasing  over  time.  The  size  of 
the  firm  engaging  in  R&D  was  a factor  in  the  rate  of  return. 
It  appeared  that  the  smaller  the  firm,  the  less  it  received  in 
return  on  R&D  investment.  The  rate  of  return  on  basic 
research  by  industry  was  noted  as  a strong  determinant  in 
productivity  increases. 

In  conclusion,  the  researchers  reaffirmed  that  there  was 
a distinct  relationship  of  R&D  to  positive  productivity 
growth.  Yet  it  remains  uncertain  to  what  degree  the  model 
underestimates  economic  growth  from  the  contribution  of 
federal  and  military  efforts  and  expense  on  research  and 
development. 


50  Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin 


November-December  1991 


BOOK  REVIEWS 


Assignment:  Pentagon— 

The  Insider’s  Guide 
to  the  Potomac 
Puzzle  Palace 

By  MG  Perry  M.  Smith,  USAF  (retired) 
Pergamon-Brassey’s:  1989 

Reviewed  by  John  Brand,  LABCOM  Survivability  Manage- 
ment Office 

This  little  book  is  not  just  an  engaging  and  entertaining 
essay  in  mere  survival  for  Pentagon-bound  military.  It  is  a 
delightful  mixture  of  coping  strategies  for  staff  people,  a win- 
dow into  anecdotal  history,  and  a discourse  on  ethics  and 
philosophy.  Although  the  advice  on  coping  professionally 
with  a Pentagon  staff  environment  and  its  stresses  is  intensely 
practical  and  situation  oriented,  it  is  applicable  to  any  staff 
assignment  in  any  headquarters — I suspect  it  would  do  for 
Xerox  or  IBM  as  well  as  DOD.  The  advice  is  also  applicable 
for  workers  in  research  and  development  or  test  and  evalua- 
tion. This  book  should  be  read  by  military  and  civilian 
defense  professionals — and  by  others. 

There  is  a wealth  of  advice  on  mundane  matters  such  as 
car  pooling  (not  least  to  limit  the  work  day),  finding  things 
in  “The  Building,”  house  hunting,  and  so  on.  These  alone 
would  justify  getting  and  reading  the  book.  But  more  im- 
portant, especially  to  anyone  who  works  with  other  human 
beings,  is  the  advice  on  being  a good  staff  officer.  That  ad- 
vice is  useful  to  all  military  and  civil  professionals. 

The  advice  is  simple  and  concrete,  as  a few  of  the  chapter 
headings  suggest:  The  Pentagon:  Realities  and  Myths 
(Chapter  2);  Rules  of  Thumb:  Helpful  Hints  on  How  to  Get 
Ready  to  Work,  Survive  and  Thrive  (Chapter  3);  Where  Were 
You  When  the  Page  Was  Blank? . . . the  Agony  and  the  Ecstasy 
of  the  Action  Officer  (Chapter  6);  Difficult  Bosses  (Chapter 
9);  Working  with  Defense  Contractors  (Chapter  15);  Some 
of  the  Fudge  Factory’s  Deficiencies  (Chapter  16);  Interview- 
ing (Chapter  18);  How  to  Give  and  Receive  Briefings  in  the 
Pentagon  (Chapter  19);  People  Who  Can  Help  You  (Chapter 
22);  Military  Ethics  in  the  Pentagon  (Chapter  25);  and  Future 
Shock:  Pentagon  Changes  Through  the  1990s  (Chapter  26). 

These  bits  of  advice  never  mince  words.  For  example,  in 
“Rules  of  Thumb”  we  are  told: 

“Learn  from  the  Bad  Folks.  The  good  people 
are  plentiful . . . However,  you  can  learn  more 
of  what  not  to  do  from  the  bad  people:  the  slick 
operators,  the  sycophants,  the  manipulators, 
those  who  play  fast  and  loose  with  the 
facts  . . . 

“ Learn  whom  to  trust  and  whom  not  to  trust 

‘ ‘ Maintain  your  integrity  In  the  jungle  of  the 
Washington  scene,  it  is  quite  easy  to  sell  your  soul 
incrementally  without  even  realizing  what  you 


are  doing. 

There  are  certainly  lots  of  temptations  to  cook 
the  numbers  . . . 

“ Beware  of  those  who  operate  outside  the 
system  . . . 

“ Watch  out  for  Loose  cannons  on  the  deck 

“Be  prepared  to  be  fired  ..." 

The  essence  of  a Service  staff,  and  perhaps  even  more  of 
a Joint  Staff,  is  teamwork.  Underlying  the  team  work, 
however,  is  the  advocacy  process  that  is  used  to  determine 
the  common  point  of  view.  This  dynamic  ebb  and  flow  of 
ideas,  with  defense  of  often  competing  points  of  view,  is 
often  misinterpreted  as  useless  pandemonium.  What  is 
overlooked  is  the  essential  noisiness  of  any  free  market, 
especially  one  of  ideas.  A static  appearance  may  be  mistaken 
for  perfection,  but  such  an  environment  cannot  adapt  to  a 
changing  world.  Of  course,  unless  the  market  place  of  ideas 
eventually  converges  to  a common  policy,  the  process  is  in- 
effectual, and  cannot  adapt  to  any  world.  Good  staff  work 
is  one  of  the  essences  of  the  general  staff — the  other  is  leader- 
ship, and  this  book  has  a lot  of  advice  about  both.  But 
without  ethics  neither  action  officer  nor  leader  can  func- 
tion, and  ethics  is  a theme  that  recurs  over  and  over 
throughout  this  book. 

Perhaps  the  most  fascinating  aspect  of  this  book,  one 
which  commends  it  to  the  attention  of  anti-militarists  in 
academia  or  citizens  interested  in  all  aspects  of  the  social 
environment  in  which  they  live,  is  the  window  into  the 
philosophy  of  an  intensely  ethical  and  honest  man.  Ill  wind 
notwithstanding,  and  contrary  to  some  sensationalist 
novelists  and  reporters,  the  people  who  end  up  in  The 
Building  are  drawn  from  society  rather  than  some  foreign 
planet — they  are  just  usually  brighter  and  harder  working 
than  the  average.  The  advice  that  is  given  is  based  on  how 
to  function  according  to  a code  of  conduct  based  on  honor, 
and  there  is  a large  segment  of  the  population  that  needs 
to  be  exposed  to  advice  to  working  people  based  on  com- 
mon and  tacit  acceptance  of  honor,  honesty  and  intelligent 
public  service.  The  philosophy  in  this  book  is  not  a sermon 
to  the  believing  or  propaganda  to  the  disbelieving;  it  is  a 
discourse  from  one  public  servant  to  another  based  on  and 
with  shared  acceptance  of  a philosophy  as  a working  tool. 
This  is  more  enlightening  to  the  cynical  or  the  misled  than 
all  the  press  releases  in  the  world. 

Perhaps  the  best  advice  on  ethics  is  summed  up  in  the 
chapter  on  “Military  Ethics  in  the  Pentagon:” 

“Military  services  must,  of  course,  understand 
the  bureaucratic  and  political  rules  of  the  game, 
but  they  can  still  live  within  the  framework  of 
high  institutional  and  personal  integrity.  If  stan- 
ding up  for  a principle  costs  you  a promotion, 
a great  new  job , or  forced  retirement,  so  be  it . ” 

(P-  230) 

It  is  worth  remembering  that  this  was  written  by  a man 
who  earned  the  rank  of  Major  General — and  that  in  spite 
of  having  once  been  fired  in  mid-career,  as  he  says,  from  a 
job  in  the  Pentagon. 


*u.s. 


November-December  1991 


Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin  51 


BOOK  REVIEWS 


The  Political  Economy 
of  Military 
Expenditure: 

An  Introduction 

By  Peter  Dunne 

An  Article  Published  in  The  Cambridge  Journal  of 
Economics,  Volume  14,  No.  4,  December  1990, 
pages  395-404 

Reviewed  by  CPT  Tom  Gilbert,  an  Army  Acquisition  Corps 
officer  attending  Oregon  State  University 

This  article  illustrates  a contemporary  view  of  the  impor- 
tance and  impact  of  military  expenditure  on  the  economies 
of  modern  industrialized  countries,  specifically  the  U.S.  and 
Britain.  The  paper  outlines  divergent  thoughts  on  the  ef- 
fect of  the  “peace  dividend”  on  a nation’s  economy. 

This  research  is  of  particular  relevance  since  the  U.S. 
military  is  entering  the  first  stage  of  a sizable  contraction  in 
force  levels,  weapons  procurement  and  total  gross  expen- 
ditures. Since  the  U.S.  military  will  enter  the  new  century 
at  its  smallest  size  (in  both  manpower  and  percent  of  GNP) 
since  before  the  Korean  War,  this  article  provides  a unique 
perspective  on  the  anticipated  impact  on  the  economy. 

The  article  acknowledges  that  military  expenditure  has 
significant  impact  on  the  economy  for  the  employment  it 
provides  through  direct  or  indirect  means  and  the  trade  it 
permits.  The  largest  problem  in  adequately  measuring  the 


cost  effectiveness  of  that  expenditure  has  been  the  inabili- 
ty to  measure  the  force  capability  of  the  military  as  a quan- 
tifiable and  finite  figure. 

Three  approaches  to  examining  the  military’s  role  in  the 
economy  were  discussed.  They  were  the  neoclassical, 
liberal,  and  Marxist  economic  approaches.  A corollary  ef- 
fect of  military  expenditure,  called  underconsumption,  is 
that  using  the  military  as  an  outlet  permits  the  “absorption 
of  surplus”  without  the  increase  in  payroll  to  maintain  con- 
tribution levels. 

Macro-economic  effects  of  military  spending  appear  to 
adversely  impact  the  ability  of  the  nation  in  the  area  of  con- 
sumption expenditure.  The  cost  of  the  military  reduces 
capital  that  could  have  been  used  by  the  public  and  private 
sectors  of  the  economy.  A side  effect  of  military  action,  ac- 
cording to  the  author,  is  that  so  long  as  the  conflict  does 
not  directly  impact  the  nation,  war  is  basically  good  for  the 
stock  markets. 

The  industrial  effects  of  the  military,  specifically  with  pro- 
curement, illustrates  the  potential  to  use  this  sector  as  a 
means  of  achieving  artificial  employment  levels.  An  exam- 
ple of  this  in  the  U.S.  is  that  as  the  military  draws  down,  we 
are  seeing  the  parochial  side  of  the  elected  officials  as  they 
scramble  to  save  their  own  district’s  military  complex. 

Overall,  the  economic  effects  of  military  reductions  are 
difficult  to  quantify.  It  is  the  considered  opinion  of  the 
author  and  his  colleagues  that  the  downsizing  of  the  military 
is  anticipated  to  be  good  for  the  economy.  This  will  permit 
the  economy  as  a whole  to  seize  new  economic  oppor- 
tunities. 


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52  Army  Research,  Development  & Acquisition  Bulletin 


November-December  1991 


FROM  THE 
ARMY  ACQUISITION 
EXECUTIVE.  . . 


Today  the  Army  acquisition  community  faces  a major  challenge: 
to  develop,  produce,  and  field  superior  equipment  for  our  soldiers 
with  the  smallest  budgets  in  a decade.  The  Army  must  deal  with 
this  reality  as  we  modernize.  Success  in  future  conflicts  depends 
on  accomplishing  more  with  less  and  reinforces  the  arguments  for 
more  effective  contracting. 

The  essential  steps  in  system  contracting  are:  (1)  requirement 
statement;  (2)  source  selection;  (3)  development  contracting;  (4) 
contract  management;  and,  (5)productionaward.  Wemustplan 
for  and  carefully  manage  each  of  these  steps.  I suggest  the  follow- 
ing be  considered  as  we  move  into  this  era  of  budget  constrained 
modernization: 

1 . Balanced  requirements.  We  are  often  accused  of  “gold- 
plating”  weapon  systems.  With  decreasing  budgets,  streamlined, 
realistic  requirements  are  more  critical  than  ever.  We  need  to  be 
sure  that  we  do  not  ask  for  more  than  the  technology  can  deliver, 
for  earlier  delivery  than  can  be  achieved  with  moderate  risk,  or  for 
capabilities  that  are  more  than  we  can  afford.  Our  requests  for  data 
need  to  be  tailored  to  specific  programs.  Although  considerations 
for  follow-on  competition  often  require  that  we  obtain  technical 
data  packages,  we  should  examine  the  program's  future  and 
realistically  determine  the  benefits  versus  the  costs  of  these  data. 

2 . Best  value  source  selections.  The  source  selection  process 
reduces  the  field  of  competitors  to  that  offeror  who  can  best 
deliver  the  required  product  within  the  proposed  cost  and  con- 
tract schedule.  To  assure  the  selection  of  that  offeror,  our  solicita- 
tions must  emphasize: 

(a)  Realistic  proposals.  Award  to  a contractor  with  unrealistic 
costs  will  lead  to  either  cost  and  schedule  overruns  or  unsatisfac- 
tory performance  or  both,  possibly  concluding  with  a major 
restructuring  or  contract  termination . Our  aim  is  ‘ ‘best  value,  ’ ’ in- 
cluding equitable  distribution  of  risks — not  to  secure  the  lowest 
estimated  award  price.  It  is  essential  that  each  contractor’s  pro- 
posal be  measured  against  a government  cost  estimate  (GCE) 
tailored  to  his  proposed  approach . I encourage  Source  Selection 
Authorities  to  instruct  their  Source  Selection  Evaluation  Board 
Chairmen  to  assess  the  realism  of  each  cost/price  proposal  using 
a GCE  based  on  that  contractor's  technical  and  management  ap- 
proach. 

(b)  Program  affordability.  We  must  employ  the  technique  of 
Design  to  Cost  (DTC)  to  balance  the  importance  of  development, 
production,  and  operating  and  support  costs.  DTC  serves  as  a 
yardstick  and  works  to  encourage  that  systems  are  developed 
within  the  original  cost,  performance  and  time  frameworks. 

(c)  Past  performance.  A contractor’s  applicable  track  record 
of  technical,  cost  and  management  performance  should  be  con- 
sidered during  evaluation.  Evaluators  should  thoroughly  examine 
a contractor’s  performance  on  similar  efforts.  We  must  be  tough 
but  fair  in  the  evaluation  of  past  performance.  Data  must  be  timely 
and  accurate.  We  should  fully  investigate  negative  reports  to  con- 
firm their  applicability  to  the  current  selection.  All  negative  data 
should  be  discussed  with  offerors  so  they  have  an  opportunity  to 
respond. 

(d)  Management  structure.  The  organizational  structure  cited 


in  the  management  proposal  should  indicate  how  the  contractor 
will  implement  his  technical  proposal.  Evaluators  should  carefully 
review  the  organizational  structure,  relationships  and  ar- 
rangements (such  as  joint  ventures,  teaming  proposals,  and  even 
significant  subcontract  agreements)  to  assure  accountability  and 
clear  responsibility  for  contract  performance  by  a defined  prime 
contractor  organizational  entity  and  specific  individuals.  In 
evaluating  these  arrangements,  take  into  account  government  risk 
associated  with  lack  of  accountability.  As  a general  proposition, 
we  should  use  joint  ventures  only  as  a last  resort  because  of  the 
divided  responsibilities  inherent  in  those  relationships. 

3.  Development  contracting.  In  Engineering  and  Manufac- 
turing Development  (EMD)  contracts  we  must  evaluate  the  entire 
cost  proposal  and  insist  on  fee  structures  that  represent  a true  pic- 
ture of  the  contractor’s  share  of  risk.  We  should  aggressively  seek 
a contract  type  that  incent  ivizes  contractors  to  hold  costs  within 
their  proposed  estimate  while  adhering  to  the  contract’s  technical 
requirements.  Incentive  fee  contracts  should  have  share  ratios 
which  provide  meaningful  rewards  for  cost  underruns  and  signifi- 
cant loss  of  fee  for  cost  overruns.  Myjune27,  1991  memo,  “Con- 
tracting for  Research  and  Development,”  covers  this  subject  in 
more  detail. 

4.  Contract  management.  Contract  management  is  a team  ef- 
fort involving  the  Administrative  Contracting  Officer,  the  Procur- 
ing Contracting  Officer,  as  well  as  the  PEO  and  PM.  The 
contractor’s  performance  must  be  carefully  monitored  to  provide 
early  detection  of  problems. 

Even  with  proper  safeguards  in  place,  major  problems  can  still 
arise.  When  a contract  is  hampered  with  serious  cost  over- 
runs/cost growth  and/or  unacceptable  schedule  delays,  the  Army 
must  consider  contract  termination.  Contracts  should  clearly  in- 
dicate those  conditions  which  would  prompt  the  Army  to  initiate 
a review  to  determine  if  the  effort  should  be  terminated. 

5.  Affordable  production.  Past  acquisition  strategies  have 
been  characterized  by  fixed  price  or  not-to-exceed  (NTE)  produc- 
tion options  in  competitively  awarded,  cost  type  EMD  contracts. 
These  option  requirements  often  fail  to  consider  a contractor’s  in- 
ability to  realistically  price  ill-defined  options  early  in  the  develop- 
ment program.  While  there  may  be  an  argument  for  locking-in 
production  prices  while  still  in  a competitive  phase,  we  should  not 
place  unwarranted  financial  risk  on  the  contractor — precisely 
what  we  are  avoiding  with  the  cost  reimbursable  EMD  contract. 

Instead  of  insisting  on  fixed  or  NTE  option  prices  prior  to  award , 
we  should  give  the  contractor  time  to  learn  more  about  the  system 
and  its  production  costs  by  delaying  negotiation  of  production  op- 
tions until  after  Critical  Design  Review . T o encourage  reasonable 
prices  in  production,  development  contracts  should  be  structured 
to  provide  significant  award  fees  to  contractors  who  meet  the 
original  DTC. 

We  must  develop  the  most  appropriate  approach  for  each  ac- 
quisition. Our  ability  to  accomplish  Army  modernization  objec- 
tives will  be  enhanced  with  streamlined  realistic  requirements, 
selection  of  the  best  value  contractor,  by  effectively  monitoring 
his  efforts  and  ensuring  affordable  production  systems  for  our 
troops.  I am  confident  that  the  general  approaches  described 
above  will  help  us  meet  this  challenge. 

Stephen  K.  Conver 


UNIVERSITY  OF  FLORIDA 


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